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1
from barbie to harry pot ter,   the Beatles to Beyoncé, Hollywood 
to Bollywood, and Viagra to life- saving AIDS medications, intellectual 
property now dominates our culture and rules our economy and welfare. 
Our children grow up in a world of copyrighted characters surrounded 
by trademarked goods. With the advent of the World Trade Organization 
and its legal obligations, intellectual property also increasingly aff ects 
people across the globe, from Brazil to Bangladesh. Yet the full cultural 
and economic consequences of intellectual property policies are often 
hidden. We focus instead on the fruits of innovation—more iPods, more 
bestsellers, more blockbuster drugs—without concern for what is being 
produced, by whom, and for whose benefi t.
But make no mistake: intellectual property laws have profound eff ects 
on human capabilities, what Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum defi ne 
as what people “are actually able to do and be.” 1 The most obvious example 
is law’s regulation of access to basic necessities, such as textbooks and es-
sential medicines. But the connections run deeper still. Intellectual prop-
erty incentivizes pharmaceutical companies to innovate drugs that sell—
hence we are fl ooded with cures for erectile dysfunction and baldness, but 
still have no cure for the diseases that affl  ict millions of the poor, from ma-
laria to tuberculosis, because these people are too poor to save their lives. 
Intellectual property laws aff ect our ability to think, learn, share, sing, 
introduction: culture and freedom
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dance, tell stories, joke, borrow ideas, inspire and be inspired, reply, cri-
tique, and pay homage. In short, intellectual property laws do much more 
than “incentivize innovation,” as the common perception goes. Intellec-
tual property bears fundamentally on the basic activities that make for a 
full and joyful life. Furthermore, in a global Knowledge Economy, intellec-
tual property distributes wealth and power and aff ects global justice.
Take the example of one Solomon Linda. A black migrant worker 
living in a squalid Johannesburg hostel in 1939, Linda composed a song 
based on his own childhood experiences protecting cattle from lions in 
the jungle. The song borrowed the syncopation of American jazz from 
across the Atlantic and mixed it with an a cappella melody to create what 
would become Africa’s fi rst recorded pop hit. Linda’s song soon crossed 
the Atlantic and was reborn, fi rst as “Wimoweh” and later as “The Lion 
Sleeps Tonight.” It would go on to be recorded over 170 times, eventually 
fi nding its way into Disney’s immensely popular fi lm and Broadway pro-
duction The Lion King. But while the song eventually produced millions 
of dollars for Disney and others, Linda died destitute, suff ering from a 
curable kidney disease at the age of fi fty- three. One of Linda’s children 
died of malnutrition and another died of AIDS.
Linda’s story illustrates how intellectual property laws have eff ects 
that extend well beyond incentives for creation. Law regulates recogni-
tion (or here, misrecognition) of the contributions of diverse people to 
our global culture, and distributes the material rewards of innovation. 
A misrecognition of Linda’s contribution led to his inability to pay for 
food and drugs that could have saved his and his children’s lives; con-
versely, recognizing Linda’s cultural contribution would have given him 
the agency to provide for himself and his family. Intellectual property 
governs the fl ow of free culture, allowing Solomon to remix American 
jazz with his own South African music, and yet also raises issues of fair 
culture. Solomon’s creation was left to the laws of the jungle, free to be 
exploited by Westerners with more knowledge and power. Finally, Linda’s 
song reveals the power of culture as a vehicle for mutual understanding, 
shared meaning, and sociability. “The Lion Sleeps Tonight” is praised as 
a song “the whole world knows.” 2
This book highlights the broad social and economic dimensions of 
innovation and cultural exchange in a global context of sharp inequalities 
in power and knowledge. I argue that law must facilitate the ability of all 
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citizens, rich or poor, brown or white, man or woman, straight or gay, to 
participate in making knowledge of our world and to benefi t materially 
from their cultural production. Democratic cultural production promotes 
not only economic development from market exchanges in a Knowledge 
Age, but also human development. Enhancing one’s capacity to participate 
in cultural production and critique engenders autonomy and equality, 
learning, critical thinking, sharing, sociability, and mutual recognition 
and understanding. This book is a call for intellectual property law and 
legal decision makers to expressly recognize and contend with the plural 
values at stake in cultural production and exchange.
from goods to a good life
In this book I will show that intellectual property laws shaped only by 
the narrow economic view that predominates today results in a crabbed 
understanding of culture and law’s role in promoting culture. Current law 
takes as its mandate the production of more cultural goods, from R2D2 
to iPads, to be exchanged in the global marketplace. To date, even the 
most trenchant critiques of the excesses of this law take this normative 
goal as given. The infl uential “public domain movement” led by scholars 
critiquing the exponential growth of intellectual property laws at the 
turn of the century focused their ire on the counterproductive eff ects 
of too much property on this ultimate goal—intellectual productivity. 
Too many property rights, they argued, will more likely stifl e innovation 
than promote it.
But copyright and patent laws do more than incentivize the creation of 
more goods. They fundamentally aff ect human capabilities and the ability 
to live a good life. As we will see, the impact of these laws goes far beyond 
gross domestic product. At the start of the twenty- fi rst century, the legal 
regime of intellectual property has insinuated itself more deeply into our 
lives and more deeply into the framework of international law than at any 
other period of time in history, aff ecting our ability to do a broad range 
of activities, including to create and contest culture and to produce and 
distribute life- saving drugs. Indeed, now that full compliance with the 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement 
is required in all but the world’s very least developed countries, intellectual 
property has become literally a question of life or death.
Intellectual property’s march into all corners of our lives and to the 
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most destitute corners of the world has paradoxically exposed the fragil-
ity of its economic foundations while amplifying its social and cultural 
eff ects. Global actors have responded to these eff ects. During the Doha 
Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations in 2001, the 
WTO declared that intellectual property, while important, should not 
stand in the way of “WTO members’ right to protect public health and, 
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.” 3 The World Intel-
lectual Property Organization (WIPO) responded to the dramatic social 
and economic eff ects of intellectual property on developing countries, 
in particular, by adopting in 2007 a “development agenda” that would 
reorient the organization’s policymaking from promoting effi  ciency to 
“development.” The WIPO pledged “to approach intellectual property 
enforcement in the context of broader societal interests and especially 
development- oriented concerns,” stating that intellectual property law 
and policy must be created and carried out in “a manner conducive to 
social and economic welfare.” 4
Despite these real- world changes, in the United States, intellectual 
property scholars insist on explaining this fi eld only through the narrow 
lens of a particular economic vision. Giving evidence to Amartya Sen’s 
observation that “[t]heories have lives of their own, quite defi antly of the 
phenomenal world that can be actually observed,” by and large, Ameri-
can legal scholars continue to understand intellectual property solely as 
a tool to solve an economic “public goods” problem: nonrivalrous and 
nonexcludable goods such as music and scientifi c knowledge will be too 
easy to copy and share—and thus there will not be an incentive to create 
them in the fi rst place—without a monopoly right in these creations for 
a limited period of time.5
But intellectual property today is more than simply a tool for incentiv-
izing creative production. Intellectual property laws bear considerably on 
central features of human fl ourishing, from the developing world’s access 
to food, textbooks, and essential medicines; to the ability of citizens every-
where to participate democratically in political and cultural discourse; to 
the capacity to earn a livelihood from one’s intellectual contributions to 
our global culture. This book calls for a deeper understanding of intel-
lectual property and its broader social, cultural, and economic eff ects, one 
that acknowledges that regulation of cultural production and exchange 
has a profound impact on human freedom.
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In the pages that follow, I argue that we must recognize culture not 
just as products, but as critical processes of creative and social interaction 
that promote our humanity. Cultural participation is an end in itself and 
cultural participation has intrinsic value. Singing, dancing, and shar-
ing stories together; utilizing our intellect to make new knowledge of 
the world—these are fundamentally what human freedom is for. At the 
same time, cultural participation is a critical means for fostering cultural 
change and exchange. Individuals take values, norms, images, and ideas 
from the world around them—near and far, past and present—and recast 
them to tell their own stories and remake culture. Yet a decade on into the 
twenty- fi rst century, much of the cultural forms that are familiar and dear 
to us are in private hands, wrapped up as intellectual property in the form 
of copyrights (in books, music, art, and fi lm), patents (in scientifi c inno-
vation), and trademarks (in commercial brands). The law of intellectual 
property—what it allows; what it prevents; who makes the decisions; and 
crucially, who pays or receives the money—thus is central to our ability 
to talk back to or talk through our culture. Cultural exchanges cultivate 
humanity in other important ways. Exchanging stories and knowledge 
with one another both confers recognition on diverse others and fosters 
mutual understanding.
Today we readily understand how ownership of property in land is 
central to our ability to control our own destinies; at the same time, we 
regulate property relations to refl ect the kinds of interactions we deem 
just. Modern property law “governs human interaction to ensure that 
people relate to each other with respect and dignity,” 6 for example, by im-
plying into every leasehold a warranty of habitability, prohibiting racially 
restrictive covenants, and guaranteeing equal access to places of public 
accommodation. As Joseph Singer reminds us, real property law both 
refl ects and shapes our free and democratic society.7
This book seeks to bring our attention to the increasingly important 
ways that intellectual property law frames a free and democratic society 
and just global social relations. As I will show, intellectual property laws 
that regulate the ability to produce, share, and enjoy culture are central 
to our ability to cultivate ourselves and our communities.
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three views of culture
“Culture” is a word on everybody’s lips in intellectual property scholar-
ship. James Boyle has spurred a “cultural environmentalism” movement 
to counter the privatization of our intellectual heritage. Larry Lessig has 
warned that legal code and computer code together are morphing our once 
“free culture” into a “permission culture.” Yochai Benkler has explored 
how commons- based methods of production “provide more opportunities 
for participating in the creation of culture.” And Jack Balkin has said that 
interpreters of the First Amendment and intellectual property ought to 
be concerned with “cultural democracy.” All of these scholars seek to pro-
tect our cultural commons and the processes of cultural innovation. Yet 
there is resistance in the academy to the elaboration of a cultural theory 
of intellectual property that would stand beside and help illuminate the 
dominant economic account of our law, and none of these theorists has 
off ered such an account. This book takes up that task.
Before elaborating, I should briefl y distinguish my view of culture 
from two common perceptions of culture: culture as tradition and culture 
as commodity. (I consider these distinctions in detail in Chapter 2.) For 
well over a century the dominant anthropological conception of culture 
was of static tradition handed down from above, rotely reproduced from 
generation to generation. Culture as tradition takes, in Michel Foucault’s 
words, “the spectator’s posture” toward the present—that of “the fl âneur, 
the idle . . . satisfi ed to . . . build up a storehouse of memories.” 8 But this 
view of culture has been rejected both positively and normatively by mod-
ern theorists from fi elds as wide- ranging as anthropology to philosophy.
The view of culture as commodity has particular resonance in intel-
lectual property law. On the one hand, mass culture has a democratizing 
eff ect, increasing access to cultural works by the public. At the same time, 
however, architectures of commodity culture, from technology to law, 
have enforced autocratic cultural authority. As told in Jürgen Habermas’s 
infl uential account The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 
culture by the end of the twentieth century was transformed into static 
commodities handed down to the masses with little if any opportunity to 
meaningfully engage with the imposed culture. During the late twentieth 
century, social theorists from Habermas to Foucault came to focus on the 
constraints of culture on human freedom.
In short, neither the tradition nor commodity views of culture, which 
201111 Pass 3 press.indd   6 2/10/12   2:23 PM
introduc tion 7
conceive culture as something that is given and passively consumed, are 
fully in tune with modern Enlightenment values, which emphasize inno-
vation as critical thinking and engagement, not mere passive enjoyment 
of goods handed down by others.
This book begins the project of developing a third theory of culture 
that would better refl ect and shape a free and democratic society and the 
demands of global justice. Anthropology, cultural studies, philosophy, 
and development economics off er rich views of culture and its eff ects on 
human freedom and development. Notably these views are infl uencing, 
and are being infl uenced by, transnational actors working on intellectual 
property issues, from multilateral agencies such as WIPO, the WTO, and 
the World Health Organization (WHO) to a civil society movement for 
“Access to Knowledge.” Yet they have not fully challenged the dominance 
of the single- minded economic account of this law at home in the United 
States.
The capabilities approach associated with Amartya Sen and Mar-
tha Nussbaum supplies the normative vision animating this book. I rely 
on both Nussbaum’s elaboration of a list of central human capabilities 
that law should promote, as well as Sen’s description of development as 
freedom, to elaborate the plural values at stake in modern intellectual 
property confl icts.
Today there is growing recognition that culture is a key component 
of human development. Surely this includes the production and just dis-
tribution of essential cultural goods, from medicines to biotechnology 
to educational materials, art, and literature. All of these are critical to 
enabling a fulfi lling life, bearing direct relation to what Nussbaum iden-
tifi es as “central human capabilities,” from the capability to live “a hu-
man life of normal length,” to “being able to use the senses, to imagine, 
think, and reason . . . in a ‘truly human’ way . . . cultivated by adequate 
education.” 9 In adapting Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to intellectual 
property law, I seek to elaborate the connections between the cultural 
sphere, intellectual property, and the expansion of human capabilities. 
Where traditional intellectual property scholarship focuses on knowledge 
products, a cultural approach takes a broader view of cultural freedom 
and equality as vital to promoting not only health and education, but also 
a whole host of central human capabilities, including:
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• Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with 
experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own choice 
(religious, literary, musical, and so forth)
• Supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be 
crucial in the development of emotions
• Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in 
critical ref lection about the planning of one’s life
• Being able to engage in various forms of social interaction
• Being able to laugh, play, and enjoy recreational activities
• Being able to hold property, and having property rights on an 
equal basis with others
• In work, being able to work as a human being exercising practical 
reason, and to enter into meaningful relationships of mutual 
recognition with other workers.10
Margaret Jane Radin brought theories of human fl ourishing to bear on 
real property law (including Nussbaum’s own theories), highlighting this 
law’s role in promoting personhood. Today, Nussbaum and Sen’s theory 
of human capabilities may usefully help us begin to reorient intellectual 
property law, as well.
In these pages, I suggest that culture is better understood by consid-
ering three central features: participation, livelihood, and shared meaning. 
This view of culture as a participatory community is more in line with the 
values of a free a democratic society and, as I shall argue, is the view of 
culture that modern intellectual property laws ought to promote.
Participation
What Foucault famously described as the “author- function” describes 
how power and knowledge are controlled by a select few. The juridical 
category of “author” serves to legitimate and insulate cultural authority 
from the proliferation of alternate meanings.11 But today this vision of 
cultural authority is yielding to a more dialogic process, in which ordinary 
individuals wield the power and claim the authority to produce knowledge 
of the world, from journalism to music, art, and science. This democra-
tization is taking place through a confl uence of innovations, from blogs 
to customer reviews; to YouTube, MySpace, and peer- to- peer fi le sharing; 
to open-source collaboration. Participatory culture democratizes cultural 
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meaning- making: cultural meaning derives less exclusively from tradi-
tional authorities and more from the people themselves. And as examples 
from Ethiopia to India to South Africa in the proceeding pages illustrate, 
participatory culture extends well beyond the United States. More and 
more, individuals and communities around the world seek to engage in 
global processes of meaning- making.
Of course, the rise of participatory culture does not mean that we 
should reorient law to promote it. There are certainly normative bene-
fi ts to stable cultural meaning and authority. Trademark law is built on 
this premise, reasoning that without stable meanings, marks would lose 
their ability to signal to consumers the source of the product. Copyright 
and patent, too, are premised on the notion that protecting authors and 
inventors produces better art and science. Indeed, in a recent book, The 
Cult of the Amateur, Andrew Keen suggests that by embracing cultural 
democracy we would be giving up on cultural quality.12
But while we have elaborated reasons for privileging stable cultural 
meanings, the case for cultural democracy—that is, dissent and change 
within culture—has been more elusive. This book begins to elaborate 
the benefi ts of democratic culture, a culture in which all people have 
the capacity to participate. I use the phrase working through culture to 
describe the myriad ways in which individuals exercise their human 
capabilities—from critical thinking to learning, sharing, playing, and 
engaging in meaningful work—within the cultural domain, and not just 
outside of it. The normative benefi ts of active engagement in rather than 
passive acceptance of culture are legion: from producing greater and more 
diverse cultural content, to fostering engaged democratic citizens, to pro-
moting learning through emulation and pretend play, to engendering 
mutual recognition and understanding among diverse peoples. In addi-
tion, participatory culture has signifi cant economic value, especially for 
marginalized communities historically left out of the processes of cultural 
production.
Livelihood
A twenty- fi rst- century theory of culture cannot ignore the important is-
sues of development and global justice. Culture plays a critical role in 
development, in particular in countries’ ability to meet the U.N. Millen-
nium Development Goals, which include the eradication of global poverty, 
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universal education, gender equality, child and maternal health, progress 
in fi ghting HIV/AIDS, and environmental sustainability.
To promote development as freedom, in Sen’s words, intellectual prop-
erty law should seek to enhance people’s capacity to participate in cul-
tural production and shared communities of meaning. Furthermore, we 
must recognize that cultural production is both an end and a means of 
development. Recognition of Australian aboriginal artists, African mu-
sicians, and Ethiopian farmers as producers of cultural meaning, for 
example, could potentially direct signifi cant revenues into these coun-
tries. As Sen has written, “cultural liberty is important not only in the 
cultural sphere, but in the successes and failures in social, political, and 
economic spheres. The diff erent dimensions of human life have strong 
interrelations.” 13 Here, working through culture has yet another meaning. 
In the Knowledge Age, cultural work is a promising means of economic 
development. Concerns about the commodifi cation of culture notwith-
standing, working through culture can off er an antidote to alienation by 
providing recognition and remuneration for meaningful work.
Shared Meaning
Finally, growth and diversifi cation in cultural production may promote 
mutual recognition and understanding across diverse cultures. As media 
scholars observe, the phenomenally popular new websites of the early part 
of this new century, from Facebook to YouTube to Flickr, are not necessar-
ily about high- quality content but “social connections.” 14 Shared meaning 
goes to the very heart of what makes culture tick; culture evokes commu-
nal responses to and aff ection for common musical and literary referents. 
The communal nature of the new Participation Age cannot be overstated. 
As President Obama stated in his Inaugural Address, today’s electronic 
networks not only “feed our commerce,” but also “bind us together.” 15
Put simply, a global culture in which all peoples have an opportunity 
to be creators is surely a means to economic development, but it is also 
much more. The cultural sphere of life encompasses those joys that make 
a human life truly worth living. As child psychologists observe, “When 
young children are free from illness, malnutrition, neglect, and abuse, 
they turn their considerable energies to play.” 16 This is the crux of Sen’s 
insight that economic development goals must go beyond raising GDP to 
ask what is required to ensure that people can live fulfi lling lives.
201111 Pass 3 press.indd   10 2/10/12   2:23 PM
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Cultural exchanges are not merely monetary transactions involving 
static goods. Individuals make cultural goods to share with others parts of 
themselves—their history, their music, their stories. Cultural activity pro-
motes self- development and mutual understanding, potentially realizing 
G. W. F. Hegel’s twin goals of “individual self- realization and reciprocal 
recognition.” Serious study of the processes of cultural production and 
exchange governed by modern intellectual property laws must recognize 
the special ways in which culture can promote mutual recognition and 
understanding. As John Dewey eloquently put it, “the art characteristic 
of a civilization is the means for entering sympathetically into the deep-
est elements in the experience of remote and foreign civilizations.” 17 By 
pointing out the common human characteristics that bind us all, culture 
promotes shared meaning not only among those who look and think alike, 
but also among far- fl ung peoples.
beyond efficiency
Intellectual property scholars today focus on a single goal: effi  ciency. But 
in this book, I elaborate the connections between cultural production and 
plural values, from freedom to equality, democracy, development, and 
mutual recognition and understanding. Freedom to participate in cultural 
life stands at the very core of liberty. As Salman Rushdie has stated, “Those 
who do not have power over the story that dominates their lives, power 
to retell it, rethink it, deconstruct it, joke about it, and change it as times 
change, truly are powerless, because they cannot think new thoughts.” 18 
Cultural liberty also has important implications for equality. The liberty to 
contest hegemonic discourses has particularly profound possibilities for 
women and other minorities who have not traditionally had power over 
the stories that dominate their lives. Drawing on the insights of Charles 
Taylor’s “politics of recognition,” I will show with various real- world ex-
amples how democratizing the capacity to make and contest culture can 
distribute power to shape meaning and enhance the capacity to contest 
hegemonic meanings—so long as copyright and trademark laws do not 
stand in the way.
Active engagement in the cultural sphere can also be a school for 
engendering the central traits of democratic citizenship, from critical 
thinking to creativity to sharing and sociability. I have already alluded to how 
democratic participation in making culture is linked to economic develop-
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ment; I will also consider how recognizing diverse others as authors and 
inventors promotes mutual recognition and mutual understanding.
the public domain
This book affi  rms the important observation of scholars of the public 
domain that creativity is a social and reiterative process. I elaborate on 
their descriptive claims for a robust public domain by developing further 
the normative importance of cultural participation. Cultural sharing pro-
motes our humanity.
At the same time, some public domain advocates may fi nd discom-
forting my calls to democratize who we recognize as authors and inven-
tors. In subsequent chapters, I argue that histories of colonialism and 
cultural and racial stereotypes have often led us to overlook the knowledge 
contributions of the poor. While I do not advocate for new sui generis 
intellectual property rights for indigenous peoples or the poor, I point 
out how poor people’s knowledge—even when qualifying as novel and 
nonobvious, or as original and fi xed—often gets freely appropriated by 
creators in the developed world because the works are presumed to be 
ancient or folk culture. I argue that a more democratic culture, that is, 
one in which more and more of the world’s people are engaged in cultural 
production and exchange, requires fi rst the simple recognition that each 
of us has a story to tell and knowledge to share.
the lady with a mouse
I write this book about culture and freedom at a moment of profound 
cultural change around the world. While culture has always been some-
thing invented rather than discovered, cultural reform until now has 
largely been the work of artists or an elite vanguard. Today the tools for 
authoring our own lives and creating our own communities are increas-
ingly coming into the ordinary person’s grasp, and on a truly global scale.
Immanuel Kant iterated his Enlightenment imperative “Sapere 
Aude!” (Think for oneself!)19 long before the emergence of the Internet 
and the tools of digital technology known as “Web 2.0” dramatically en-
hanced our ability to rip, mix, and contest our given culture from the 
bottom up. By and large, late into the twentieth century, Enlightenment, 
where it emerged at all, had come mostly to the political sphere. The 
cultural sphere, in contrast, remained largely in the control of traditional 
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authorities, from media moguls to religious mullahs, backed by the force 
of law, if not God. Indeed, while much of the world embraced democracy 
in the political realm, the cultural sphere grew less democratic. As told in 
Habermas’s foundational work The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere, culture by the end of the twentieth century was transformed into 
static commodities handed down to the masses with little if any oppor-
tunity to meaningfully engage with them.
But today we see signs that Enlightenment may fi nally go the next 
mile, as social movements and new technologies usher in critical modes 
of being within culture. The twenty- fi rst century has ushered in a Partici-
pation Age that is turning on their head our centuries- old conceptions of 
culture as tradition or as static, canned commodities. The convergence of 
social movements with digital technology and the Internet has enabled 
the rise of a democratic culture in which more and more people claim a 
right and ability to participate not just in the political sphere, but in the 
domains of culture as well. Individuals, traditionally the consumers of 
“take- it- or- leave it” culture, make “bespoke” culture—that is, a culture 
tailored for their own use. On the Internet, Netizens are a part of not 
only the Information Age—in which consumers passively receive culture 
protected by intellectual property—but also a Participation Age of remix 
culture, YouTube, MySpace, blogs, podcasts, wikis, and peer- to- peer fi le 
sharing.
This new generation views intellectual properties as the raw materi-
als for its own creative acts, blurring the lines that have long separated 
producers from consumers. Witness a disc jockey named “Dangermouse” 
who mashes up the Beatles’ White Album and hip- hop artist Jay- Z’s Black 
Album to create the award- winning Grey Album. Witness girl fans of Harry 
Potter who post stories at www.fanfi ction.net to retell life at Hogwarts 
from Hermione’s perspective. Witness Nintendo’s Wii game console, 
which allows players to personalize their “Mii” avatars—from gender and 
skin color down to the shape of their eyes—before setting off  on their ad-
ventures. The enhanced ability to write oneself into the traditional script 
off ers a powerful new take on Legos and action fi gures. Our children now 
have the virtual building blocks to render cultural universes their own.
Indeed, the whimsical painting Lady with a Mouse may serve as a 
useful allegory for modern culture. Rendered by the Indian artist Mo-
han Sivanand, it depicts a slender Indian woman sitting at a computer. 
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While the image of an “Indian woman” has typically been used in art as 
a standard-bearer of tradition, the presence of the computer in the image 
reminds us that the rise of YouTube, MySpace, and a read- write culture 
forces a reconsideration of such old notions. The “lady” in the painting 
is no passive receptacle of tradition. Far from it, in this context, with 
technology as a leitmotif of modernity, she is poised with the power to 
make culture herself. Is she writing a blog? Posting a video to YouTube? 
Connecting with a virtual community on Facebook? The Lady with a 
Mouse reminds us that culture is made, not inherited. We are moving 
away from culture as Mickey Mouse—the immutable, prefab product of 
a corporation—to culture empowered by a computer mouse.
reductionism, factionalism, narcissism
Talk of inventing oneself, if taken literally, can surely give pause. As Zadie 
Smith warns: “When a human being becomes a set of data on a website 
like Facebook, he or she is reduced. Everything shrinks. Individual char-
acter. Friendships. Language. Sensibility.” 20 The fear is that “inventing 
ourselves” may indeed produce a society of products, but not people.
Others such as Cass Sunstein lament that the Internet is leading to com-
munities that are highly factionalized and off er little exposure to opposing 
viewpoints.21 In a related point, Andrew Keen argues that the world of par-
ticipatory culture on YouTube and Facebook is atomistic and narcissistic.22
These are important concerns, and I agree we must protect against 
reductionism, factionalism, and narcissism. At the same time, I am em-
boldened by examples as far- fl ung as open- source collaboration, fan fi c-
tion, and YouTube, which show us that what we are witnessing is often 
not a rejection of culture and community by individuals sloughing off  
their communal skins, but rather the emergence of autonomous and demo-
cratic participation within communities of shared meaning. Despite their 
affi  liation and shared norms, robust debate within cultural communities 
remains, especially on the Internet, where, as the media critic of the New 
York Times observes, “the only authentic response to a YouTube video is 
another YouTube video.” 23 Shared meaning does not imply obedient ac-
ceptance of cultural traditions. Much of the cultural creativity on YouTube 
and the Internet I will describe reveals individuals not as subjects but 
as citizens, taking up their responsibility to participate and engage in 
reasoned argument and critique within cultural domains.
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intellectual property as a tool,  not a right
Let me clarify that in my view, intellectual property remains a tool, not a 
right. Mine is a complex consequentialist approach that seeks to expand 
the purpose of this law beyond incentives and effi  ciency to promoting 
the broad range of values we hold dear in the twenty- fi rst century. As 
mentioned earlier, my book dovetails with the broad contemporary move-
Lady with a Mouse—painting by Mohan Sivanand, photograph by Sam Sellers. 
(Courtesy of Mohan Sivanand)
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ment in international intellectual property circles to reconsider this law 
as a tool for promoting human development and not GDP or effi  ciency 
alone. But my goals are also fundamentally connected to our own do-
mestic law. If the goal of American utilitarian intellectual property law 
is to promote culture, we must pay heed to what vision of culture we are 
promoting.
An important question arises: if intellectual property remains a tool, 
is it too blunt a tool to promote the broad canvas of values we place under 
the rubric of human development? Henry Smith’s persuasive query to 
scholars advocating a social relations approach to property law applies 
well in the intellectual property context, too. Perhaps, as Smith suggests, 
“talking about ultimate ends is more glamorous than asking the more 
engineering- like question of how to serve them.” 24 But to this I reply that 
the simple elegance of economic analysis has both masked problematic 
assumptions behind its numbers and failed to give clear empirical sup-
port for current laws—a point that, as I show in the next chapter, even 
the father of economic analysis of law, Richard Posner, concedes.
from ip to ip
“IP” is the well- recognized shorthand for an intellectual property law 
focused on the production of culture as stuff , whereas “iP” is a shorthand 
for a new vision of culture that recognizes culture as a community that 
individuals make together, if not brick by brick, then video by video. The 
interdisciplinary, pluralist vision of intellectual property developed herein 
prioritizes people and participation in creative global markets and recog-
nizes that intellectual property laws aff ect human capability, distributive 
justice, and global social relations. My reinterpretation of intellectual 
property applies to suburban American fan- fi ction authors and African 
coff ee farmers alike: all seek a greater capacity for accessing and crafting 
new knowledge of the world. In turn, these cultural capabilities structure 
our social relations, as new creators seek to access global markets to attain 
recognition for their creativity, share meaning with others, and ultimately 
to be fairly remunerated for their contributions to our global culture.
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toward a more comprehensive,  interdisciplinary 
approach
In Chapter 1, “Beyond Incentives,” I present the limits of the current 
incentives approach as a comprehensive theory of intellectual property. 
I show that the narrow economic account of intellectual property can 
neither fully explain nor guide resolution of some of the most troubling 
intellectual property confl icts of our day, from the rise of user- generated 
content on the Internet, to biopiracy, to the expansion of intellectual prop-
erty rights to the developing world. This chapter calls for a reorientation in 
intellectual property law and policy away from a singular focus on ex ante 
incentives to a consideration of law’s broad social and economic eff ects.
The next two chapters begin to theorize a cultural approach to intel-
lectual property that would stand beside and complement the current 
economic approach. Chapter 2, “Bespoke Culture,” compares two concep-
tions of culture, culture as tradition and culture as commodity, with a new 
vision of culture as participatory community emergent in the new millen-
nium. Liberal democratic theory has largely ignored the cultural sphere, 
privileging freedom and equality in the political sphere but allowing for 
fewer rights to contest or remake cultural norms and community. In this 
chapter I pull from interdisciplinary theory—from the cultural theory of 
Pierre Bourdieu, to the philosophy of Habermas and Foucault, to the art 
criticism of Dewey—to highlight the eff ect of freedom in the cultural 
sphere on society, politics, and the economy. Our vision of culture matters. 
Armed with a fuller understanding of the descriptive and prescriptive 
superiority of a participatory vision of culture, we may more profi tably 
critique and remake intellectual property law with careful attention to 
just what kind of culture this law ought to promote.
I turn to the links between cultural democracy and development in 
Chapter 3, “Fair Culture.” At the turn of the millennium, the Participa-
tion Age and the goal of poverty eradication have dovetailed. As a recent 
U.N. Human Development Report has noted, in a Knowledge Age in 
which wealth derives from cultural production and exchange in global 
markets, “cultural freedom is not just a human right, but also a key to 
development.” 25 The concept of fair culture yokes together meaning and 
livelihood. But in this chapter I consider the impediments to cultural 
participation by the poor, which range from unequal capacity and lack of 
capital to stereotypes and biases that lead to misrecognition and exploita-
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tion. This chapter considers strategies for stimulating cultural produc-
tion in the developing world, and for recognizing the ongoing innovation 
and authorship of those in the developing world, from coff ee farmers in 
Ethiopia to the auteurs of Bollywood fi lms.
Chapter 4, “Everyone’s a Superhero,” elaborates the connections 
among culture, freedom, and equality through a close study of fan- fi ction 
communities on the Internet. The stereotypes of popular culture insinu-
ate themselves deeply into our lives, coloring our views on occupations 
and roles. From stories featuring Hermione Granger as the lead heroine, 
to Harry Potter in Kolkata, to Star Trek same- sex romances, fan- created 
fi ction reimagines our cultural landscape, granting liberty and agency to 
those denied it in the popular mythology. Lacking the global distribution 
channels of traditional media, diverse authors now fi nd an alternative 
in the World Wide Web, which brings their work to the world. I argue 
that fan fi ction that challenges the hegemony of the original ought to 
be considered fair use where the writer is commenting on either the ab-
sence or negative portrayal of girls, women, or minorities in the original 
work. Alice Randall’s unauthorized parody of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone 
with the Wind—cheekily titled The Wind Done Gone—is a case in point. 
Randall’s book, which retells the story of the Civil War from the perspec-
tive of a black slave woman on Scarlett O’Hara’s plantation, seeks to upend 
the highly infl uential yet racist portrayals of blacks in Mitchell’s iconic 
work. Scholars raise three principal critiques to such unlicensed use: (1) 
Why not write your own story rather than borrowing another’s? (2) Even 
if you must borrow, why not license it? and (3) Won’t recoding popular 
icons destabilize culture? Relying on a cultural theory that prizes partici-
pation in, rather than separation from, culture as a response to cultural 
hegemony, I reply to these objections.
I turn from the local to the global in Chapter 5, asking, “Can Intellec-
tual Property Help the Poor?” Many have critiqued the rapid expansion of 
intellectual property rights into the developing world as impediments to 
development, and in Chapter 7 I explore the pernicious eff ects of strong 
intellectual property rights on access to life- saving medicines for the 
global poor. In this chapter, however, I ask whether intellectual property 
law must do more to recognize the innovations of the poor. While the 
poor are often presumed to be the bearers of “traditional knowledge” 
rather than the innovations that are the subject of modern patents and 
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trademarks, I argue that poor people’s knowledge is much more dynamic 
than the term traditional knowledge recognizes. I consider the impedi-
ments to our understanding poor people’s knowledge (a term I prefer to 
traditional knowledge) as creative work deserving of ex ante intellectual 
property rights, and argue that the poor wish to be seen as creators of 
their own destiny and to be treated fairly in world trade.
I turn from innovators to authors in Chapter 6, “Bollywood/Holly-
wood,” where I consider cultural exchanges involving fi lms between the 
East and West. Acknowledging that a free fl ow of culture is not always a 
fair fl ow of culture, I consider a recent spate of copyright suits by Holly-
wood against Bollywood that accuse the latter of ruthlessly copying movie 
themes and scenes from American fi lms. But claims of cultural appropria-
tion go far back, and travel in multiple directions. The revered American 
director Steven Spielberg has been accused of copying the idea for E.T.: 
The Extra- Terrestrial from legendary Indian fi lmmaker Satyajit Ray’s 1962 
script for The Alien. Disney’s The Lion King bears striking similarities to 
Osamu Tezuka’s Japanese anime series, Kimba the White Lion. Neither 
Ray nor Tezuka’s studio sued the American fi lmmakers, and this chapter 
is by no means an attempt to rekindle any particular legal case. Rather, 
I use these examples to consider copyright’s role in promoting cultural 
exchange, mutual recognition among global authors, and mutual under-
standing through the sharing of diverse cultural works.
The fi nal chapter, “An Issue of Life or Death,” reiterates that there 
is much more at stake in intellectual property law than the production 
of more technological gadgets or literary characters. Life itself hangs in 
the balance, and the example of AIDS patients in sub- Saharan Africa 
drives home the point that the simplistic incentives/access trope that 
dominates contemporary intellectual property analysis is an inadequate 
framework for addressing local and global intellectual property confl icts 
in the twenty- fi rst century. The problem of poor people’s access to medi-
cines is a prime example of the failure of the narrow incentives model, 
since patents provide little incentive for the production of medicines that 
would treat the poor. In this chapter, I propose that just as the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in State v. Shack declared that “property rights promote 
human values,” intellectual property rights should give way to the human 
values of freedom and equality as well. While this subject may seem 
distant from the topic of cultural participation addressed in earlier chap-
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ters, the connection between the ability to live a full and healthy life and 
cultural participation is far from tangential. Intellectual property rights 
and the freedoms they can promote are interrelated—patents govern the 
ability to live a healthy life, which in turn enables human beings to fully 
contribute to making our culture.
Today intellectual property law has grown and expanded to every 
corner of the earth. The law has come of age, but we will need a social 
enlightenment in intellectual property law similar to the one we wit-
nessed in real property law during the last century in order to recog-
nize the plural social, cultural, and economic eff ects of a legal regime 
that governs the global production, enjoyment, and exchange of culture. 
Intellectual property laws aff ect fundamental values, from freedom to 
effi  ciency, from democracy to development, from dignity to distributive 
justice. Our laws ought to promote these plural values, including but 
beyond effi  ciency alone.
If intellectual property is to serve humankind, we need to better 
understand the process of cultural creation. Economists point out that 
these processes may be impeded by too little or too much property. Social 
and cultural theory can illuminate how individuals and society grow and 
change through cultural exchanges. In sum, this is not just the domain 
of economists who study innovation; it has long been the domain of 
musicologists, anthropologists, sociologists, literary critics, philosophers, 
and others in the cultural study business. This book makes the case for 
broadening our methodological approaches to intellectual property to 
include perspectives from fi elds including but beyond economics, such 
as development economics, anthropology, cultural studies, and philoso-
phy. In the pages that follow, I elaborate how these fi elds can enrich 
our understanding of the deep connections between culture and human 
freedom.
While specifi c doctrinal reforms may follow from my critique, that 
is not my project here. In these pages I urge a broader vision of law’s ef-
fects on culture and freedom. But I believe that a radical revision of the 
law is not necessary to eff ectuate the plural values at stake in cultural 
production, for two reasons. First, intellectual property law has histori-
cally incorporated plural values—from fairness to free speech to the im-
portance of promoting diverse speakers and creators. But these plural 
values have increasingly been swallowed up by a single- minded law and 
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economic rhetoric focused on effi  ciency alone. In part, my project is to 
resurrect these plural values. Even so, my theory is also surely infl u-
enced by new normative visions of equality, development, and human 
capability—under standings that have not yet fully infl uenced intellectual 
property law.
In short, where traditional accounts of intellectual property under-
stand this law as a mere instrument to incentivize effi  cient production, 
this book maps a network of cultural, social, and technological regimes 
that are making and remaking intellectual property law in the new cen-
tury. Indeed, the New York Times writes that confl icts around intellectual 
property just may well be “the fi rst new social movement of the century.” 26 
Call it the ripping, mixing, and burning of law.
modern man invents himself
Born in India in the 1920s, my grandmother Sita was the youngest of fi ve 
sisters. All of her elder sisters married in their teens; none was educated 
beyond secondary school. But by the time my grandmother came of age, 
her father saw that her possibilities could be far greater. A visionary in 
his own right, my great- grandfather encouraged my grandmother to seek 
an education. Sita attended St. Mary’s College in Madras, where she was 
elected student body president and became a champion tennis player. 
Later, she was accepted to Banaras Hindu University, often called the 
“Harvard of India,” where she earned a master’s degree in physics. When 
her peers were willingly led into arranged marriages, Sita defi ed one of 
the most entrenched of Indian cultural traditions and married for love. 
Later in life, my grandmother, who would eventually become a professor 
of physics and mother of six, would quip: “In this dynamic world, one 
cannot be static.”
This is a book about intellectual property. But I do not share this 
story because my grandmother, a professor of physics, was an inventor 
of things—that is, the traditional subject of intellectual property. Rather, 
I share it because my grandmother was the inventor of her own life. To 
paraphrase Foucault, modern man invents himself.27 My grandmother 
was born two decades before Indian Independence, as ideas of freedom, 
democracy, and equality were taking root, challenging traditional culture 
and customs. While the masses may have believed that culture was com-
posed of fi xed traditions to be passed down, unchanged, from generation 
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to generation, reformers like my grandmother saw culture as something 
invented by individuals themselves. She saw diverse options within Indian 
culture and chose for herself the path she would take. In the modern 
parlance, she did not take culture as given, but “ripped and mixed” it to 
create something new.
Intellectual property is the law of innovation, both in science and in 
the arts. But it is not only about authoring books or inventing tools. Intel-
lectual property law is also about authoring our own lives and inventing 
our own communities. The capacity to critically engage “given” cultural 
norms lies at the heart of social change and freedom itself. This book 
functions both as critique and as foundation. It critiques the dominant 
modern understanding of intellectual property, a view that portrays in-
novation as a simple function of monetary reward, and specifi es the goal 
as the creation of more—more products, more movies, more books—in 
an eff ort to off er a foundation for a broader vision of intellectual property’s 
role in society. Intellectual property is the law not only of innovation, but 
also of culture, and its change and exchange. An intellectual property law 
befi tting this new participatory century, then, must lift its gaze beyond the 
narrow goal of incentivizing the creation of more intellectual products to 
facilitating critical and autonomous participation in the cultural sphere. 
Modernity is not simply technology. A modern intellectual property law 
must promote our capacity to author our own lives.
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more than a  quar ter -  century  ago,   property scholars inter-
rupted the hegemony of a law and economics discourse focused exclu-
sively on effi  ciency to introduce broader theories about property and so-
cial relations. As the New Jersey Supreme Court declared in 1971 in the 
historic case of State v. Shack, “[p]roperty rights serve human values.” 
Modern property law was to balance plural values beyond effi  ciency to 
consider personhood, health, dignity, liberty, equality, and distributive 
justice.
In contrast, at the start of the twenty- fi rst century intellectual property 
scholarship remains moored to a singular economic account. In the mod-
ern day, intellectual property is understood almost exclusively as being 
about incentives.1 Its theory is utilitarian, but with the maximand simply 
creative output: law’s goal is to promote the invention of more machines, 
from the Blackberry to the iPod, and more intellectual products, from 
Mickey Mouse to R2D2. Scholars and legislators struggle to calibrate 
the optimal length of copyright and patent terms to promote effi  cient in-
novation. Even critiques of the recent expansion of intellectual property 
law’s breadth, scope, and duration adopt the same language. Progressive 
law and economics scholars argue that too much intellectual property 
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We did not always understand copyrights, patents, trademarks, and 
trade secrets this way. Copyright law emerged out of the Enlightenment 
in England in the early eighteenth century, when the granting of limited 
rights to authors broke the perpetual monopoly in intellectual works 
held by printers, encouraging the creation of new works and their broad 
dissemination to a more democratically engaged public. Patent law has al-
ways sought to encourage access to knowledge, requiring owners to share 
knowledge of their inventions in exchange for limited monopoly rights, 
rather than protecting the knowledge as a trade secret. And trademark 
law originated in theories of unfair competition and consumer protec-
tion, not property law.
But over the last few decades law and economics scholars have re-
imagined intellectual property law, portraying it as solely an instrumental 
mechanism to incentivize creativity (copyright), invention (patents), and 
industry (trademarks). Because information is assumed by its nature to 
be nonrivalrous and nonexcludable, the concern is that free- riding will 
eliminate any incentive to produce information. The insertion of property 
rights, the theory goes, incentivizes the production of information, which 
will then inure to society’s benefi t through the market mechanism, with 
those willing and able to pay being permitted to consume the informa-
tion. Others might free ride, but only where high transaction costs would 
make marketplace exchanges unlikely. In short, market failure is cited as 
the raison d’être for intellectual property, explaining copyright, patent, 
and even trademark.
But intellectual property today is more than simply a tool for incenti-
vizing creative production in the form of more things, from Bratz dolls to 
PCs. Intellectual property laws bear considerably on the ability of human-
kind to fl ourish, aff ecting everything from the developing world’s access 
to food, textbooks, and essential medicines, to the ability of citizens every-
where to democratically participate in political and cultural discourse, to 
the equal opportunity to earn a livelihood from one’s intellectual contribu-
tions toward making a better world. Today, the legal regime of intellectual 
property has inserted itself more deeply into our lives and more deeply 
into the framework of international law.
Despite these real- world changes, intellectual property scholars con-
tinue to understand intellectual property solely as a tool to solve an eco-
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nomic “public goods” problem: nonrivalrous and nonexcludable goods 
such as music and scientifi c knowledge will be too easy to copy and 
share—thus wiping out any incentive to create them in the fi rst place—
unless a monopoly right in the ideas is provided for a limited period of 
time. The dominance of this singular, narrow economic discourse has 
rarely been challenged.
Yet in case after case today, we see that traditional law and economic 
analyses fail to capture fully the struggles at the heart of local and global in-
tellectual property law confl icts. In the handful of cases that follow—rang-
ing from high technology to low, from fi rst world to third—we will see that 
the proponents of that school have failed to persuade the U.S. Supreme 
Court, let alone activists in the developing world. Indeed perhaps one of 
the most remarkable facts about William Landes’s and Richard Posner’s 
seminal text The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, hailed as 
“the most important book ever written about intellectual property,” is that 
it fi nds that much of intellectual property law’s expansion at the end of the 
last century cannot be justifi ed by economic reasoning. They conclude devas-
tatingly that “no public- interest explanation for the evolution of intellec-
tual property law over this period seems plausible.” 2 Their book is as much 
of a wake- up call for reform of intellectual property law as it is a massive 
undertaking to rationalize this law within an economic framework.
But where Posner and Landes would correct the descriptive disconnect 
by mooring intellectual property law more fi rmly to economic analysis, 
I argue that a more multidimensional account of this law is necessary. 
Pundits declare that “[i]ntellectual property has come of age,” 3 but it is 
increasingly apparent that current intellectual property law is not mature 
enough to face the diverse and changing world in which we now live. 
I off er three critiques of the narrow intellectual- property- as- incentives 
understanding: (1) it fails descriptively as a comprehensive account of 
extant legal doctrine, (2) it fails prescriptively as the exclusive basis for 
deciding the important intellectual property confl icts of the day, and (3) 
it fails to capture fully the dynamics of cultural creation and circulation.
One prominent example of the disconnect between intellectual prop-
erty theory and practice is Eldred v. Ashcroft, the fi rst copyright case to 
go before the Supreme Court in the new century. At issue in Eldred was 
the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 
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1998, in which Congress extended the already lengthy copyright term by 
another twenty years. The fi rst copyright term established in 1790 lasted 
fourteen years from the time of publication, with the option to renew for 
another fourteen years. In contrast, with the 1998 extension, the copyright 
term was extended to last for the life of the author plus seventy years. Thus 
today copyright in a work will often last well over a century. Consumer 
rights advocates argued that the extension was unconstitutional, violat-
ing the U.S. Copyright Clause’s provision that copyrights last “for limited 
times,” and that the extension trampled on First Amendment rights to use 
cultural works in speech. But the Supreme Court approved the extension 
over these objections. Notably, the Court reached this conclusion despite 
the objections of illustrious economists, including fi ve Nobel laureates, 
who wrote as amici curiae that “[t]he term extension for existing works 
makes no signifi cant contribution to an author’s economic incentive to cre-
ate.” 4 The Court upheld the act nonetheless, citing fairness and cultural 
restoration explanations.
Economic analysis also did not fare well in the other recent, landmark 
copyright case to come before the Court, Metro- Goldwyn- Mayer Studios 
Inc. v. Grokster.5 In that case, the Court considered whether the makers 
of a peer- to- peer fi le- sharing software could be held secondarily liable for 
copyright infringement. Again, the Supreme Court refused an invitation 
to rewrite copyright law according to popular law and economic rationales. 
Consider the backdrop against which the Court decided the case: a brief 
of illustrious law professors and economists—including, in a rare mo-
ment of agreement, Nobel laureates Kenneth Arrow and Gary Becker—
urged a purely economic approach. In answering whether peer- to- peer 
fi le- sharing services such as Grokster should be secondarily liable for 
copyright infringement committed by users of its software, amici sought 
to make trial courts economic cost accountants, imposing liability on the 
basis of whether the intellectual property holder or the alleged second-
ary infringer is the cheaper enforcer of the intellectual property holder’s 
rights. Arrow and company urged that the Court adopt a test inquiring 
“whether the indirectly liable party at low cost could have discouraged 
the infringing uses, and whether the complaining copyright holder at 
low cost could have pursued the direct infringers rather than litigating 
on indirect liability theories.” 6
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But where the law and economics scholars argued in favor of impos-
ing liability on Grokster on the basis of effi  ciency, the Supreme Court 
chose to impose liability for what it saw as moral wrongdoing. Justice 
Souter’s opinion for a unanimous Court adopted the common law ap-
proach to fault- based liability, which turns not on cost- benefi t analysis 
but on the basic principle of fair business practices. The Court ultimately 
held that Grokster could be accountable because it had demonstrated a 
bad intent to encourage and profi t from illicit copying by users. The Court 
cited common law precedent, concluding that “[t]here is a defi nite ten-
dency to impose greater responsibility upon a defendant whose conduct 
was intended to do harm, or was morally wrong.” The Court adopted 
an inducement theory that ultimately premised liability on “purposeful, 
culpable expression and conduct.” Where an economic approach might 
predicate liability on least- cost avoiders or on the eff ects of infringement 
on creators’ incentives—but certainly not on the bad mind of the actors—
the Court focused on moral culpability.
A brief in favor of Grokster written by Harvard law professors would 
have simply reaffi  rmed the prevailing secondary liability approach ar-
ticulated in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. In Sony, 
the Court refused to impose secondary liability on the makers of the 
VCR, worried that liability would harm the incentives for innovation. That 
standard, the Harvard professors argued, “has proven to be an eff ective 
means of balancing the interests of copyright owners with the equally 
important need to preserve incentives for technological innovation.” 7 The 
Harvard brief pressed the Court to conclude that since Grokster’s technol-
ogy permitted “substantial non- infringing uses,” it should be immune 
from secondary liability.
But the Court declined to ground its ruling on either economic theory. 
It acknowledged the validity of both economic approaches, recognizing 
indirect liability as a practical option when direct enforcement is infeasible 
and recognizing the need to limit liability so as to not thwart future in-
novation. But the Court decided this momentous case on other grounds, 
invoking morality and fairness. To be sure, the Court in Grokster ignored 
many other cultural values at stake in the case. Lacking a language for 
recognizing participatory culture, for example, the Court failed to note 
the social benefi ts of peer- to- peer fi le- sharing technology, which allows 
201111 Pass 3 press.indd   27 2/10/12   2:23 PM
28 beyond incentives
individuals to share information widely without paying for server space 
or high bandwidth connections. But simply by embracing basic values of 
morality and fairness, the Court off ers an analysis that suggests that for 
all of its uniqueness, intellectual property law is also common law, teem-
ing with plural values including, but not limited to, incentives. Indeed, 
a recent article in the Harvard Law Review puts further into question 
the centrality of the incentives rationale in copyright law. In the article, 
Shyam Balganesh shows that despite copyright’s lip service to incentives, 
not a single doctrine in this law actually focuses on the way in which market 
incentives infl uence creators.8
The problem of overreaching rights is by no means limited to copy-
right. In the patent fi eld there has been uproar over the introduction 
of patents on methods for doing business in cyberspace—for example, 
Amazon.com’s infamous “One- Click” patent. For decades courts had been 
reluctant to recognize patents in “business methods” such as the use 
of grocery carts at supermarkets; the natural competitive advantage of 
introducing better business methods was considered enough incentive
—a patent, overkill. But in 1998 in the case of State Street Bank v. Sig-
nature Financial Group,9 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit clearly embraced such patents, opening the fl oodgates to business- 
method patents related to e- commerce in particular. These patents are 
controversial, because many fi nd it hard to justify a twenty- year exclusive 
monopoly as necessary to incentivize improvements in means for servic-
ing e- commerce consumers. Yet as recently as 2010 the Supreme Court 
affi  rmed the continued availability of business method patents in Bilski 
v. Kappos.10
Another important patent case of the twenty- fi rst century, eBay v. 
MercExchange, involved the question of whether injunctions should auto-
matically issue in the face of patent infringement.11 The main argument 
for automatic injunctions turned on the idea of “patent exceptionalism”; 
although injunctions are equitable remedies that generally require careful 
weighing of the equities, some argued that this familiar consideration 
was not required in patent cases. The Court in eBay rejected this notion, 
not merely on grounds of effi  ciency but rather, by acknowledging the 
need to take the basic value of fairness into consideration in patent cases. 
The Court affi  rmed that the equitable standards that apply elsewhere in 
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the law apply in patent law, too. In short, despite its preeminent position 
in legal scholarship, the narrow understanding of intellectual property as 
incentives is not, in fact, driving the most important legal decisions in 
the fi eld.
Meanwhile, rapid- fi re technological advances and new forms of cre-
ative output, from YouTube and MySpace to the advent of open- source 
collaborative networks, garage bands, remix culture, and the World Wide 
Web itself, undermine utilitarian intellectual property law’s very premise: 
that intellectual property rights are necessary to incentivize creation.12 
Indeed, there is a growing body of literature focused on explaining the 
existence of “IP without IP”—that is, intellectual production in the ab-
sence of intellectual property rights, from the innovation of French chefs 
to the creativity of stand-up comedians and fashion houses.13
There are normative concerns as well. The dominant law- and- 
economics approach in this fi eld would rely on the market to spur cre-
ation—but this leads to the appalling conclusion that drugs for baldness 
must be more important than drugs for malaria because the former enjoy 
a multi- billion- dollar market, while those who need the latter are too 
poor to off er much to save their own lives. Understanding intellectual 
property as incentive- to- create reduces to the claim that the ability to pay, 
as evidenced in the marketplace, should determine the production and 
distribution of knowledge and culture. A central feature of this account as 
it has taken hold in intellectual property law is its focus on the market as 
the vehicle for solving distributional problems. Willingness to pay deter-
mines access to the fruits of this information regime. After the property 
right is established, the government’s role is limited to protecting that 
property right, and to intervening only in cases of further market failures.
A central failure of intellectual property as incentives is its neglect of 
distribution. As I have argued, utility in the intellectual property context 
is defi ned simply as the maximization of creative output. The goal then 
becomes creating the greatest number of cultural artifacts to be trickled 
down to the greatest number of people. The utilitarian approach to intel-
lectual property does not ask: Who makes the goods? Who profi ts, and 
at whose expense? Is high- tech production up in India but without sig-
nifi cant benefi t to women or the poor? Martha Nussbaum describes this 
as “the problem of respect for the separate person.” A utilitarian calculus 
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that presumes overall welfare in the aggregate “doesn’t tell us where the 
top and the bottom are,” Nussbaum observes. “[I]t doesn’t tell us ‘who 
has got the money, and whether any of it is mine.’” Analyses based on 
the well- being of the aggregate do not confront distinctions between the 
developed and developing worlds, the urban and the rural, and women 
and men, or among blacks, Asians, Latinos, and whites.
To be sure, this account in legal scholarship diff ers from the under-
standing of utilitarianism among moral philosophers and even among 
economists themselves. Rather than presuming the goodness of maxi-
mizing creative output, utilitarians would begin with individual prefer-
ences and build the theory from there. Focusing on individual preferences 
would require us to consider impacts on people who have no ability to 
pay for intellectual goods. But given that my goal is to reinterpret intel-
lectual property law, I will concentrate my energies on the utilitarianism 
expressed by today’s intellectual property scholars.
Before I turn to my cultural critique, it may be useful to review the 
existing critical intellectual property landscape. To date, most intellec-
tual property scholars have sought to rationalize intellectual property 
law within the framework of economics. Some, let us call them Intellec-
tual Property Originalists, argue that intellectual property was narrowly 
construed at the time of the nation’s founding as an instrumental tool, 
grudgingly accepted as necessary for incentivizing innovation. They are 
Originalists in the sense that they are elaborating their understanding 
of the founders’ constitutional mandate in the domain described by the 
phrase “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Scholars 
such as James Boyle, Mark Lemley, and Larry Lessig read this clause as 
limiting copyright and patent to the narrow goal of incentivizing produc-
tion.14 By confi ning intellectual property to this goal, they hope to fi ght its 
creeping extension. Boyle and Lessig’s nonprofi t organization, the Creative 
Commons, even off ers a Founders’ Copyright—a license for fourteen 
years with a one- time option to renew.15
Originalists emphasize an “incentives/access tradeoff ” at the core of 
intellectual property law. Intellectual property rights are necessary incen-
tives to promote creative activity, but if they go too far they may impede 
access to knowledge. For most critics of intellectual property law today, 
these two values—incentives and access—are the two that matter; other 
values are typically subsumed by these two broad categories of intellec-
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tual property law’s central values. Questions about productivity implicate 
“incentives,” while concerns as diverse as the fair use of copyrighted 
materials to the distribution of drugs to the poor are issues of “access.” 
In sum, the prevailing vision is an incentive vision. Intellectual property 
is to conform to this single purpose. For some, like the Originalists, this 
leads to a narrow view of the extent of intellectual property rights. They 
worry that broader rights harm downstream production. New innovation 
always occurs on the back of older innovation. Thus the focus of contem-
porary scholars is the length of the copyright or patent term and the scope 
of these rights, to be determined entirely on the basis of incentives for 
present and future innovation. Others see the incentive theory as justify-
ing broad intellectual property rights. The intellectual property holder of 
a broader right can always negotiate with downstream users, at least in 
the absence of overwhelming transaction costs, which presumably have 
been reduced because of technology. By and large, the fi ght is over the 
proper economic analysis to incentivize production or sometimes more 
broadly, as in the work of Landes and Posner, to correct market failure in 
information production.16
My goal here is to move intellectual property beyond this struggle. 
This is not to say that getting the economics of innovation right is not im-
portant. But it is not all that is important in setting the metes and bounds 
of intellectual property. The fi ght over intellectual property should con-
sider values beyond simply the value of incentivizing production. While 
many will view this as radical, upsetting the simple elegance of a single- 
minded legal domain, I am far from the fi rst to propose a broader account 
of intellectual property. Neil Netanel, Jack Balkin, and David Lange would 
have us keep First Amendment values foremost in mind when analyzing 
intellectual property confl icts. Richard Epstein has argued for intellectual 
property scholars to consider more closely this law’s similarities to real 
property law. And William Fisher more than a decade ago made the pre-
scient call for reorienting intellectual property law to promote a good life.17
I suggest that intellectual property law must adopt broader social 
and cultural analysis. The fundamental failure in the economic story of 
intellectual property has to do with information’s role in cultural life and 
human fl ourishing. It is odd that the area of law most closely focused on 
Dickens, Rowling, Star Trek, Lost, Gershwin, and Prince is indiff erent to 
understanding these creative works and their relationship to society, and 
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to that part of the academy that seeks to understand these relations. The 
disciplines of cultural studies, sociology, science and technology studies, 
and development studies off er theories of cultural production and human 
fl ourishing, but their insights have been largely ignored for the elegant 
simplicity of the economic narrative.18 In this chapter and throughout this 
book, I will try to bring development and cultural theory to bear on local 
and global confl icts related to intellectual property. Culture is not just a 
set of “inputs” necessary for further innovation. Culture is the sphere 
in which individuals participate, create, share ideas, and enjoy life with 
others. Cultural works engender empathy for the other and foster mutual 
understanding. In short, culture plays a critical—and in the Knowledge 
Age, an increasingly important—role in promoting freedom in the social, 
political, and economic spheres of life. Thus rather than narrowly view-
ing intellectual property as incentives- for- creation—that is, as merely 
economic or technology policy—we must understand intellectual property 
as social and cultural policy. Increasingly in the Knowledge Age, intel-
lectual property laws come to bear on giant- sized values, from democracy 
and development to freedom and equality.
I want to be careful to avoid falling prey to Hume’s is- ought fallacy. 
In the examples that follow, I show the complexity of values that appear to 
be at stake in local and global intellectual property confl icts, and seek to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of the utilitarian intellectual property story 
as a descriptive matter. This alone does not tell us what our normative 
values should be, yet in discussing these cases, we can begin to see that 
the very recognition of the disparate social and cultural eff ects of our 
global intellectual property policy becomes a rallying cry to take these 
eff ects into account.
Before proceeding let me clarify that my critique, which among other 
ideas builds on Amartya Sen’s broad conception of development as free-
dom, does not reject economics. Far from it, it adopts a broad economic 
view that recognizes more fully the rich interconnections between eco-
nomics and culture, and the eff ect of freedom in the cultural domain on 
overall individual well- being.
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from youtube to fandom to remix:  working 
through culture
The Harry Potter stories have captivated the world, even reviving interest 
in reading. Penned by J. K. Rowling, they glorify the exploits of an En-
glish boy who is to save humanity and the enchanted world—with a little 
help from his friends. In the offl  ine world, Rowling’s multipart series has 
come to an end, but the familiar characters of Harry, Ron, Hermione, 
and their gang live on in the ether, where young and old recast familiar 
people and places from this lore to tell new stories. A thirteen- year- old, 
Heather Lawver, began editing an online, real- world version of the fi c-
tional Daily Prophet newspaper for the wizarding world in the Harry Pot-
ter series. Many girl fans bring Harry’s sidekick, Hermione, to the front 
and center of the action in their own stories. In India an author penned 
Harry Potter in Kolkata, turning his own street corner into a site of magic. 
The book was quickly pulled after Indian lawyers for Rowling and War-
ner Bros. (producer of the Harry Potter fi lms) issued a cease- and- desist 
letter to the work’s Indian publisher. Meanwhile, Rowling has abided 
literally hundreds of thousands of other fan- fi ction stories based on her 
characters.
Current copyright theory takes a narrow view of fair use. From You-
Tube videos to fan works to digital mash- ups of music, the dominant 
approach of the last quarter century focuses on market failure. Law views 
unauthorized imitations of original copyrighted expression—from songs 
to characters, settings, and plots—as theft. In the absence of an express 
license for use, statutorily authorized fair use is limited to a narrow set 
of circumstances where market failure prohibits private bargains from 
being struck. A classic case for fair use under this rationale is parody of 
the copyrighted work. Consider the case of the rap group 2 Live Crew, 
which sought a license from Roy Orbison to lampoon his song “Oh, 
Pretty Woman” with the lyrics “bald headed woman” and other insulting 
phrases. Not surprisingly, Orbison denied permission. The group 2 Live 
Crew went ahead and made their song anyway, and Orbison’s publisher 
brought suit. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the rap group’s version 
was a fair use because it parodied Orbison’s song. Although there are 
many reasons for privileging parody as fair use19—the First Amendment 
comes immediately to mind—many legal scholars have explained the 
Court’s rationale in terms of market failure.20 In Posner’s words, “ne-
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gotiating for a parody license” is a “high- transaction- cost negotiation.” 
The logic is simple: few are ready to license a right to be made fun of. 
Posner contrasts parody, where the copyrighted work is “the target not 
the weapon” of the infringing use, with satire, where the copyrighted 
work is the weapon, used to make fun of some other thing—society, or 
a politician. In the heat of the U.S. presidential election during summer 
2008, for example, John McCain used in a campaign ad—without permis-
sion—the Frankie Valli song “Can’t Take My Eyes Off  of You” to make fun 
of the press’s infatuation with his rival Barack Obama. Few would argue 
that the McCain ad is less socially valuable than 2 Live Crew’s spoof. But 
under the market failure rationale for fair use, social value is not the key 
determinant. As Posner asks, if the copyrighted work is not the butt of 
the joke, “why should the owner of the original be reluctant to license the 
parody?” 21 “Only if the parodist is seeking to ridicule the original work,” 
Posner reasons, “is a market transaction infeasible and an involuntary 
taking therefore justifi able.” 22
To be sure, fair use is a fl exible doctrine that requires careful weigh-
ing of many factors on a case- by- case basis. But by and large, this view 
of thinking about fair use as justifi ed only in instances of market failure 
has prevailed in theory and practice, and serves as the current backdrop 
against which users nevertheless continue to interact with copyrighted 
materials on and off  the Internet, often at their own peril. The fact is, even 
though much user- generated content is noncommercial, and consciously 
so, it may be illegal under current copyright law and policy, where the 
default rule is to get a license. Girls writing themselves into the Potter 
stories are “pirates” taking the property of Rowling and Warner Bros., 
unwelcome in copyright law’s fair use “safe harbor.”
In his important book Convergence Culture, Henry Jenkins calls it a 
“paradoxical result” where “works that are hostile to the original creators 
. . . can be read more explicitly as making critiques of the source material,” 
thus “having greater freedom from copyright enforcement than works 
that embrace the ideas behind the original work and simply seek to extend 
them in new directions.” 23 Furthermore, Jenkins laments today’s eff ects 
of a fair- use law developed in a bygone era of unidirectional media, where 
professionals created content largely for the static consumption of the 
masses. Today’s technology, in contrast, emboldens citizen participation 
in cultural works and cultural production like never before. Yet copyright 
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fair- use analyses have been slow to recognize the rise of participatory 
culture. As Jenkins writes:
Current copyright law simply doesn’t have a category for deal-
ing with amateur creative expression. Where there has been 
“public interest” factored into the legal defi nition of fair use—
such as the desire to protect the rights of libraries to circulate 
books or journalists to quote or academics to cite other re-
searchers—it has been advanced in terms of legitimated 
classes of users and not a generalized public right to cultural 
participation. Our current notion of fair use is an artifact 
of an era when few people had access to the marketplace of 
ideas, and those who did fell into certain professional classes. 
It surely demands reconsideration as we develop technolo-
gies that broaden who may produce and circulate cultural 
materials.24
The result? Heather Lawver and other kids who inhabit the Potter uni-
verse, developing their own critical reading, writing, and thinking skills 
through it, are left in a legal grey zone. Indeed, rather than parody, many 
user- created YouTube videos and other fan works shared on the Internet 
are better understood as paying homage to the original works and their 
creators.
The critique here is twofold: fi rst, current visions of fair use driven 
by market failure analysis show little understanding of the benefi ts of 
working through culture—that is, playing, learning, and creating through 
the cultural objects given to us. Law privileges only a narrow form of 
working through culture—parody—not because of its normative benefi ts, 
but because a license for parodies may be diffi  cult. This leaves a host of 
socially and culturally worthwhile activities in a legal grey zone. Second, 
the narrow market failure analysis of fair use does not acknowledge the 
ways in which the culture concept today is radically changing. Increas-
ingly, culture is no longer a static object handed down by cultural authori-
ties. Changing technologies and social mores have made culture more 
interactive and participatory. But this paradoxically puts more ordinary 
people at risk of committing copyright infringement.
One of the most famous mash- ups of recent years, which I men-
tioned briefl y in the Introduction, off ers an illustration. Turning the tables 
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on the traditional modalities of cultural production and reception, one 
disc jockey known as “Dangermouse” digitally mashed The Beatles’ The 
White Album with hip- hop artist Jay- Z’s The Black Album to create The 
Grey Album. Dangermouse celebrated his copying, boldly declaring on 
his website that his album “uses the full vocal content of Jay- Z’s Black 
Album” and that “[e]very kick, snare, and chord is taken from the Beatles 
White Album and is in their original recording somewhere.” 25 Despite 
its pointedly derivative nature, the album drew critical acclaim. Culling 
from the past, DJ Dangermouse created music that Rolling Stone hailed 
as “ahead of its time.”
In the hip- hop music world, this modus operandi is not new. Indeed, 
Jay- Z had intentionally facilitated mash- ups by releasing an a cappella ver-
sion of The Black Album. The owners of copyrights in The Beatles catalog, 
in contrast, had long resisted licensing these works. Publishing house 
EMI, which claims ownership in The White Album, issued a cease- and- 
desist letter to Dangermouse, to which he quickly complied, removing The 
Grey Album from his website. But by then the cat was out of the bag. The 
work quickly became a cult hit in underground hip- hop clubs, exchanged 
via peer- to- peer fi le- sharing services and other Internet- based protocols. 
On a single day declared “Grey Tuesday,” more than a hundred websites 
distributed 100,000 copies of the work, making The Grey Album, “if only 
for a day, the #1 release in the country.” 26 Grey Tuesday was widely reported 
as a coordinated act of civil disobedience against an excessively restrictive 
copyright law. Suddenly, the copyright law of the last century appeared 
too obedient to traditional cultural, technical, and legal authorities.
Technically, sampling is “a digital process in which pre- recorded 
sounds are incorporated into the sonic fabric of a new song.” Socially, 
sampling is homage: new creators use the technique to represent them-
selves historically within a lineage of earlier creators and traditions. The 
popular practice of digital sampling in hip- hop and rap exemplifi es this 
approach of working through culture. Sampling reveals its social side in 
precisely its reiterations of tradition. Far from simple mimesis, rappers 
practice an art that cultural theorists call signifi cation: the exercise of 
cultural agency within a context of discursive hegemony.27 Individuals 
express themselves through critique, comment, or parody of cultural 
authorities, all the while seeking to represent themselves within a culture 
that had previously overlooked, or even worse, oppressed them. Stated 
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diff erently, the mash- up is often a form of cultural dissent. The sample 
is used to evoke the past and to create a lineage between authors, thus 
claiming a place for oneself within a culture’s historical narrative. Sam-
pling signals that an artist is working within a tradition, not without it. 
At the same time, as Walter Benjamin has described, the proliferation of 
copies contributes to the “shattering of tradition”; it debunks the mythi-
cal cult of the original, questioning the very existence of a singular text 
or cultural authority. The Age of Mechanical Reproduction is yielding to 
the Age of Electronic Participation. To unmask cultural autocracy is to 
make way for cultural democracy.
But while private arrangements may sometimes strike in favor of 
these new auteurs, the default rules themselves off er little predictability 
or comfort for those fan creators who express themselves by inhabiting, 
or working through, the canon, without necessarily critiquing or writing 
against the original. The current legal regime would either chill such 
creative eff orts or drive cultural democracy and equality underground. 
Hence Jenkins calls for rewriting the law of fair use to cover “legitimate 
grassroots, not- for- profi t circulation of critical essays and stories that com-
ment on the content of mass media.” 28
The economic theory of fair use as market failure in fact has an 
underlying cultural theory—even if it is an accidental one. The market 
failure approach privileges creative work developed wholly outside popu-
lar culture (hailed as “original”) or that goes against culture (understood 
as parody, or critique), but it does not recognize activity working through 
culture. This view of fair use, and of culture, is too narrow. In contrast, 
where Posner would allow a free ride for a “take off ” on an original copy-
righted work, I would emphasize the importance of a “take on” an original 
copyrighted work.29
My analysis is both descriptive and prescriptive. The current market 
failure approach misrecognizes how individuals actually participate in 
culture. I use the phrase “working through culture” to describe what 
contemporary cultural theorists from Bourdieu to Foucault to Habermas 
recognize about how modern subjects engage the world (I develop this 
theory further in Chapter 2). Foucault, for example, describes authorship 
not as the search for an original subject, but rather as the quest to “grasp 
the subject’s points of insertion, modes of functioning, and system of 
dependencies” on existing discourses.30 As I show in the next chapter, 
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cultural theory elaborates the view that the modern subject is situated 
within contemporary discourses, and yet is not fully defi ned by them.
It is true that, by and large, the Enlightenment understood freedom 
and equality as developed in opposition to culture. The Romantic Move-
ment exalted the artist above others as someone who created truth and 
meaning for him- or herself, unlike those for whom knowledge came from 
religious and cultural authorities from above. Recall this was the fi rst time 
we saw use of the word “creator” with a little “c”—until then, only God 
was endowed with the gift of Creation.31 But the proliferation of author-
ship alongside cultural rights at the turn of the century has confounded 
expectations that Enlightenment would triumph over culture. Increas-
ingly, we now understand that we develop our autonomous selves through 
and within a cultural discourse, inhabiting tradition, not just resisting it.
In the next chapter, I elaborate normative arguments for freedom 
within culture. These range from liberty to “think for oneself,” to the 
use of rational argument to seek equality and liberation from oppressive 
culture, to the ethical responsibility to critique unjust traditions.32 There 
are still other reasons. According to Habermas, communicative action 
is the process through which people form their identities, transmit and 
renew cultural knowledge, and achieve mutual understanding.33 I con-
sider, as well, how active participation within the cultural sphere promotes 
learning and qualities central to a well- functioning democracy, especially 
critical thinking and communal engagement. In short, rather than focus-
ing on market failure and building the theory from there, I argue that we 
must fi rst recognize the social value of working through culture, from 
autobiographical storytelling through YouTube videos; to empowerment 
by making oneself the superhero in the story; to satire, homage, and 
sharing as ways of connecting with others for mutual understanding.
A libertarian may argue that we may fi nd more freedom by exiting re-
strictive cultures rather than remaining within them. Indeed, this notion 
underlies traditional copyright law, which envisions creativity as taking 
place either against culture or outside of it. But this traditional binary op-
tion of culture (on the terms of the powerful) or freedom (without culture) 
is less and less satisfactory today. In the modern world, individuals want 
both: they demand freedom, but often within the cultural communities 
in which we live and grow.
The law and economic scholar of intellectual property will reply that 
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intellectual property law should address not just market failure, but also 
incentives. The concern is that a rule broadening fair use will not promote 
innovation as well as a rule focused on originality would. The conceit is 
that fan fi ction and mash- ups are copying, not creativity. But this pre-
sumes that fans rotely mimic the original. Hundreds of thousands of 
entries on fan- fi ction websites dispel such an idea. They reveal instead 
painstaking eff orts to develop one’s own voice within existing, often al-
most overpowering, discursive frameworks. Fan communities help writ-
ers in this process of fi nding one’s own voice within culture, critiquing 
and advising one another to better tell one’s own stories, albeit within a 
framework of shared meaning.
Furthermore, the critic will argue that the existing rule promotes 
greater expressive diversity than would one that allowed for more working 
through culture. But this critique privileges diversity across culture rather 
than within it. The familiar idea is that diversity across distinct cultures 
allows individuals greater choice among ways of life. But as I have argued 
elsewhere, this vision often creates false choices. Rather than choosing to 
leave one’s cultural communities, modern individuals prefer to remain 
within them, and to exercise choice and reason within those spheres. For 
example, many gays do not wish to leave the Boy Scouts of America but 
instead hope to be recognized within this association. Women typically 
choose not to leave patriarchal religious communities but rather to stay 
within and reform them. Thus the value of diversity within cultures be-
gins to come into focus: such diversity allows for greater choice among a 
range of options within our normative communities.34
I off er a fi nal critique of the traditional economic approach to fan 
and user- generated content. The traditional economic approach does not 
consider the distribution of the material benefi ts of this cultural produc-
tion. Law is content to condemn YouTube videos, mash- ups, and fan fi c-
tion to a legal grey zone, in which authors of such material create in the 
shadow of the threat of lawsuits and dare not commercialize their work. 
The Grey Album was critically acclaimed, but DJ Dangermouse could 
not earn a single penny from the “pirate” work. While many fan- fi ction 
writers enjoy participating in a noncommercial culture—indeed, they 
argue that a nonpropertied space allows for the development of more 
experimental creative products and communities—still others may seek, 
understandably, to profi t from their creations. These distributive concerns 
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are particularly poignant when we fi nd that people from traditionally mar-
ginalized communities are producing cultural criticism that is also poten-
tially lucrative. I shall return to these distributive questions in Chapter 3, 
“Fair Culture.”
stories in the cup:  participation, meaningful work, 
and livelihood
Ethiopia is the birthplace of coff ee. According to a local legend dating back 
to the ninth century, a shepherd boy named Kaldi observed that goats who 
ate wild coff ee berries appeared to “dance” after consuming them. Kaldi, 
hungry and tired himself, tried the berries and found himself joining the 
dance.35 Today, more than a thousand years later, 1.5 million Ethiopians 
earn their livelihood from coff ee.
But the last decade has proven disastrous for many of these coff ee 
farmers. In 2001 a global oversupply of coff ee led to a sharp decline in 
prices, drastically aff ecting Ethiopian farmers’ profi ts and well- being. 
Many were left with no money for basic necessities such as food and 
schools. The eff ect on Ethiopian coff ee farmers from the fall in com-
modity prices was not, however, inevitable. Ethiopia produces some of 
the world’s fi nest coff ees, in particular Harar, Sidamo, and Yirgacheff e, 
which sell well above commodity coff ee prices in Western specialty mar-
kets. Indeed, the top coff ee buyer for coff ee giant Starbucks declared 
Ethiopian coff ee “the world’s best coff ee.” 36 But the Ethiopian farmers 
failed to distinguish their specialty products from the pedestrian cof-
fee purveyed around the world, and their specialty product sold at mere 
commodity prices.
In 2005, Getachew Mengistie, the director of Ethiopia’s Intellectual 
Property Offi  ce, traveled to the United States, where he discovered a pound 
of his country’s Sidamo coff ee selling at a local Starbucks for a gourmet 
price of $26 a pound. He knew that his country’s farmers only received 
$1.45 a pound for this specialty coff ee, and sometimes even $0.75 at the 
commodity price. Ethiopia was capturing only 3 to 6 percent of the retail 
price, and Mengistie believed that the remaining value did not simply 
derive from roasting, distributing, and marketing the coff ee. Indeed, es-
timates are that specialty coff ee should return about 45 percent of the 
retail price to the owners of this coff ee’s high reputation.
Mengistie struck upon a bold plan to try to claim more of the coff ee’s 
201111 Pass 3 press.indd   40 2/10/12   2:23 PM
beyond incentives 41
value for his countrymen and -women. Ethiopia applied for trademarks 
in Harar, Sidamo, and Yirgacheff e coff ees around the world. While most 
countries granted the trademarks, there was resistance in the United 
States from a formidable foe—Starbucks. The coff ee retail giant argued 
that no other countries were using trademarks to control their coff ees. 
Many countries used “geographic certifi cation” marks instead, which en-
sure that the origin of a coff ee is not misrepresented. With a geographic 
certifi cation, for example, coff ee not grown in Guatemala cannot be sold 
as “Guatemalan coff ee.” In Chapter 6, I discuss the growing use by de-
veloping nations of geographical indications such as these as a way to 
prevent their products from being copied and mass- produced elsewhere 
yet sold under the geographical name. I argue that these legal devices 
off er a good way of protecting “poor people’s knowledge” because they 
are relatively cheap to acquire, they allow for multiple producers within 
a certain region, and they recognize, socially and materially, the cultural 
and scientifi c contributions of the community.
Ethiopia, however, insisted on trademarks. The legal diff erence is sig-
nifi cant; the country did not simply seek to enjoin counterfeits but instead 
sought to control and develop a brand. Ethiopia sought to distinguish its 
high- end coff ees from commodity products, which a geographic certi-
fi cation would do, but it also sought to build consumer desire for these 
coff ees. Ethiopia proposed to license these trademarks to Starbucks and 
other coff ee retailers only if they invested in building the brand among 
consumers. If Starbucks wanted to market this coff ee under the Harar, 
Sidamo, or Yirgacheff e names, it would have to play by Ethiopia’s rules. 
After a global consumer campaign led by Oxfam International, Starbucks 
relented, withdrawing its opposition to the trademarks and signing the 
license agreement.37
After centuries of making coff ee, Ethiopia recognized that in today’s 
global markets much of the retail value of the coff ee lay in the coff ee’s 
meaning. Indeed, Starbucks trades as much on the social meaning of cof-
fee as its taste. The latte- drinking Starbucks customer pays a premium for 
the story in the cup. Starbucks recognizes this, often enhancing the expe-
rience with photographs of indigenous coff ee farmers around the world 
and text about their lives on its coff ee packaging. Consider the evocative 
language of a Starbucks ad:
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Sometimes the coff ee stirs you. A completed sentence ends 
with a small black dot, but that’s how epiphanies begin. A cof-
fee bean. A tiny, good thing from the earth. But the best ones 
have something special locked inside: an exotic destination, a 
spirited conversation, a divine inspiration. We search the world 
to fi nd those beans and bring them to you.38
Starbucks even decorates some cafes with the bright colors and motifs 
found in some developing countries.39
Ethiopia sought to move from being the object of someone else’s 
lucrative story to becoming its subject. Its trademark eff ort signals the 
country’s desire to move from being the supplier of mere raw materi-
als to a purveyor of social meaning with real economic value. Ethiopia’s 
tactic suggests the next wave in “fair trade” practices. Rather than rely 
on a charitable act on the part of the Western enterprise or Western pub-
lic, developing countries may claim their rights as intellectual property 
owners—thereby gaining control over their own reputation and destiny.
It is not commonplace for a developing country to apply for trade-
marks in foreign lands. Ethiopia worked in conjunction with foreign not- 
for- profi t groups such as Light Years IP and pro bono attorneys at the 
Washington- based law fi rm of Arnold & Porter. Ethiopia’s campaign for its 
trademarks in the United States was championed by Oxfam International, 
a group better known for its activities combating hunger worldwide. But 
Oxfam saw trademarks for Ethiopian coff ee as central to that very enter-
prise. Such a move accords with Amartya Sen’s insight that famine arises 
out of the lack of capacity to purchase the food one needs, not from the 
absence of food in the local marketplace.40 To combat hunger, one needs 
to work on human capabilities to generate income.
A cultural approach to poor people’s knowledge converges with the 
traditional economic approach to intellectual property on the following 
point: intellectual property rights related to poor people’s knowledge 
can provide the incentives needed for the preservation, cultivation, and 
exchange of resources and knowledge. Yet the utility in the cultural 
approach goes beyond the creation of benefi cial products. Anil Gupta, 
founder of the Honey Bee Network in India, which helps locate and sup-
port innovation among India’s rural poor, explains: “Once this knowledge 
becomes a basis for livelihood, conservation, lateral learning and social 
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networking, a knowledge society starts emerging.” Developing countries 
too seek to fl ourish as knowledge societies—communities in which all 
people have the capacity to participate in the cultivation and progression 
of knowledge. Intellectual property ownership makes up a signifi cant pro-
portion of the total value of world trade, but rich countries and businesses 
have captured most of this. Increasingly, some of the poorest countries 
and communities in the world are seeking a greater share of the global 
value of their products. As the Ethiopian example shows, this value lies 
not in the raw materials themselves, but in how they are marketed, espe-
cially to consumers in high- end markets. These consumers seek more 
than just a cup of coff ee. Often they promote and support a set of global 
social relations based on recognition of others, shared meaning, and a 
conception of fairness.
The uproar about “biopiracy” in the fi eld of patented inventions can 
be understood along similar lines. Attempts by Western corporations to 
patent the Indian staples turmeric, neem, and basmati rice, for example, 
drew sharp condemnation in the developing world. Another infamous 
case involves the hoodia cactus, a plant native to southern Africa. The San 
people of the Kalahari Desert of southern Africa eat this “miracle plant,” 
which “tells your brain you are full,” suppressing hunger and thirst dur-
ing long desert crossings.41 Upon learning of the San’s use from a Dutch 
anthropologist, the South African Council for Scientifi c and Industrial 
Research patented the hoodia’s appetite- suppressing element. The patent 
was eventually acquired by Pfi zer, which sought to develop a diet drug to 
serve a market potentially worth billions. The central question in many of 
these cases is who should claim the value, and how much is their rightful 
claim, in these inventions. Even the European Patent Offi  ce (EPO) has 
acknowledged that yesterday’s answers to these questions are inadequate. 
In Scenarios for the Future, a landmark work considering the pressures 
that will confront the patent offi  ce in the next quarter- century, the EPO 
writes that patent law must now respond to claims from below. “The key 
question that emerges,” the report states, is “[a]s new and powerful players 
emerge, who has power and authority?” 42
Despite calls to maintain our understanding of intellectual property sim-
ply as a utilitarian tool for stimulating creative production, intellectual 
property more and more demonstrates a claim on plural values, from 
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participation to freedom, equality, mutual recognition, meaningful work, 
and development. The intellectual- property- as- incentives approach fails 
to account for the wide range of values at stake in global intellectual 
production today. Even the well- intentioned critics of maximalist intel-
lectual property cannot address the giant- sized values implicit in current 
debates, from democracy to development, purely from within the tradi-
tional economic framework. The fundamental value of the intellectual- 
property- as- incentives approach is maximizing cultural production. This 
narrow theory presumes that maximizing cultural production in the ag-
gregate will lead to the greatest good for the greatest number of people. 
We may assess this theory on its own terms—both from a narrow and 
from a broader utilitarian analysis. But this is not my project. My goal is 
to broaden the descriptive and prescriptive framework for understanding 
intellectual property. In so doing, I show that concerns about equality, 
social relations, and democracy animate contemporary intellectual prop-
erty law and eff orts to reform it.
But before proceeding, let me repeat: I do not reject the utilitarian ac-
count’s central insights in toto; it remains a necessary tool in formulating 
intellectual property policy. Neither do I wish to exchange one metanar-
rative for another. Rather I argue that neither an economic nor a cultural 
lens alone provides a complete picture, and I urge intellectual property 
scholars to begin to integrate the two and come to recognize that the inter-
relationship between culture and economics goes well beyond incentives.
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a four- year-  old girl  jumps up from the couch and starts messing 
around behind the television. Her curious father asks, “What are you 
doing back there?” The little girl, who was born digital, replies: “I’m look-
ing for the mouse.” 1 Culture in the last century was marked by a mouse 
named Mickey—a canned product of a powerful media corporation held 
tightly under lock and key. Culture in this new century is symbolized 
by a very diff erent mouse. The new mouse is not a product, but a tool for 
participating in the process of making culture oneself.
This chapter considers a principal raison d’être of intellectual prop-
erty law: culture. The conceit is that intellectual property is a tool for 
incentivizing cultural production, from literature to art and science.2 But 
thus far scholars of intellectual property have spent far too little time 
considering what culture is and how the object of law’s desire, culture, is 
itself changing. The dominant law- and- economic theory of intellectual 
property law is premised on a thin theory of culture as commodities. 
But culture is not just a set of goods; it is a fundamental component of a 
good life. In this chapter, I turn to social and cultural theory to elaborate 
a richer theory of culture as critical processes of creative engagement and 
exchange that promote our humanity.
Intellectual property is one of the most important legal tools for regu-
lating the production and circulation of culture today, from music, art, 
chapter two
Bespoke Culture
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and fi lm to scientifi c knowledge to expressive commercial speech in the 
form of trademarks. Yet law misunderstands the very nature of culture 
itself. What is perhaps most surprising is that social and cultural theory 
are largely absent from scholarly study of the fi eld. In fact, culture stud-
ies, from anthropology to development economics to philosophy, have 
elaborated rich understandings of culture—its processes of production 
and circulation, its eff ects on social and economic life, and its role in 
human development.
In this chapter, I turn to these disciplines to contrast three views of 
culture that have dominated cultural studies (and infl uenced intellectual 
property law in turn): culture as tradition, culture as commodity, and cul-
ture as participatory community. From the late nineteenth century and for 
nearly a century thereafter, both anthropologists and the public at large 
understood culture as tradition, that is, as a set of learned customs and 
rituals transmitted from generation to generation. Culture as tradition 
presumed culture to be fi xed, hierarchical, and unchanging over time. 
The rise of mass media during the last century fostered the correspond-
ing emergence of culture as commodity. In Jürgen Habermas’s account, 
the turn toward viewing culture as a commodity paradoxically had its 
roots in the Enlightenment. In The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere, Habermas fascinatingly recounts how the Enlightenment coff ee 
house culture of the late eighteenth century, in which people debated 
ideas, literature, and politics, evolved from a culture- producing society to a 
culture- consuming one. Mass media grew to serve a growing bourgeoisie 
that sought to mix learning and leisure. As Habermas reveals the irony, 
over time the consumption of books became the end of Enlightenment, 
rather than its means.
At the start of the twenty- fi rst century, these two views of culture—as 
tradition and as commodity—are being challenged, by both social actors 
and scholars in the academy. On the ground, global social movements 
fueled by new technologies and political economies are challenging the 
conventional “take it or leave it” understanding of culture as either un-
assailable truth called “tradition,” or as canned commodities poised to 
entertain. Whereas people of the last century understood culture as “off  
the rack”—a set of homogeneous goods and beliefs imposed on citizens 
by cultural authorities—increasingly people today understand culture 
as bespoke, tailored for the wearers themselves. On the Internet, young 
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girls publish their own Harry Potter “fan fi ction” that moves Hermione 
Granger from the periphery to the center of the adventure. In India, a 
fan renames Harry as Hari, taking the hero’s adventures to the streets of 
Kolkata. Muslim youth fashion Islamic superheroes, challenging Marvel’s 
and DC Comics’ vision of who is a superhero. Players of the digital game 
The Beatles: Rock Band inhabit the world of John, Paul, Ringo, and George, 
collaborating and creating the world’s most popular music “all together 
now.” 3 And on YouTube, hundreds of millions of people have answered the 
challenge to “Broadcast Yourself,” making an end- run around traditional 
commercial media by connecting directly with millions around the world 
on every topic under the sun. Welcome to the age of bespoke culture, aka 
DIY (do- it- yourself) or DIWO (do- it- with- others) culture.4
The enhanced ability—and willingness—of ordinary people to chal-
lenge cultural authorities, be they mullahs or Hollywood moguls, is no-
table in its own right. Some of the most popular videos on YouTube, for 
example, have been posted by ordinary Muslim men and women around 
the world, who use the medium to defi ne and share their own answers 
to the oft- asked question after September 11, 2001: What is a Muslim? 
Homemade videos by and of ordinary Muslims around the world—in 
their college dormitories; as female police offi  cers on the streets of Am-
man, Jordan; as moms debating mullahs in the United Kingdom—and 
even simple one- line “Tweets” such as those from the street protests of the 
“Arab Spring” of 2011 are a potent part of the content of culture today and 
are remaking Muslim identity in the twenty- fi rst century. The result is 
that traditional cultural authority is eroding as more and more individuals 
in the modern world are questioning, debating, and collectively redefi ning 
their cultural communities just as they would their political communities. 
Web 2.0 is spurring and refl ecting a much larger shift in the fabric of 
society: we are moving away from imposed cultural identities toward a 
conception of cultural identity based on autonomy, reason, and choice.
This is a big claim. Let me clarify that in making it, I do not deny 
the existence of participation and dissent within cultures for millennia. 
Indeed, we have long understood that the very essence of culture is partici-
pation. Culture is fundamentally collective, requiring the participation of 
many in making and sustaining shared meaning. Surely, this was true 
before the Internet: individuals and communities have always sought to 
participate in the cultural universes they love, by doing everything from 
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singing, dancing, and telling stories together to playing with Star Wars 
action fi gures, dressing in elaborate DIY character costumes, and attend-
ing Star Trek conventions. As my own grandmother’s story illustrates, 
culture has never really been a fi xed tradition or static commodity simply 
handed down to people to imbibe; individuals have always had a hand in 
challenging cultural traditions and inventing new ones. Cultural theo-
rists such as John Fiske have amply demonstrated how even before the 
Internet, individuals and disempowered communities reimagined the 
mass culture produced on television in active, not passive, ways to better 
refl ect their own lives and desires.
But while this may have always been the case—that culture is always 
invented, not discovered—our theories of culture, combined with our law 
and technological architectures for producing and consuming culture, have 
not always refl ected or promoted this vision. Indeed, as the culture-as-
tradition and commodity views suggest, for most of the twentieth century, 
the dominant scholarly understanding in democratic liberal theory has 
been that “culture constrains.” 5 A few select reformers challenge cus-
tom, but the masses obey it. As Anthony Appiah reminds us, it has long 
been the role of the artist to “disturb us and make us dissatisfi ed with 
our habitual life in culture.” 6 But increasingly today, on blogs, YouTube, 
Flickr, Twitter, Weibo, and Facebook, we are all artists who, if not literally 
making our own news and art, are at least more ready to author our own 
lives and to not take the given culture lying down.
To be sure, culture does not represent a sphere of unlimited autonomy 
or choice. To the contrary, French theorist Pierre Bourdieu has famously 
described culture as a “habitus,” referring to the constraints our social 
environment imposes on us. According to Bourdieu, cultural constraints 
may more or less determine our lives. But today, there is growing recogni-
tion that as cultures modernize and as more and more options are made 
available to people through technology, travel, and liberalization, “culture 
becomes less . . . habitus . . . and more an arena for conscious choice.” 7
Law’s conception of culture matters. If law conceives culture as tradi-
tion, or as a fi xed commodity to be handed down primarily to entertain 
the masses, it will instantiate traditional or commodity culture. In this 
chapter I argue instead that law ought to put its weight behind what I call 
a participatory culture. While the benefi ts of democracy in the political 
sphere are well known, scholars have spent far less time considering the 
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benefi ts of participation and debate in the cultural sphere. I turn to social 
and cultural theory to elaborate the benefi ts of active and more widespread 
participation in the cultural sphere, which range from promoting learn-
ing and the critical thinking skills crucial in a democratic society, to 
incentivizing freedom and creativity, to challenging discriminatory cul-
tural traditions and authorities, to promoting economic development and 
mutual understanding. Furthermore, I will show that the view of culture 
as participatory community is not only more in line with Enlightenment 
values than are the tradition and commodity views of culture, but also 
better takes into account the changes wrought by the Internet and shift-
ing social expectations at the turn of the century. It is to the elaboration 
of this third view of culture as participatory community that I will soon 
turn. But fi rst we must revisit the conventional understandings of culture, 
for these still have a powerful hold on our imaginations today, and are 
especially entrenched in intellectual property law.
culture as tradition
Scholars credit Edward B. Tylor with the fi rst anthropological defi nition 
of culture, in 1871. Tylor called culture “that complex whole which taken 
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capa-
bilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” 8 Credited with 
being ahead of his time, Tylor’s conception of culture found adherents 
among anthropologists well into the twentieth century. Bronislaw Ma-
linowski in the early twentieth century defi ned culture as “inherited arti-
facts, goods, technical processes, ideas, habits, and values.” 9 Ruth Benedict 
wrote of culture as “learned behavior” passed down from generation to 
generation.10 Margaret Mead called culture “the whole complex of tradi-
tional behavior which has been developed by the human race and is suc-
cessively learned by each generation.” 11 Edward T. Hall wrote in 1966, “[N]o 
matter how hard a man tries it is impossible for him to divest himself of 
his own culture, for it has penetrated to the roots of his nervous system 
and determines how he perceives the world.” 12 Émile Durkheim did not 
use the word “culture,” but his description of “collective conscience” is 
similar in concept: “The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to 
average citizens of the society forms a determinate system which has its 
own life; one may call it the collective or common view.” 13 These early 
theoretical views of culture are consonant with some popular concep-
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tions of culture even today. The most recent Merriam- Webster Dictionary 
defi nes culture as “the integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, 
and behavior that depends upon the capacity for learning and transmit-
ting knowledge to succeeding generations.” 14 In the culture- as- tradition 
view, culture is ancient, fi xed, unitary, and transferable.
But by the late twentieth century the idea of culture as tradition began 
to morph considerably, at least in intellectual circles. Postmodern intel-
lectuals began to question large, theoretical concepts such as “nation” 
and “culture,” fi nding that the reifi ed conception of culture as a “whole” 
made famous by Tylor “obscures a good deal more than it reveals.” 15 Post-
modernists observed that cultural groups were in fact more internally 
diverse—engaged in dialogue with other cultures, and subject to change—
than the culture- as- tradition formulation allowed. Anthropologists like 
Renato Rosaldo observed that cultures are marked by fault lines such 
as class, race, gender, and sexuality. The postmodernist project was to 
highlight the suppressed or repressed voices that metanarratives sought 
to hide—that is, to de- reify and unmask culture.
But while postmodernism disintegrated culture, it did not destroy it. 
After postmodernism cracked open and fragmented the concepts of na-
tion and culture, new movements in anthropology and “cultural studies” 
stepped in to pick up the pieces. Scholars in these disciplines attempted 
to navigate a conception of culture that is somewhere between the banks 
of culture as a static “thing” and culture as a “fi ction.” Today, whereas the 
dictionary may continue to defi ne culture as refi ned traditions learned by 
individuals in discrete “cultures,” the specialists who study culture, from 
anthropologists to social theorists, shun such a view.
As Cliff ord Geertz memorably characterized it in his infl uential The 
Interpretation of Cultures, “the concept of culture . . . is essentially a semi-
otic one. Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in 
webs of signifi cance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs.” 
Culture describes the meanings that individuals create in order to make a 
home in the world.16 According to this view, culture is made, not found, and 
culture- making is an ongoing, dynamic process, not a fi nished product 
passed down through the ages. In the contemporary view, collective identity 
is “a hybrid, often discontinuous inventive process.” 17 Cultural theorists 
today reject a notion of culture as natural or given and rotely learned, 
instead viewing culture as socially constructed webs of shared meaning.
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culture as commodity
Let us examine another powerful view of culture: culture as commodity. 
Return to Habermas’s account The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, in which Habermas 
tells of the rise of the liberal bourgeois public sphere in late eighteenth- 
and early nineteenth- century Europe during the age of Enlightenment. 
There, for the fi rst time in history, individuals rejected monarchy and feu-
dal social relations in favor of republicanism. The Enlightenment motto, 
articulated by Kant as “Think for Oneself,” extended beyond politics. From 
here on, the people would drive not only politics, but also art, philosophy, 
and literary meaning. “Public opinion” on this vast range of matters was 
formed in what Habermas calls the “public sphere,” places and spaces 
where private individuals gathered as citizens to debate publicly the issues 
of the day. Salons, coff ee houses, pamphlets, and journals became sites 
of critical- rational debate where public opinion could be freely formed, 
and reformed. Habermas’s ideal public sphere has several key features: 
individuals are equals, debate takes place on rational terms, and persua-
sion involves mutual recognition, not coercion. Habermas adopts C. W. 
Mills’s formulation for determining what constitutes “public opinion”:
In a public . . . (1) virtually as many people express opinions 
as receive them. (2) Public communications are so organized 
that there is a chance immediately and eff ectively to answer 
back any opinion expressed in public. Opinion formed by such 
discussion (3) readily fi nds an outlet in eff ective action, even 
against—if necessary—the prevailing system of authority. 
And (4) authoritative institutions do not penetrate the public, 
which is thus more or less autonomous in its operation.18
For Habermas, the promise of Enlightenment was not simply its com-
mitment to public access to cultural knowledge in the form of literature, 
books, and essays, but also its commitment to truly democratic partici-
pation in cultural debates about the meaning of the works themselves. 
Simply stated: intellectual works are the means, not the ends, of Enlighten-
ment. In a democratic public sphere, individuals should have more options 
than just “yes/no responses” to given works. In Habermas’s view, without 
choice and the opportunity for individuals to engage with and debate 
given ideas, there would be no diff erence between republicanism and 
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feudalism. For Habermas, the growth of an autonomous public sphere in 
newspapers, journals, reading clubs, Masonic lodges, and coff ee houses in 
eighteenth- century Europe was crucial for maintaining the people’s inde-
pendence of thought. In an ideal public sphere, thought was not coerced 
by power—be it the king or media moguls. The essential characteristic 
of the public sphere is its “critical” nature, whereby the public no longer 
accepts the authority of the monarch and begins to rationally debate policy 
and morals among citizens themselves. Habermas holds that “ideal” dis-
course occurs where individuals recognize one another as equals, have 
equal capacity to engage in discourse, and can speak uncoerced by power. 
According to Habermas, to have truly public opinion, there should be the 
opportunity for “criticizable validity claims.” 19
But The Structural Transformation tells two tales. The second half 
of the book, Habermas’s earliest work and now a foundational text in 
discussions of the public sphere, chronicles the decline of this Enlighten-
ment culture of rational debate and its transformation into a culture of 
mass media and bourgeoisie commodity consumption in the twentieth 
century.20 Habermas recounts an ironic transformation, whereby the En-
lightenment ideal of access to knowledge led to the commercialization 
of cultural goods for the masses. Two simultaneous developments—the 
rise of mass media, and the introduction of the concept of leisure for a 
bourgeois middle class—transformed the participatory culture of the 
Enlightenment era, when citizens themselves debated and created mean-
ing, into a culture of consumption. “[A]t one time the commercialization 
of cultural goods had been the precondition for rational- critical debate,” 
but over time this access to cultural goods began, “surreptitiously,” to 
become the end and not the means of debate. By the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, we were beginning to see “the replacement of a 
reading public that debated critically about matters of culture by the mass 
public of culture consumers.” 21 Debate itself became a canned commodity 
for consumption and for enjoyment as entertainment and leisure, rather 
than a political activity of the people. Writes Habermas:
Put bluntly: you had to pay for books, theater, concert, and 
museum, but not for the conversation about what you had read, 
heard, and seen and what you might completely absorb only 
through this conversation. Today the conversation itself is ad-
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ministered. Professional dialogues at the podium, panel dis-
cussions, and round table shows—the rational debate of private 
people becomes one of the production numbers of the stars in 
radio and television, a salable package ready for the box offi  ce.22
The focus on cultural products for mass consumption went hand in 
hand with the rise of the concept of leisure23 and with democratization. In 
Habermas’s words, “Anyone who owned an encyclopedia was educated.” 24 
Mass media acquired its power and cultural authority in the name of 
making knowledge accessible to the public. Culture as commodity and 
as entertainment stimulated mental relaxation rather than the engaged 
and critical faculties required for the public use of reason.25 Furthermore, 
there was a heightened separation between cultural elites—intellectu-
als, artists, and big media conglomerates—and the general public. As 
Habermas tells it, “the public is split apart into minorities of specialists 
who put their reason to use nonpublicly and the great mass of consum-
ers whose receptiveness is public but uncritical.” 26 Intellectual property 
rights such as copyright further protected and entrenched a creative elite. 
In short: the public sphere became privatized. Meanwhile, the very core 
of democratic society—a critical and innovative citizenry—was dulled.
Culture as commodities bears some resemblance to culture as tradi-
tion: again, cultural meanings are produced by a few and imposed on the 
many. The irony of commercial “mass” culture is that while culture is 
distributed to a mass public, it is produced only by a few. Furthermore, 
the fl ow of culture from mass media to the public is largely unidirectional; 
cultural products are presented as fi nished products and consumed “as 
is.” Habermas adopts C. W. Mills’s distinction between “mass” opinion 
and “public” opinion as defi ned earlier, noting that in a “mass”
1) far fewer people express opinions than receive them. . . . 
[as] individuals receive impressions from the mass media; 
(2) it is diffi  cult or impossible for the individual to answer 
back immediately or with any eff ect; (3) authorities control 
possi bilities for any action upon opinions; and (4) the mass 
is not autonomous.27
In a commodity culture, Habermas critiques, culture consumers are 
“as little a ‘public’ as were those formations of pre- bourgeois society in 
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which the ancient opinions were formed, secure in their tradition, and 
circulated unpolemically with the eff ect of ‘laws of opinion.’” 28 (Observing 
the similarities between commodity culture and traditional culture, the 
Brazilian musician and culture minister Gilberto Gil has decried advo-
cates of “absolute [intellectual] property control” as “fundamentalists.”)29 
Professional purveyors of culture and media solidify social control, and 
more and more the public comes to accept culture as a given. Commodity 
culture fails Habermas’s ideal of a public sphere because although mass 
media reach a broad public, “they do not fulfi ll the requirements of a 
public process of rational- critical debate according to the liberal model. 
As institutionally authorized opinions, they are always privileged and 
achieve no mutual correspondence with the nonorganized mass of the 
‘public.’” 30 Habermas holds that mass opinion is the result of coercion, not 
consensus. Private interests and power drive debates and social change. 
In sum, the public sphere is “public” in name alone; once again, culture 
functions as imposed tradition.
John Philip Sousa was an infl uential early critic of commodity cul-
ture. Sousa famously lamented “the menace of mechanical music” when 
an improved phonograph was introduced in the early twentieth century. 
The American composer argued that mechanical delivery threatened to 
strip music of its human soul. “Canned music,” 31 he said, would lead to 
the death of amateur musicians and even impede the evolution of humans 
themselves to the point where “we will not have a vocal cord left.” 32 While 
no such biological transformation came to pass, the changes in social cul-
ture Sousa feared are similar to those documented by Habermas. Sousa 
worried that the role of individual creators (now dubbed “amateurs”) 
would diminish and be replaced by that of professional entertainers. “[I]t 
must be admitted that where families lack time or inclination to acquire 
musical technic [sic], and to hear public performances, the best of these 
machines supply a certain amount of satisfaction and pleasure,” Sousa 
wrote, continuing:33
Under such conditions the tide of amateurism cannot but re-
cede, until there will be left only the mechanical device and the 
professional executant. Singing will no longer be a fi ne accom-
plishment; vocal exercises, so important a factor in the curric-
ulum of physical culture, will be out of vogue! Then what of 
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the national throat? Will it not weaken? What of the national 
chest? Will it not shrink?34
Sousa laments the democratic society that loses its voice for lack of ex-
ercising it.
Sousa’s critique, while powerful, is also overblown. Let me state at the 
outset that I acknowledge far more the benefi ts of commodifi ed culture 
than Sousa did a century ago. As even the New York Times observed in 
an editorial response to Sousa in 1907, Sousa’s tirade against “canned 
music” failed to acknowledge the signifi cant ways that “the self- playing 
piano and the improved phonograph . . . are eff ective instruments in the 
spread of culture.” The Times opined that “[a]ppreciation of the best music 
is largely growing through their infl uence,” and “they are musically edu-
cating the multitude.” 35 As Walter Benjamin later observed, mechanical 
reproduction or copies demystify the mystique of the original, allowing 
more democratic access to knowledge. Mass media also spurred the for-
mation of national consciousness and identity, as Benedict Anderson has 
described, because the widespread distribution of common cultural refe-
rents helped cement communities of shared knowledge and experience.
There is another important context in which I do not reject whole-
sale the commodifi cation of culture. In Chapter 1, I discussed the recent 
turn to intellectual property rights by poor peoples in the developing 
world, from the trademarking of Ethiopian specialty coff ees to the San of 
southern Africa claiming patent- like rights in the medicinal properties of 
the hoodia cactus. In such contexts, commodifi cation can have multiple 
benefi ts, from helping to preserve valuable art and knowledge, to giving 
recognition to the world’s diverse authors and inventors, to off ering a 
vehicle for sharing one’s knowledge and culture with others, to providing 
a potentially lucrative means of economic development. As scholars like 
Arjun Appadurai and Rosemary Coombe have shown, cultural commodi-
ties have social and cultural lives and meanings. 
My critique of the commodity view of culture is not Sousa’s—that 
commodifi cation itself is inherently profane and dehumanizing. Rather, 
my critique is of a twentieth- century mentality that began to view cultural 
commodities as the ends and not means of Enlightenment. As Haber-
mas showed, the Enlightenment commitment to universalizing access 
to knowledge perversely led to a single- minded focus on the production 
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of culture for the people, but not by them. Simply stated, and to take just 
one example, the production of books took precedence over a culture of 
book clubs and similar discussion groups. Driven by this logic, utilitar-
ian intellectual property sought incentives for the production of more 
cultural goods, without care for who produced the goods and the terms 
under which they could be engaged.
Today, when scholars and practitioners of intellectual property law 
advocate for this law to promote “culture,” it is largely this commodity 
view of culture. Law protects the incentives of cultural elites, from Apple 
to Disney, to produce cultural products for mass consumption. These 
cultural producers are praised for educating and entertaining the public; 
in turn, current law supports the expectation that the public should pas-
sively receive information products. Worse still, when confronted with 
revolutionary challenges to traditional and professional cultural authority 
at the dawn of the new millennium, we have witnessed new intellectual 
property laws that seek to actively maintain the commodity view of cul-
ture, giving creators even greater exclusive control over their cultural 
products. The recent Digital Millennium Copyright Act, for example, 
imposes criminal liabilities for circumventing technological encryptions 
on digital content and legally obligates Internet service providers such as 
Google to take down copyright- infringing material posted on sites like 
YouTube. The market failure rationale for fair use gives maximum value 
to incentives for professional creators and minimal value to public par-
ticipation in making and sharing culture. In short, the utilitarian logic 
of intellectual property today, which is focused on incentives to produce 
goods, has led to a law that stands fundamentally at odds with the emer-
gent participatory culture.
participatory culture in the twenty-  first century
At the start of the twenty- fi rst century, the century- old conceptions of 
culture as tradition and culture as commodity are being turned on their 
head. True to its motto “Broadcast Yourself,” half of YouTube’s nearly 100 
million videos are “user- created.” 36 A 2007 report by the Organisation for 
Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) estimates that over 
one- third of all U.S. Internet users have posted content to the Internet and 
more than one- half of users under age thirty have produced and shared 
original content on the Web, from blogs to videos.37 Web platforms deriv-
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ing content from users are among the most popular and fastest growing in 
the world, with YouTube the fourth most popular website behind Yahoo, 
MSN, and Google.38 In the music world, bands like Radiohead partner 
with iTunes and GarageBand to give fans the musical components to their 
songs—known as “stems”—to allow users to rip, mix, and burn their own 
tunes. Creators upload their remixes under Creative Commons licenses 
to share with others. The participatory culture of new media is converg-
ing with old media as well. Now even broadcast television shows invite 
audience participation, challenging fans to “create your own superhero,” 
or to develop your own storyline to share with a show’s creators and with 
other fans on a show’s website. Some 20 million viewers call in to vote for 
their favorite talent on American Idol. As Jean Burgess and Joshua Green, 
authors of a new study on YouTube, write, “Consumption is no longer 
necessarily seen as the end point in an economic chain of production but 
as a dynamic site of innovation and growth in itself.” 39
Surely the Internet bears witness to the stupidity as well as the wis-
dom of crowds. An important new book edited by Saul Levmore and 
Martha Nussbaum, The Off ensive Internet, highlights the prevalence of 
sexist and racist harassment in Internet communities, and excruciating 
instances of public shaming of young people who may be most vulnerable 
to peer pressure and abuse. But the solution to such abuses, as contribu-
tors to that book argue, is not to throw out the baby with the bath water, 
but to ask what technological and legal architectures allow for these abuses 
to take place, and whether they can continue to be justifi ed. The goal is 
to root out abusive activity that in fact stifl es participation, while con-
structing law and technology that would allow for broader, productive 
engagement.
It bears repeating that participatory culture is fueled by more than 
technological change. Its roots are undeniably social and political. At its 
core is an Enlightenment claim that all men are intellectuals, capable 
of thinking for themselves and of making knowledge of the world. The 
movement known as “identity politics” in the 1990s grew out of this con-
ceit. Disempowered groups argued that they lacked media power and the 
ability to control their own images and identities. Minorities and women 
pointed out that they were more often the objects of dominant culture, 
rather than allowed to be subjects capable of producing knowledge them-
selves. The social movement known as “identity politics” sought to en-
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hance recognition of cultural others, namely those who had been written 
out of the dominant cultural discourse.
At the turn of the century this social movement converged with a 
technological one. The rise of the Internet and digital technology signifi -
cantly enhanced the possibility of democratic infl uence over meaning- 
making. The Information Age of the late twentieth century has given way 
to the Participation Age of the twenty- fi rst century. Several features of 
the high- technology architecture of the new millennium, from the digital 
medium to the Internet, off er the potential for a return to what Haber-
mas calls the “unfi nished project” of Enlightenment, that is, the promise 
of a time when cultural meaning comes from the people themselves. 
By disseminating more widely the levers of making cultural meaning, 
new technologies—what the legal scholar Michael Froomkin refers to as 
“hardware for democracy” 40—assist us as we seek to think for ourselves, 
refl ecting Kant’s aspiration for humankind.
To be sure, obstacles to full participation remain, among them a 
continuing digital divide, lack of leisure time, and technical incapacity 
(the hardware is still diffi  cult to use for many). Young white men still 
dominate the Internet. And traditional media retain strong control and 
infl uence in new domains, from YouTube to Twitter. But as I will empha-
size, the rise of participatory culture is signifi cant just in its potential. The 
relative ease of commenting on others’ cultural expressions and making 
one’s own content destabilizes traditional cultural authorities, making 
that authority more transparent and contingent. Moreover, the simple 
fact that individuals can more easily participate—even if they ultimately 
choose not to—can itself be empowering.
The technological features of participatory culture include:
• Many- to- many interactivity. While traditional media allowed for 
either one- to- one interactivity (a phone conversation between two 
people) or one- to- many non- interactivity (a broadcast radio or 
television program), the Internet allows many people at once to 
communicate with many others (described variously as “narrow-
casting” or “multicasting”). Given that traditional media tend to 
privilege the message of those with access to the few channels of 
communication, the democratizing potential of this new commu-
nicative power has been well noted, even by the U.S. Supreme 
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Court: “Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone 
line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther 
than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, 
mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become 
a pamphleteer. . . . ‘[T]he content on the Internet is as diverse as 
human thought.’” 41
• Amenability to manipulation and revision. Information stored in 
digital form is far easier to manipulate than information in ana-
log form. Cutting and pasting once involved scissors and glue. The 
digital medium facilitates the rearranging of text, art, music, and 
video, and permits the addition of new elements along the way.
• End- to- end architecture. The architecture of the Internet shifts the 
development of culture away from popular media with top- down 
control to a system known as “end- to- end architecture.” The cur-
rent infrastructure of the Internet offers a system in which intel-
ligence is located not in the middle but at the ends—that is, in the 
computers of the users themselves. This open architecture facili-
tates democratic resistance to dominant cultural discourses. As 
I argue in Chapters 4 and 6, the digital technologies empower 
minorities, girls, women, and the poor who have not been re-
f lected in traditional media to represent themselves and foster 
mutual understanding.42
• Digital hardware. Digital video cameras now abound, creating 
amateur auteurs. Sony’s latest high- definition video camera, 
whose $2,000 price tag makes it an expensive luxury for most 
home users, brings even high- quality video imaging within the 
reach of some middle- class households. The computer itself, of 
course, is the most powerful piece of digital hardware. Its increas-
ing penetration in American households has extended access to 
the digital revolution, though a digital divide still persists.
• Authoring software. Consider Apple’s iMovie, or the music soft-
ware GarageBand, which lets you, depending on your prefer-
ences, feel and sound like a rock star or conduct a full orchestra. 
Both iMovie and GarageBand come free with the purchase of an 
Apple computer. The Web itself comes with authoring software. 
Tim Berners- Lee, the Web’s inventor, insisted that Web software 
include not just a browser, which would enable one to access con-
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tent on others’ computers, but also an editor, which would enable 
the user to add her own content.43 “Mod” software, such as Ma-
chinima, enables users to not merely watch a movie or play a 
videogame, but also to turn the games into film and to “modify” 
or “re- skin” existing characters to look like themselves. Increas-
ingly, software will allow our children to insert themselves into 
their favorite make- believe worlds. Dollhouses now face virtual 
competition.
• Peer- to- peer networks. Technologies of creation require technolo-
gies of communication. Peer- to- peer networks give us each a 
bullhorn, mercifully without forcing anyone else to listen to what 
we have to say. Peer- to- peer services capitalize on the fact that at 
any moment most computers exhaust only a small percentage of 
their computational power and their network access. Bandwidth 
access can be expensive, but peer- to- peer services reduce the need 
for the author to purchase large amounts of it by making the file 
available for download from a variety of distribution points across 
the Internet. Even very large files—typically ones including 
video—can be disseminated rapidly using software such as Bit-
Torrent. The more popular a file, the more readily it becomes 
available via peer- to- peer services. By sharing computing re-
sources across the Web, each of us becomes more powerful than 
we would be standing alone.
• Blogs. Companies such as Google and Moveable Type offer free 
software to create Web- based diaries that enable any individual or 
group to comment on the issues of the day—or on the issues of 
their own lives. They also host such blogs for free. By 2008, 
worldwide blogs numbered over 150 million; nearly 350 million 
people worldwide were reading blogs.44
• Wikis. Even the task of writing a major encyclopedia of the world 
is no longer in the hands of a small group of editors at a major 
publishing house. Wikipedia takes advantage of the distribution 
of human knowledge by permitting individuals worldwide to 
contribute bits and pieces to a large encyclopedia. It is written and 
edited “collaboratively by volunteers, allowing most articles to be 
changed by anyone with access to the website.” 45
• Podcasting and vidcasting. The radio station now faces competition 
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from home-brewed talk and music available on the Internet. The 
wide distribution of mobile digital music players enables users to 
download readily their favorite audiocast and listen to it at their 
convenience. Rather than rely on editors at radio stations to deter-
mine audio programming, podcasting permits anyone to supply 
material, subjecting herself only to the mercy of the audience. 
Fast on the heels of podcasting has been vidcasting, in which 
individuals—equipped with digital camcorders, editing software, 
and a home computer—offer television clips, music videos, politi-
cal commentary, and amateur video blogging on popular sites 
such as YouTube, without requiring the intermediation of large 
studio houses.
• Social networking sites. Individuals have found a powerful means 
of expressing themselves to a community of their own choosing 
through social networking sites such as MySpace, Facebook, 
Orkut, and Twitter. In these sites, individuals can initiate the 
topics—they can set the agenda. Some might protest that much 
of the conversation responds to items in the mass media, from 
television to movies to news.46 But it is in this communal conver-
sation that individuals can question, debate, and criticize what 
is happening around them. Social networking sites also provide 
for a forum for political association. Members of Facebook can 
create or join a “group” with a specific goal or purpose and then 
initiate or comment on discussion topics. Due to social network-
ing sites, countries such as Egypt have seen increased grassroots 
movements by women toward political participation. Facebook’s 
“event” feature, for instance, allows individuals to publicize 
events, including ones that they are initiating. Because of such 
features, authoritarian governments across the world have come 
to see Facebook as a threat. When Ahmed Maher Ibrahim used 
Facebook to organize a protest against the Egyptian president, 
the police beat him—and demanded his Facebook password.47 
And while most social- networking sites consist of communities 
of “friends,” they are not necessarily parochial. Questions like 
“do you like my new haircut” and commands to “see how much 
the baby grew today” are “the ephemera that keep . . . people 
related to each other.” 48
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culture and liberal democratic theory
My account thus far has been largely descriptive. The question remains: 
Why does participatory culture matter? Should we support the rise of par-
ticipatory culture or seek a return to the logics of cultural production and 
consumption that governed the last century? To answer these questions, 
we need to turn to theory. Today there is increasing recognition that par-
ticipatory culture is centrally linked to freedom, equality, democracy, and 
development. It is to the elaboration of these connections that I now turn.
I suggest that John Rawls is much less relevant in this context than is 
Habermas, or Aristotle as elaborated by Nussbaum. Rawls, who is credited 
with elaborating the most important theory of justice in the twentieth 
century, focuses on the requirements for structuring a society that betters 
the least well- off . But Rawls’s concern is political institutions, not culture, 
and he expressly limits his theory to the political sphere, specifying that 
judges, legislators, and citizens should engage in rational debate in the 
public sphere over political matters.49 Rawls’s theory of public reason does 
not apply to normative communities or commitments—what he calls the 
“background culture.” 50 Rawls intentionally “leaves untouched all kinds of 
doctrines, religious, metaphysical, and moral, with their long traditions 
of development and interpretation.” 51
My own interest is culture rather than political institutions. For al-
though Rawls takes as a given the “background culture,” this is precisely 
the arena of privately created and contested meanings that liberal and 
postmodern theories must more critically explore today. In fact, democ-
racy, participation, freedom, and equality are just as important in the 
cultural sphere as they are in the political.
In contrast to Rawls, Habermas takes a much broader view of the 
“public sphere.” Where Rawls takes the background culture as a given, 
and focuses on the creation of public discourse apart from it, Habermas 
views the background culture itself—what he calls the “lifeworld”—as 
his real subject of interest. In his magnum opus The Theory of Commu-
nicative Action, Habermas describes the lifeworld as the background cul-
ture in which we live and act, including everything from traditions and 
communities to language, beliefs, and institutions. While the lifeworld 
is usually taken for granted as self- evident or natural, the challenge of 
a robust public sphere, says Habermas, is to debate everything openly 
and free from coercion, including and especially the lifeworld itself. The 
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public sphere becomes corrupted, or in Habermas’s terms “rationalized,” 
when power controls the lifeworld, making certain ways of being appear 
natural and uncontestable.
Habermas’s lifeworld is not something an individual can exit. The 
lifeworld forms us and provides the language and symbols through which 
we speak and act. And yet the lifeworld can and must be transformed—
thus, Habermas’s conception here stands in contrast to the view of culture 
as tradition that I described earlier. In Habermas’s view, a robust public 
sphere frees culture from being fi xed and determined and reveals the 
lifeworld as something that individuals create, challenge, and can change 
of their own free will. While Rawls leaves the “background culture” un-
touched, Habermas urges that those very normative commitments and 
truths that appear sacrosanct are the ones we should be willing to question 
and critically engage with reasoned arguments. Habermas envisions a 
culture that “puts itself on trial.” 52
Surely, Habermas highlights the instrumental role that culture plays 
in liberal democratic society. Habermas credits the eighteenth- century 
salons and coff ee houses of the Enlightenment with creating the spaces 
in which citizens could develop their critical faculties and form “public 
opinion” by debating the political issues of the day. Signifi cantly, here 
culture was not only an end of Enlightenment but also its means. The 
public use of reason was exercised through the medium of literature 
and literary debates. For Habermas, a robust and autonomous public 
sphere is constitutive of republican democracy. But in Habermas’s view, 
the benefi ts of ideal communicative action go further, from facilitating 
self- development and equal recognition of participants in an inclusive 
public sphere, to engendering social solidarity and mutual understanding 
among participants.
Michel Foucault, most often understood as a postmodern critic of 
liberal theory, at the end of his life penned an important exchange with 
Habermas about cultural critique. In that later work, Foucault also advo-
cates critical engagement with the cultures in which we live. The Enlight-
enment is to be understood not as a specifi c age or epoch, Foucault writes, 
but as a critical “attitude” toward the present.53 Revisiting Kant’s essay 
“What Is Enlightenment?” Foucault concludes that Enlightenment is “the 
attitude of modernity,” which he describes as a commitment to engage 
in “a permanent critique of our historical era.” 54 For Foucault, Enlighten-
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ment is at once “a task and an obligation.” 55 The modern individual can 
simultaneously revel in the present yet assert the liberty to transgress it 
and transfi gure the world. We must recognize “the limits that are imposed 
on us” and then engage in “an experiment with the possibility of going 
beyond them,” Foucault writes. The modern individual “simultaneously 
respects [her] reality and violates it.” 56 For all their diff erences, in this 
fi nal exchange between them, Habermas and Foucault both rejected the 
passive acceptance of culture as tradition in favor of cultural critique.
My praise of participatory culture builds on the insights of these 
philosophers. Habermas and Foucault expanded the focus beyond po-
litical process, noting how culture constitutes self and society while also 
providing the very building blocks for reconstructing the social edifi ce. 
To repeat: we can never leave the lifeworld. But as modern beings we 
must be empowered to question and transform it. Indeed, it is precisely 
because culture is so infl uential in shaping our world and our selves that 
individual rights to debate it and participate in its making are imperative. 
As Jack Balkin has persuasively argued, we need “democratic culture” 
because people must have a say in critiquing and remaking the cultural 
forces that shape their lives, just as democratic citizens have a say in shap-
ing the politics that govern us.57 Democratic culture may be even more 
important than democratic politics. Balkin explains, “[L]aw and gover-
nance are only parts of this world. Culture is an even larger part, and in 
some ways it has an even more capacious role in structuring our lives.” 58
the benefits of participatory culture
Participatory culture is instrumentally and intrinsically related to promot-
ing freedom, engendering equality, and fostering human and economic 
development. I consider here in some more detail particular benefi ts of 
participatory culture in these regards.
Freedom and Equality
Freedom to participate in cultural life stands at the very core of liberty. As 
Salman Rushdie has stated, “Those who do not have power over the story 
that dominates their lives, power to retell it, rethink it, deconstruct it, joke 
about it, and change it as times change, truly are powerless, because they 
cannot think new thoughts.” 59
Additionally, there is a liberty interest in engaging cultural works not 
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just intellectually but also physically, with one’s whole body. Consider the 
human imperative for physical interaction with cultural works by sing-
ing, dancing, dressing up, or acting out favorite lines from a fi lm. Martha 
Nussbaum describes how physically performing in dance or theater can 
itself be liberating, particularly for women. She recalls the Indian intellec-
tual Rabindranath Tagore’s emphasis on empowering women through the 
arts, particularly dance and drama. “Women were his particular concern, 
since he saw that women were typically brought up to be ashamed of their 
bodies and unable to move freely, particularly in the presence of men,” 
Nussbaum writes. “A lifelong advocate of women’s freedom and equality, 
he saw that simply telling girls to move more freely would be unlikely to 
overcome years of repression, but giving them precisely choreographed 
moves to perform, leaping from here to there, would be a more successful 
incentive to freedom.” 60
Today, we can witness precisely these types of liberating moves that 
simultaneously recode popular culture on YouTube. Beyoncé’s hit song 
“Single Ladies (Put a Ring on It)” has inspired hundreds of individuals 
to post themselves dancing to the song on YouTube. Although each video 
entails fans mimicking the pop star’s moves in the original video, the 
individuality of each dancer is unmistakable. Particularly interesting are 
the numerous videos of “Single Ladies” by gay men, a phenomenon noted 
on the popular television show Glee, which focuses on the tribulations 
of high school. Recognizing that young gay men struggle to come out to 
their families and peers during high school, one episode featured a gay 
football player videotaping himself and two female friends doing their 
own rendition of “Single Ladies”—until his father walks in and abruptly 
stops the recording. The young man provocatively lip- syncs Beyoncé’s 
words, “Acting up . . . I could care less what you think.” He continues, “I 
need no permission, did I mention, don’t pay him any attention.” 61 In the 
hands (and feet) of these men, the song “Single Ladies” is reworked as a 
comment both on the possibility of gay marriage and on the performance 
of femininity. These videos persist on YouTube, generating literally mil-
lions of views, because Beyoncé invited fans to create their own versions 
of her hit song. Unlike some artists, Beyoncé seems to embrace partici-
patory culture. She even aired some of the videos during her world tour.
In this example, we can also see how cultural liberty has important 
implications for equality. The liberty to contest hegemonic discourses 
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has particularly profound possibilities for women and other minorities 
who have not traditionally had power over the stories that dominate our 
lives.
We have an intuitive understanding for the value of political dissent 
in a democratic republic. First Amendment theory views dissent as cru-
cial to autonomy and choice, and as a means for discovering truth. But 
what about cultural dissent—that is, the right and ability to disagree with 
cultural traditions or norms? Is not cultural autocracy just as constrictive 
of freedom and equality, especially as experienced by women, gays, and 
others who have suff ered under oppressive cultural traditions? Theorists 
from Bourdieu to Foucault have described the profound ways in which 
culture governs human capability—in Nussbaum’s words, what people 
“are actually able to do and be.” 62 Women may have equal rights on paper, 
for example, but cultural norms about women’s roles profoundly infl uence 
women’s aspirations and opportunities. Misrepresentations and the lack 
of representation of gays and lesbians in mainstream media contribute to 
their leading closeted lives, at times unable to reveal their identities publi-
cally or express themselves. Participatory culture is a means of challeng-
ing oppressive cultural constraints that negatively aff ect both individual 
liberty and social status. As Stuart Hall writes, “Popular culture is one of 
the sites where this struggle for and against a culture of the powerful is 
engaged. . . . It is partly where hegemony arises, and where it is secured. 
. . . That is why ‘popular culture’ matters.” 63
Intellectual property laws are often implicated in contests over cul-
tural meaning, and particularly in challenges to dominant cultural dis-
courses, because many of the most popular cultural images, which gener-
ate far- reaching understandings of gender, race, sexuality, and dominance, 
are protected by copyrights and trademarks. The YouTube videos using 
Beyoncé’s song may violate her copyright, leaving the participants at the 
mercy of her generosity. In 2005, DC Comics demanded that a New York 
gallery cease and desist from showing artist Mark Chamberlain’s homo-
erotic watercolor depictions of Batman and Robin kissing and embracing. 
Mattel has ruthlessly gone after individuals and artists who put Barbie in 
a compromising and unfl attering light. While many artists have emerged 
victorious in legal battles over their right to rework such popular icons, 
their victories have cost millions of dollars in legal fees and have entailed 
years of protracted battles. Worse still, many artists and amateur creators 
201111 Pass 3 press.indd   66 2/10/12   2:23 PM
bespoke culture 67
simply “cease and desist” because they do not have the funds to legally 
discern whether theirs is a “fair use” of intellectual property.
Michel de Certeau describes such acts as resistance to cultural hege-
mony. Individuals engage in everyday resistance to dominant culture by 
a process called “bricolage,” which entails making do and tinkering with 
the cultural images around us to create subversive meanings. Bricolage 
involves “artisan- like inventiveness” by ordinary people; often, the texts 
to which people respond are owned by others.64 “Everyday life invents 
itself by poaching in countless ways on the property of others,” 65 writes 
de Certeau. According to de Certeau, individuals do not receive culture 
as fi xed products, but rather “inhabit” cultural texts “like a rented apart-
ment.” The individual “transforms another person’s property into a space 
borrowed for a moment by a transient.” Just as “renters make comparable 
changes in an apartment they furnish with their acts and memories,” 
de Certeau writes, so “do speakers, in the language into which they in-
sert both the messages of their native tongue and, through their accent, 
through their own ‘turns of phrase,’ etc., their own history.” 66 For de Cer-
teau, the question is not what cultural products are handed down to the 
people but what they make of them. His analysis is both descriptive and 
prescriptive. Culture is the web of meanings in which we make a home; 
it is where we live and the discursive space we “inhabit.” At the same 
time, we are actively spinning our own meanings, contesting hegemony 
through everyday acts of resistance.
Autonomy and Self- Development
In our examples of Indian women acting and dancing and gay men lip- 
syncing on YouTube, we can begin to see more clearly how cultural par-
ticipation is a vehicle of self- development. Simply put: individuals develop 
themselves through culture. In one of the most important pieces of Ameri-
can writing on the signifi cance of art in human life, Art as Experience, 
John Dewey writes that individuality “is realized only in interaction with 
surrounding conditions.” 67 Dewey is critical of both the “classical” ap-
proach to art, which views art as outside of culture, and the “romantic” 
view that searches for that which is fresh and spontaneous.68 Notably, 
Dewey describes the creation of the self and of a work of art in nearly 
identical terms. Both are the creation of what Dewey calls “intercourse” 
between the self and society. “[T]he self is both formed and brought to 
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consciousness through interaction with the environment,” and it is the 
result of such intercourse that we call a “work of art.” 69 Self- cultivation, 
like art, is work—something actively made, not discovered. Both arise 
only from sustained interaction with one’s cultural surroundings.
A “School of Political Participation”
John Stuart Mill described local government as a “school of political par-
ticipation and skill.” 70 Similarly, today we are recognizing the ways in 
which cultural participation serves as an arena for developing engaged 
and active political citizens among the young and old. The election of 
President Barack Obama in 2008 was spurred by an enormous surge in 
cultural creativity shared on the Internet, from Will.i.am’s “Yes We Can” 
video to Shephard Fairey’s now iconic street art ripped and mixed from 
a digital photo. More profoundly, the surge in cultural participation by 
ordinary Americans, especially youth, illustrated how democratic cultural 
participation can bring about broad cultural change.
The relationship between cultural participation and political democ-
racy goes further still. We often hear that the goal of intellectual property 
is to foster innovation. Yet innovation ought not simply mean the produc-
tion of more technical goods. The essence of innovation is critical thinking. 
Participation rather than passive reception in the production of culture 
and science enables a democratic citizenry ready to question convention 
and to seek novel answers to problems, old and new.
Children, too, develop themselves as future democratic citizens by 
actively sharing, debating, critiquing, and re-creating copyrighted and 
trademarked literary works. The central characters in Harry Potter are 
themselves role models for democratic citizenship: they question author-
ity, confront evil, and defend the rights of the weak. (In contrast, the 
benighted “Muggle” family that raises Harry, his aunt and uncle the 
Dursleys, lives by the motto “Don’t Ask Questions.” 71) The rise of partici-
patory groups around the Potter series enables readers to go even further, 
acting out these values themselves in the real world around them. I have 
already mentioned Heather Lawver’s The Daily Prophet, the fan- created 
virtual newspaper for the fi ctional wizarding world of Harry Potter. This 
online newspaper was written and edited by hundreds of children from 
around the world. The stories they penned do not simply mimic the origi-
nal Potter stories but take them further, making the case for the rights 
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of Muggles and house elves, and illustrating by example that children 
should make themselves aware of current events and the news of the day.
We need to ask: Is children’s time best spent in front of a computer? 
Should children not be outdoors, running and playing? In other words, 
critical thinking may be developed by new and enhanced forms of on-
line cultural participation, but what is lost? Will we replace parks with 
computer labs, or relationships with our neighbors and classmates with 
virtual friendships and online communities? I reply that multiple forms 
of engagement—local and global, real world and virtual—are important 
for developing ourselves as individuals and as citizens. Cultural engage-
ment with mass media, in particular, is an important tool for developing 
critical faculties—participatory culture online can teach children to criti-
cally assess and reconstruct information rather than passively receive it.
Furthermore, cultural texts can serve as vehicles for questioning or 
critiquing something in the real world. The Harry Potter Alliance is an-
other real- world extension of the fi ctional Potter universe that illustrates 
this phenomenon. Through the Alliance children are coming together 
to form an army of young citizens dedicated to upholding the Potter 
books’ values of being kind, having the courage to question authority and 
cultural norms, and fi ghting for justice in the real world. The Alliance 
website describes itself as “dedicated to using the examples of Harry Pot-
ter and Albus Dumbledore to spread love and fi ght the Dark Arts in the 
real world,” imploring, “Please join us in creating the real Dumbledore’s 
Army.” 72 Protesting the banning of books (including the Potter books), 
one member asks “everyone to stand up against the Dolores Umbridges 
of the world,” making reference to the narrow- minded teacher in the 
Potter lore. Young members of the Alliance are challenged to “think of a 
banned book that you’ve read that means a lot to you . . . [and then] leave 
a short blog post explaining what that book is and what it means to you.” 73 
The Alliance post concludes: “Let’s prove Hermione right by continuing 
to read books that deal with big ideas and hard issues, despite those who 
would try to keep them off  our shelves and out of our heads.” 74
Henry Jenkins describes a partnering between the Harry Potter Alli-
ance and a citizen watchdog group critical of Walmart.75 Young members 
of the Alliance made campy videos casting themselves in the familiar 
roles of Harry, Ron, and Hermione, but here they are battling the Lord 
Waldemart, who nefariously underpays employees and runs smaller 
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businesses into the ground. We can witness similar play that engenders 
democratic engagement in the multiplayer online gaming worlds, where 
children in middle school run for elected offi  ce and edit the newspapers 
of their online communities.
The increased transparency of knowledge production gives youth 
a healthy skepticism of truth claims, and helps them fi lter fact from 
fi ction—critical skills necessary in a democracy. Furthermore, Jenkins 
argues that simply having the capacity to participate and eff ect change 
empowers youth, regardless of whether they actually participate or not. 
“Even if many of them have chosen not to participate,” concludes Jenkins, 
“they understand their place in the media ecology diff erently because they 
know how easy it is to contribute content.” 76
This important point—that simply having the capacity to have a say in 
political aff airs empowers individuals to make their voices heard—applies 
equally well to children and adults. Today even if individuals are not blog-
ging, they may still be more likely to produce some political content—even 
if that simply means posting comments on citizen blogs and traditional 
media sources, which increasingly invite and air emailed questions and 
“Tweets.” At this juncture, actual participation by the masses may be less 
signifi cant than the widespread knowledge of the potential to contribute, 
which may be empowering enough and threatening to traditional cultural 
and political authority.
Participatory culture aff ects democratic citizenship in a number of 
other ways as well. Participation greatly enhances the sheer amount of in-
formation available to citizens as they critically assess their governments 
and societies. I am far from the fi rst to observe that Wikipedia harnesses 
the wisdom of crowds. This people’s encyclopedia collects the knowledge 
of many diverse peoples rather than simply the knowledge of a few ho-
mogenous cultural elites. Today there is more knowledge in circulation 
than ever before, and even better, it is free and readily available at one’s 
fi ngertips on mobile devices as well as desktop computers. The immediate 
accessibility of information, with the enhanced ability to search for more 
information (revolutionized through Google Books), and then fi nally the 
ability to modify the information itself, democratizes access to knowledge 
in terms of both consumption and production.
To be sure, enlightened public debates about issues from climate 
change to health care reform mandate deeper knowledge and study than 
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cursory online encyclopedia entries allow. And there are real concerns 
that Wikipedia spreads inaccuracies and is dominated by white males. 
But these critiques apply equally to traditional media.
Perhaps more fundamentally, participatory culture demystifi es knowl-
edge itself. Wikipedia’s transparency—illuminating who added or modifi ed 
what information—reveals knowledge production as the result of human 
agency exercised here and now, not something static, given, or natural. 
Publicly airing dissent and the plurality of opinion also delegitimizes 
authorities, whose claims to represent the will of the people may be re-
vealed as false. Ultimately, the challenge to traditional authorities may 
be profound; as Hannah Arendt notes, a “loss of authority” precedes all 
revolutions.77
There is an ethical component to fostering critical thinking within 
cultural spheres. As Amartya Sen has written, “To see identity as merely a 
matter of discovery can not only be a conceptual confusion. It can also lead 
to a dereliction of duty by thinking human beings.” 78 Passive acceptance 
of cultural authority or tradition feeds autocracy and inequality. Cultural 
critique, in contrast, is in Foucault’s words “a task and an obligation” of 
democratic citizens.79
Learning Through Play
The very fi rst copyright law, the Statute of Anne enacted in England in 
1710, was described as “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning.” Born 
during the Enlightenment, copyright has always been a critical tool for 
facilitating learning. Today, we largely focus on the learning that accrues 
from accessing copyrighted works created by others. Yet in the fi elds of 
education and human development, nearly a century of clinical studies 
and theory have elaborated how children learn not by imbibing knowl-
edge from the top down, but by actively working through the cultural 
discourses that surround them through “pretend play.” 80 Role- playing is 
not just a descriptive term for how children learn; studies document that 
it is a normatively benefi cial way of learning, and one that schools have 
increasingly adopted and encouraged. Elaborating on the world around us, 
children mime to learn social roles and yet also take creative liberties that 
test established expectations. Culture for children is a sphere not only of 
entertainment and enjoyment but also of experimentation and innovation.
When my daughter was six, rather than restrict her schoolyard play 
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to house, fairies, or princess games (the dominant culture sold to young 
American girls), she took on the roles of knights and star warriors. My 
son at four pretended he was a boy version of Mei, an inquisitive four- 
year- old girl in the fi lm My Neighbor Totoro. Even such simple pretend 
play that challenges gender stereotypes, studies show, has benefi ts, from 
disrupting dominant discourses about gender roles (a girl can be a knight) 
to engendering sympathy for the other (a boy sees the world through the 
eyes of a four- year- old girl). Indeed, a worldwide phenomenon for adults 
celebrating these same principles, called cosplay (short for “costume role 
play”), has spread from Japan to other parts of the globe. In cosplay, in-
dividuals develop and wear elaborate costumes mimicking their favorite 
anime or manga characters. Within the game gender- switching called 
“crossplay” is common as a vehicle for gaining greater understanding of 
the other and of challenging traditional gender roles.
Recent studies show other benefi ts of role- playing include helping 
children to negotiate confl ict and develop language and collaborative 
skills.81 Perhaps most importantly in our diverse and increasingly inter-
connected world, physically and emotionally inhabiting the role of the 
other helps children learn empathy, as they contemplate what it may be 
like to walk in another’s shoes.82
To be sure, child’s play at recess or at home does not threaten copy-
right holders. The children’s work is not “fi xed” or recorded—thus it does 
not even constitute a “copy” under law. But the new online worlds of fan 
fi ction, interactive gaming, and videotaping for widespread distribution 
on platforms such as MySpace and YouTube threaten copyright owners 
unlike in the past, as the quality of children’s creations—and the reach of 
their work—are signifi cantly enhanced through technology. Consider, for 
example, what happens when yesterday’s most interactive toy—Legos—
combines with digital technology and the Internet. For seventy years, 
the Danish company Lego, which literally means “play well” in Danish, 
has been making interlocking plastic bricks and components for creative 
young minds to build whatever they imagine. In 2007, then- fourteen- 
year- old Coleman Hickey fi lmed a short video starring his Lego fi gurines 
performing “Tonight I’m Gonna Rock You Tonight” from the album to 
Spinal Tap (the fi lm, a spoof documentary of a rock band, is a cult classic 
from the early 1980s). Hickey posted the video on YouTube and received 
an overwhelming response, with over 80,000 hits. But his success did 
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not end there. The band Spinal Tap itself began showing the video to 
audiences during its recent concert tour—that is, until the Lego company 
objected, claiming copyright ownership in the Lego images in the clip. 
Spinal Tap reluctantly agreed to stop showing the video.
For its part, the Lego company, which has seen a signifi cant resur-
gence in popularity,83 claimed it objected to the video because its depic-
tion of the rock stars was inappropriate for most Lego users, who mostly 
range in age from six to twelve.84 Yet Lego has allowed numerous other 
questionable fan- made videos posted on YouTube. One stop- action video, 
“Lego Weapon Store,” opens with the main character entering a (Lego) 
weapon store stating, “I’d like to buy a weapon to kill my neighbor.” The 
store features numerous tiny weapons that Lego actually sells to kids, 
from pickaxes to chainsaws, small pistols, and dynamite.85 “Lego Weapons 
Store” has been viewed by over two million people. And in a parody video 
of the “Girls Gone Wild” video series, called “Legos Gone Wild,” the narra-
tor invites hundreds of thousands of viewers on YouTube to watch as “the 
hottest chicks in town ‘Lego’ their inhibitions”—the video features female 
Lego characters exposing themselves.86 On YouTube, Legos even have sex.
Thus far, Lego has not objected to these videos, regarding them 
as noncommercial use.87 To the extent that individuals are not making 
money using Lego’s copyrighted characters, the company has continued 
to uphold the value of interactivity on which it has been built. Indeed, 
corporate copyright objecting to interactivity may soon be a thing of the 
past. Lego itself unrolled an online interactive version called Lego Uni-
verse in 2010.
There is a fi nal point about learning by doing or playing with copy-
righted works. Individuals learn and master skills by copying and putting 
themselves in the shoes of masters, from musical greats to literary giants 
and star scientists. A new interactive video game, The Beatles: Rock Band, 
hailed by the New York Times as potentially “the most important video 
game yet made,” 88 is premised on this insight. The game allows users 
to “come together” with John, Paul, George, and Ringo, jamming and 
creating songs. Learning is a key goal of the game. As Paul McCartney 
acknowledges, even great musicians hone their skills through imitation.89 
Just as McCartney emulated “Buddy Holly, Little Richard, Jerry Lee Lewis, 
Elvis,” so too will tomorrow’s musicians learn by miming The Beatles 
and other rock bands.90
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Greater Sociability and Sharing
Cultural activity cements social solidarity and community in much the 
same way that social scientist Robert Putnam argues that civic engage-
ment in activities like bowling does. Dancing, singing, story- sharing, 
and acting are often group activities, as are fan- related activities such as 
cosplay and fan fi ction. To repeat: shared meaning is what makes culture 
tick.
Mutual Understanding
For Habermas, there is a moral component to discourse, because pub-
lic deliberation requires “mutual recognition” of others as equal partici-
pants to the dialogue.91 Communication requires recognizing and under-
standing the other. As Antje Gimmler writes, much of the interactive and 
participatory culture of Web 2.0 is built on an implicit understanding of 
Habermas’s discourse ethics. YouTube, he observes, is primarily about 
“sharing” and “social connections, not high quality commercial content.” 92 
The jury is still out on whether YouTube will fulfi ll Habermas’s rigorous 
standards for an ideal public sphere in which dialogue involves “genuine 
negotiation of complexity and diff erence.” 93 Burgess and Green optimisti-
cally opine that YouTube “is an enabler of encounters with cultural dif-
ferences and the development of political ‘listening’ across belief systems 
and identities.” 94 Tweets and blog posts by Iranian protesters during that 
country’s mass protests in the summer of 2009 off er an example. The 
moving images posted on YouTube of the death of the youthful Iranian 
woman Neda Agha- Solten, who was tragically murdered by authorities as 
she peacefully protested for democracy and human rights in her country, 
awakened the world to the courageous quest of millions of Iranians. The 
rapid and spontaneous accumulation of fi nancial support for victims of 
the Haiti earthquake, elicited in part by the dissemination of pictures and 
video of the aftermath, may be another recent variation on the theme of 
digitally facilitated empathic feeling. Long ago, Dewey observed that “the 
art characteristic of a civilization is the means for entering sympatheti-
cally into the deepest elements in the experience of remote and foreign 
civilizations.” 95 Today, ordinary citizens are artist- ambassadors and their 
videos and Tweets are documentaries.
I have already described the important role that art plays in cultivat-
ing children’s creativity, collaborative skills, and empathy for others. In 
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adulthood, these same skills and emotions continue to be engendered 
through participation in the arts. David Winnicott has argued that art is 
the sphere in which childhood play is extended into adulthood. Martha 
Nussbaum describes the arts as a crucial sphere for recognizing the hu-
manity in others because the arts aff ord a rare opportunity to feel emotion 
and contemplate the other as human. In his classic treatment on the role 
of art in social life, Art as Experience, John Dewey concluded that “art is 
the most eff ective mode of communication that exists.” 96
Nostalgia and Remembering
Milan Kundera writes: “Remembering our past, carrying it around with 
us always, may be the necessary requirement for maintaining, as they say, 
the wholeness of the self.” 97 Just as culture can connect disparate peoples 
from across the globe, it also facilitates connections across generations 
and connections between past and present. A simple song, fi lm, or story 
can immediately evoke nostalgia, triggering memories and perhaps even 
a reconsideration of one’s youth. Burgess and Green observe that YouTube 
has become an “accidental archive” of cultural memories. People “spend 
hours at a time watching old music videos, half- forgotten TV commercials, 
or clips from Sesame Street—recapturing memories from their child-
hood or young adulthood.” 98 These cultural artifacts are historical and 
yet also elicit personal, emotional responses among listeners and viewers. 
And again, intellectual property often becomes implicated as individuals 
seek to tell and broadcast their own personal histories told through the 
brands, characters, music, and fi lms owned by corporations. Copyrighted 
songs often form the soundtrack to individual video- biographies. Cultural 
works can become the basis of memories in other ways as well. The fi rst 
generation of youths to read and fall in love with Harry Potter has grown 
up. Now in college, they maintain their connection to the stories of their 
youth by forming real-life “Quidditch” teams, with tournaments to boot. 
“I associate ‘Harry Potter’ with my childhood,” says one senior at North-
western.99 For these young adults, the games are a way to feel secure and 
to stay connected with their past.
Economic Development
President Obama’s mother, the late Ann Dunham Soetoro, spent much 
of her life living and working with poor communities in Indonesia. An 
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anthropologist by training, Ms. Soetoro observed that far from evincing 
wholly diff erent mores and a way of life, the villagers and craftspeople 
with whom she lived and worked had ambitions and lifestyles similar 
to those in the United States. Their heartfelt desire was to participate 
actively in culture and commerce. Inventiveness in rural Indonesia was 
“in plentiful supply,” she observed—indeed, crafts and trade were their 
tradition—and these innovators were also “keenly interested in profi ts.” 100 
The anthropologist in Ms. Soetoro sought to show that studying a diff erent 
culture can ultimately help illuminate the common human aspirations 
that bind us all. Her work reveals a common desire for recognition as a 
creator of the world, and for fair remuneration in global markets. In the 
next chapter, I elaborate on the connections between culture and develop-
ment created by democratic participation in making culture.
critiques of participatory culture
Some scholars have objected to the idea that intellectual property law 
should support individuals’ participation in the development of their cul-
ture. Their arguments generally fall into the following categories. 
Law Should Promote Originality, Not Mimesis
There is a powerful critique of participatory culture: if we do not allow 
people to play in other people’s worlds, perhaps they will create their own 
worlds. And should we not be especially concerned when individuals, 
and perhaps especially children, are mimicking the dominant culture, 
which often exhibits sexism, racism, and class hierarchies? Lego has itself 
come under scrutiny for its recent adoption of play sets with commercial 
themes featuring, for example, Star Wars, Indiana Jones, and yes—Harry 
Potter. As one observer worries, “When you have a less structured, less 
themed set, kids have the ability to start from scratch. When you have kids 
playing out Indiana Jones, they’re playing out Hollywood’s imagination, 
not their own.” 101 More to the point: Do we want children to emulate the 
popular culture with which they are bombarded? Superman and Batman 
are hyper- masculine, praised for their might and not prone to expressing 
their feelings. Female characters are no better; from Tinkerbell to Snow 
White they set up unattainable and misguided standards of perfection 
for girls, from physical appearance to their accommodating qualities. 
Does the emulation of popular culture in pretend play simply encourage 
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the next generation to mimic and replay the unfortunate traditions of 
the past?
These are important concerns, but my approach neither rejects origi-
nality nor condones inequality. Instead, I argue that a closer look at partici-
patory cultural communities, such as the elaborate cosplay and fan- fi ction 
communities among adults, reveals that participants subvert given texts 
in radical ways. In Chapter 5, I describe some of the ways that fan fi ction 
often contests the hierarchical norms of the original—centering the girl, 
for example, or making gay relationships more explicit. As mentioned 
earlier, in cosplay gender switching is not unusual, with women playing 
male roles and vice versa (a feature dubbed “crossplay”). This is also true 
in the context of children’s play. Studies show that children learn creativ-
ity and divergent thinking through pretend play that emulates their exist-
ing worlds, as children extend the original stories in new directions.102 
Furthermore, we have seen that even strict mimesis can have positive 
eff ects; the struggle to re-create the work teaches the individual the skills 
she needs to perhaps create her own original work in the future. But play, 
too, especially for children, must be properly supervised and directed. The 
essence of the participatory culture I advocate is critical engagement in 
contrast to passive reception.
Participatory Culture Breeds Factionalism and Narcissism
Habermas himself has observed that the “Internet has certainly reacti-
vated the grassroots of an egalitarian public of writers and readers.” 103 But 
he has worried publicly about the loss of shared meaning that may result 
when the mass media culture of the last century is fractured into mil-
lions of individualized channels and blogs. Is “bespoke culture” culture 
at all? More recently the legal scholar Cass Sunstein has argued that a 
benefi t of mass media is that it served as a common reference point for 
a broad swath of people. Mass media may have been imposing, but its 
dominance led to the creation of cohesive nation- states with common 
memories and shared values. Sunstein fears that the proliferation of chat 
rooms and social networks dedicated to narrow interests of relatively ho-
mogeneous groups—from Star Trek fans to Sarah Palin foes—will lead to 
cultural fragmentation. Sunstein worries that dissent may decrease on the 
Internet, as individuals tune away from the “Daily Us” to the “Daily Me”—
social networks that reinforce our views rather than challenge them.104
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A related critique is that a world of iP (culture as a community that 
individuals make together) and MySpace is narcissistic. Posters on You-
Tube are self- aggrandizing and seek glory, not mutual understanding. 
Again, the idea is that individualism is trumping community.
But as I have shown, what is most signifi cant about cultural produc-
tion today is that new creators are not leaving the community of oth-
ers, but rather, they increasingly seek to participate in the collaborative 
project of making our culture together. Minorities and gays are inserting 
themselves into a popular culture that would otherwise either ignore 
or debase them—as with the gay Batman and Robin, or an empowered 
girl fi gure in a story where the original hero is a boy. In Chapter 4, I 
consider one of the most important cultural rewritings of our day—the 
African American author Alice Randall’s revision of Margaret Mitchell’s 
classic Gone with the Wind in the unauthorized parody The Wind Done 
Gone, which is told from the perspective of a black slave girl during the 
Civil War period. Rewriting iconic cultural works with themselves front 
and center is a radical tool for historically disadvantaged minorities, who 
have thus far been denied this subjectivity. As Anupam Chander points 
out, for many minorities, Sunstein’s idealized “Daily Us” is the “Daily 
Them.” 105 Claims by girls and minorities to retell popular stories from 
their perspectives are not a rejection of shared culture, but a call for the 
“Daily Us” to better refl ect who we really are.
Participatory Culture Threatens Professional Creators
In the face of the challenge of participatory culture, some scholars argue 
that law must be fi rst and foremost a tool for incentivizing the work of 
professional creators. Behind Andrew Keen’s lament in The Cult of the 
Amateur is the fear that while “intoxicated by the ideal of democratization” 
we will kill “professional mainstream media.” 106 The legal scholar Rob 
Merges has similarly expressed concern “that an over- emphasis on the 
conditions of participation may signifi cantly worsen the conditions for 
original creativity.” He concludes that “IP policy has as one of its central 
functions to attend to the care and feeding of creators of original works.” 107
Keen and Merges are coming from diff erent places. Keen is not a fan 
of participatory culture, which he decries as inferior and shameless.108 But 
current copyright law is not, in fact, focused on promoting only “qual-
ity” content or professional creators, as Keen would suggest. The infer-
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ence of the law’s relatively low bar on “originality” and the lack of any 
rigorous registration process, for example, suggest the opposite—that 
nearly anyone can be a legally recognized creator. Even if we concede that 
quality matters, copyright law implicates more than the production of 
more and better things. Copyright law plays a central role in facilitating 
learning (not only from books but through active and critical engage-
ment with them), democratic citizenship, freedom, equality, and mutual 
understanding.
In contrast to Keen, Merges has much more sympathy for participa-
tory culture—indeed, he would likely concede many of the benefi ts I 
have described here. But he feels that “IP policy has a special obligation 
to promote and encourage professional creatives,” without whose eff orts, 
Merges argues, “our collective culture would suff er enormously.” 109 I am 
sympathetic to the claims of professional creators—indeed, in subsequent 
chapters, I argue that many people who have not traditionally been con-
sidered authors ought to be recognized and rewarded for their cultural 
contributions. I agree that intellectual property law ought to contend 
with issues of livelihood, fairness, and incentives to participate in creat-
ing our culture. But I do not believe that incentives to participate in cul-
tural production should be our only concern. I have shown in Chapter 1 
how an increasingly exclusive focus on incentives and market failure has 
made fair- use analysis narrow. Furthermore, as I have just argued, it is 
simply not the case that current copyright doctrine is structured to favor 
professionals over amateurs, as the low bar on originality and the ease of 
obtaining a copyright suggest.
There is another important point. Merges seems to presume that the 
“creative professionals” are more deserving of protection than others be-
cause their creations are “original” while those of remixers are derivative. 
But characterizations of romantic authorship are often overblown; such 
distinctions often overlook the extent to which all creativity is derivative. 
I examine these issues in more detail in Chapter 6, where I focus on 
cultural sharing—and stealing—between Hollywood and Bollywood.
We Do Not Need Law to Promote Participatory Culture
Some suggest that while participatory culture is important, we may not 
need law to promote it. These observers are optimistic that markets will 
facilitate such participation, off ering enhanced tools for users to make 
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culture themselves if this is indeed what the public demands. Moreover, 
they argue that even where copyright owners have rights to exclude the 
public from using their works, high enforcement costs will mean that 
many users will be able to make use of others’ copyrights without either 
permission or payment. Scholars thus seek to justify the current distri-
bution of entitlements favoring professional creators using a range of 
arguments, from incentives to Lockean labor theory.
But we could argue that law should put its weight on the side of those 
who would dissent from cultural authorities, or those who seek greater 
autonomy to play and share in cultural communities, in order to actively 
balance competing claims and interests. Cultural authorities already have 
the force of tradition and market power supporting them; legal authority 
to suppress dilution and change may be overkill. Just as the First Amend-
ment recognizes the importance of political dissent, intellectual property 
law should acknowledge the importance of cultural dissent.
Notably, recognizing the value of freedom and participation within 
culture need not require wholesale rewriting of the law. The statutory 
fair- use provision of U.S. Copyright Law, for example, expressly privi-
leges “comment” and not just parody or critique. But as I argued in the 
last chapter, the statute has been narrowly interpreted in recent decades 
to promote a singular economic vision of fair use as market failure. In 
fact, fair- use law, with its required balancing of numerous factors and 
express concerns for transformative uses of copyrighted material, can 
accommodate uses that critically engage copyrighted works and put the 
original works to new educational purposes and expressive uses. Broader 
social and cultural theories that recognize the central role of working 
through culture in promoting freedom, equality, democracy, and self- 
development would help ground the law surrounding intellectual property 
and promote human freedom in ways that narrow economic theory alone 
does not.
This is not to rule out doctrinal reform—but specifi c doctrinal re-
form is not my project here. Instead, I urge that what we need is a new 
normative vision of culture and how it matters to be incorporated into intel-
lectual property law. A law that presumes culture to be static products 
or imposed tradition reinforces the power of a few cultural authorities 
and thwarts the ability of ordinary citizens to challenge existing cultural 
discourses and make cultural meaning themselves. These outcomes, in 
201111 Pass 3 press.indd   80 2/10/12   2:23 PM
bespoke culture 81
turn, have profound eff ects on freedom, equality, social relations, politics, 
and economic development.
If the raison d’être of intellectual property law is the promotion of cul-
ture, we need to know what vision of culture we are promoting. The 
theories of culture from anthropology to philosophy I have elaborated 
here usefully complement our current economic analysis of intellectual 
property. The goal of economic analysis is well intentioned: maximizing 
the social welfare. I have sought to show, however, that we need input 
from diff erent fi elds as to just what constitutes social welfare, and how 
conceptions of welfare change over time, in light of new technologies and 
social relations. “Economics as a discipline cannot determine what goods 
or activities provide value to individuals,” Omri Ben- Shahar has written 
in response to my call for the elaboration of social and cultural theories of 
intellectual property to stand beside the economic account. “It welcomes 
any insight from other disciplines, regarding sources of value, including 
insights from cultural perspectives.” Cultural and social theories provide 
insight into the value of cultural production, not just consumption, and of 
working through culture, not simply against it or outside of it. Law ought 
to recognize these benefi ts and consider them when determining the 
metes and bounds of intellectual property.
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as a young child in the  South African hinterlands, Solomon Linda 
spent his nights protecting cattle from lions in the jungle. Later, when he 
was living in a squalid Johannesburg hostel reserved for black migrant 
workers, he recalled this time and composed a song called “Mbube,” 
which means “lion” in Zulu. “Mbube” was sung a cappella, but Linda bor-
rowed the syncopation of contemporaneous American music and added 
his own haunting falsetto overlay. It was 1939. The song became Africa’s 
fi rst pop hit.1
“Mbube” would cross the Atlantic and be reborn fi rst as “Wimoweh” 
and later, “The Lion Sleeps Tonight.” It would go on to be recorded more 
than 170 times, generating millions of dollars, and was eventually incorpo-
rated into Disney’s immensely profi table movie The Lion King. The “most 
famous melody ever to emerge from Africa” 2 added to the wealth of many, 
especially in the United States, but not its composer, who, as I mentioned 
in the Introduction, died destitute from a curable kidney disease in 1962 
at age fi fty- three, with less than $25 to his name. Linda’s children had 
heard their father’s song playing over the radio, but remained unaware of 
their intellectual property claims until a South African writer chronicled 
the injustice in 2000. In February 2006, the publishing house, which 
claimed the song on the basis of an apartheid- era assignment from Linda 
that paid him less than one dollar,3 settled with Linda’s family. The settle-
chapter three
Fair Culture
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ment would come too late for his daughter Adelaide, who died of AIDS in 
2001, lacking the resources to purchase antiretroviral treatment. Two of 
Linda’s other children had died as babies, one of malnutrition.
The international circuit traveled by “Mbube” links north and south, 
past and present, copyrights and patents, songs and medicines, intel-
lectual property and development. This story of international injustice 
illustrates a number of points. First, it demonstrates the intercultural di-
mensions of creativity. Linda’s creation off ers an exemplar of Paul Gilroy’s 
“Black Atlantic” thesis, evidencing the interchange of cultures across the 
African diaspora. Second, it shows that cultural exchanges can take place in 
the presence of sharp diff erences in power and knowledge. Taking the warning 
of Linda’s story to heart, African lawyers today urge local creators to pro-
tect themselves from a similar fate by learning their rights. Third, Linda’s 
tale tragically illustrates the interrelationships among intellectual property 
rights and other freedoms. Linda’s failure to be recognized—and remuner-
ated—for his contribution to our shared culture in turn prevented him 
and his family from having the resources to access life- saving medicines, 
fi rst for himself, and then for his daughter. Intellectual property law 
both incentivized the creation, and in due course, exacted a high price 
for their retroviral drugs, a price his family could not aff ord even to save 
a life.
In this chapter, I will try to articulate a vision of intellectual property 
that comprehends the complexities and import of cultural production 
in a global context and, in so doing, helps to promote more just global 
social relations. Intellectual property does not merely incentivize and 
reward creators; it structures cultural and social relations. Intellectual 
property not only governs the production of life- saving medicines or work- 
saving machines, but also disciplines their distribution. The relationship 
between intellectual property and development goes well beyond GDP. 
Economic, social, and cultural rights are interconnected and mutually 
reinforcing: as in the case of Solomon Linda, intellectual property rights 
aff ect one’s social standing, health, and overall well- being.
Intellectual property utilitarianism neglects these deeper connections 
between culture and economics. Law’s focus on the economics of cul-
tural activity is narrow, recognizing law’s role in stimulating the optimal 
level of creative production (however elusive this goal may be), and the 
market’s in rationing distribution. As I have argued, the goal is creating 
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the greatest number of cultural artifacts to be trickled down to the great-
est number of people. The utilitarian approach to intellectual property 
does not ask: Who makes the goods? Who profi ts, and at whose expense? 
The approach ignores the moral failure to distribute essential knowledge 
goods, from textbooks to medicines, widely, so long as there is no market 
failure afoot. But in this chapter my critique goes further. I argue that the 
current narrow economic approach to intellectual property has failed to 
comprehend the broad eff ects that this law has on structuring cultural 
and social relations, and how diff erences in power and knowledge, in turn, 
aff ect one’s ability to acquire intellectual property. Intellectual property 
recognizes some authors and inventors, and misrecognizes others. In 
turn, law apportions the material spoils of creativity unequally. Cultural 
standing ultimately aff ects social standing and individual well- being, as 
some people come to lack the resources to furnish themselves with the 
basic accoutrements to live a healthy and fulfi lling life.
Furthermore, the economic approach, with its reliance on the market 
to distribute cultural and social benefi t, has failed to recognize asym-
metries in the world, including the unequal capacity to participate on 
fair terms in global markets. The Solomon Linda story illustrates how 
intellectual property laws exacerbate these incapacities rather than relieve 
them. This must no longer be the case. Today, the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) has pledged to reorient intellectual prop-
erty law from its exclusive focus on incentives to the broader promotion 
of development. I believe that meeting this ambitious goal will require a 
theory of culture and development that goes beyond those that have been 
off ered by contemporary intellectual property scholars.
why free culture is  not enough
A principal critique of the intellectual- property- as- incentives story is that 
broad and durable property rights might jeopardize further creation. Law-
rence Lessig and James Boyle have demonstrated the risk that maximalist 
intellectual property laws pose to innovation.4 Their concern resonates 
with the economists’ concern for effi  ciency. The fear is that property 
rights that are too many and too broad will stifl e innovation. A maximal-
ist intellectual property law proves to be poor innovation policy.5 Before 
we can stand on the shoulders of giants, we will need to beg their per-
mission. The libertarian might respond by arguing that one should not 
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borrow—that one should be clever enough to make one’s point without 
relying on others’ production. But scholars such as Suzanne Scotchmer 
have shown that innovation is often incremental, with new discoveries 
building on older ones.6 Requiring downstream innovators to purchase 
licenses from upstream ones might at times run aground on the diffi  culty 
of assembling (and paying for) all the necessary licenses.7 A vibrant public 
domain, however, becomes a fount of creativity, and thus preservation of 
such a domain is vital to innovation.
Lessig’s insight goes beyond innovation policy to consider the re-
quirements of a free society. In his book Free Culture, he worries about 
the development of a culture where we will need permission to speak if 
that speech involves borrowing someone else’s words. A free culture is 
not merely effi  cient; it is essential to a democratic society. Lessig affi  rms 
the value of freedom to participate “in culture and its growth.” 8
But there are several reasons why Lessig’s passionate plea to protect a 
free culture is yet incomplete. First, the dynamics of culture itself remain 
unexplored in Lessig’s account; the cultural vision embedded within the 
call for a free culture remains obscure. But without a cultural account we 
cannot fully understand the relationships among intellectual property, 
culture, and freedom. This book seeks to set forth a fuller vision of culture 
itself and some of these rich relationships.
Second, Lessig’s account fails to acknowledge people’s unequal ca-
pacity to exercise the freedoms that law provides. Freedom in theory is 
not freedom in fact. Contemporary public domain scholars hold as their 
paradigm fi gure the “commoner” who easily appropriates popular art 
and innovations for his or her own purposes. But this conception fails to 
acknowledge disparities in the ability of individuals to exercise their free-
doms. In truth, the public domain movement leaves the common person 
to the mercy of an unregulated marketplace where she must struggle to 
realize her rights. Public domain advocates seem to accept that because a 
resource is open to all by force of law, that resource will indeed be exploited 
by all.9 In practice, however, diff ering circumstances—including knowl-
edge, wealth, power, and ability—render some better able than others to 
exploit a common resource.10
Third, Lessig’s vision of freedom sometimes leads him to give short 
shrift to other values. In 2004, the Creative Commons, which Lessig and 
Boyle helped found, introduced a Developing Nation’s License, which 
201111 Pass 3 press.indd   85 2/10/12   2:23 PM
86 fair culture
would allow authors to commit their work for free use in the developing 
world, but retain their full rights in the developed world.11 Lessig praised 
the license as allowing creators to participate, fi rsthand, “in reforming 
global information policy.” But the license was quickly retired for failing 
to “meet the minimum standards of the Open Access Movement” because 
it “does not free work in any way” in the West.12 In short, Lessig’s libertar-
ian vision of “free culture” would give up on those authors who hoped 
to use copyright to promote more egalitarian values and development.
Fourth, the vision of freedom embedded in Lessig’s free culture is 
ultimately expressed through the marketplace. This leaves cultural and 
other knowledge production to the mercies of the market. Governments 
must consider directly whether knowledge production requires more di-
rect support, through alternative mechanisms such as prizes and sub-
sidies. The U.S. Congress recognized that certain diseases may aff ect 
too few people to incentivize drug companies to invest the enormous 
resources required to produce treatment. The Orphan Drug Act of 1983 
off ers tax breaks to drug companies that produce treatments for such 
diseases (though it is unclear whether the tax benefi t is greater than the 
resources required to produce the drugs). The realization that states may 
need to step in to support some cultural activity applies to minority cul-
tures as well. Markets may not be the best mechanism for stimulating 
poetry in the vernaculars of less economically powerful communities. 
The support of the arts often has many knock- on economic and cultural 
benefi ts, and is often regarded by governments as key to a successful 
economic development policy.
Fifth, Lessig’s theory of free culture tends to romanticize freedom 
in the past. Lessig begins from the premise that a “free culture has been 
our past.” 13 But the story of Solomon Linda begs the question: even when 
copyright terms were shorter, were people equally free? Who could par-
ticipate, and who was left out? A more critical historical account would 
recognize that we have traditions of both freedom and oppression, and 
that not all of our traditions are worth preserving—indeed, our public 
domain tradition is rife with examples of exploitation of the knowledge 
and creativity of traditionally disadvantaged groups and the poor (I explore 
some examples in Chapter 6). Furthermore, Lessig’s privileging of free 
culture in the past does not acknowledge the important ways in which 
our conceptions of culture have changed. As I showed in Chapter 2, for 
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more than a century the prevailing view of culture has been one of static 
tradition and imposed authority—a far cry from free culture.
Finally, public domain advocates do not suffi  ciently acknowledge 
the extent to which the romantic rhetoric of the public domain obscures 
unjust appropriation. Pioneering public domain scholars such as Boyle 
point out that the rise of the “romantic author” helped to mask the impor-
tance of the public domain for innovation. The romantic author presumed 
that artists create out of thin air, rather than borrow from a rich and 
diverse public domain.14 In truth, however, most innovation is derivative, 
building on earlier works and discoveries. Even the world’s most famous 
copyright owner, Disney, thrived by mining the works of past creators, 
from Rudyard Kipling to Victor Hugo to Robert Louis Stevenson, as I 
discuss further in Chapter 6. But the romance of the public domain is 
guilty of its own subterfuges. Unlike the works of Kipling that Disney 
appropriated, Solomon Linda’s song suff ered the common fate of being 
falsely and conveniently cast as belonging to the public domain. Linda’s 
composition was performed and recorded by the Original Evening Birds. 
But recording artists across the Atlantic treated the song as African “folk-
lore” and therefore as part of the public domain and free for the taking. 
Pete Seeger, one of the fathers of American folk music and world music, 
heard the African hit. He turned “Mbube” into “Wimoweh” in the 1950s 
and registered the copyright in the new composition under his alias Paul 
Campbell.15 (Seeger has recently decried this apparently common practice 
on Tin Pan Alley, and I will return to his confessional at the end of this 
chapter.16) A decade later, by the time “Wimoweh” was being rewritten 
as “The Lion Sleeps Tonight” by the American music legend George 
Weiss, Weiss “leapt to the obvious conclusion: ‘Wimoweh’ was based on 
an old African folk song that didn’t belong to anyone. As such, it was fair 
game.” 17 The South African journalist Rian Malan notes that the liner 
notes to the song by Weiss, who later rose to become president of the 
Songwriter’s Guild of America, described “Mbube” as “a familiar Zulu 
song about a lion hunt.” 18 Lest one think that I am testing the actions of 
earlier generations with the copyright ethics of our generation, I should 
point out that Seeger’s father, Charles Seeger, published an article titled 
“Who Owns Folklore?” in 1962. “American and European copyright law 
has been designed to encourage the acquisition and retention of property 
under rules favoring the more enterprising citizens,” he wrote. But, he 
201111 Pass 3 press.indd   87 2/10/12   2:23 PM
88 fair culture
concluded, the folk song is “entirely a product of plagiarism” and the act 
of claiming copyright in it “unethical.” 19
Solomon Linda’s story serves as warning that intellectual property 
should not be the law of the jungle. As Linda’s tale shows, simply leaving 
a resource in the public domain is not enough to satisfy societal ideals. 
Our laws must serve to facilitate the free fl ow of culture but on fair terms. 
This will require, fi rst, recognizing inequalities in people’s capacity to 
participate in cultural production, and second, ensuring fairness in cul-
tural exchanges, which may otherwise exploit innovators with unequal 
wealth, knowledge, or social status.
The skeptic will object. Solomon Linda’s tragic story is one of the 
past, and a distant past at that. Apartheid is no longer; no limits to free-
dom of contracting exist for Africans even in South Africa. Moreover, 
does not Linda’s story prove the importance of economic compensation 
as essential to intellectual property? Thus, does it not underline the eco-
nomic rationale for intellectual property off ered by contemporary law and 
economics accounts of the subject? Indeed, does it not link that account 
with a view of justice?
Solomon Linda’s tale is the grossly magnifi ed version of commonplace 
inequities.20 Today, creativity around the world fl ourishes, but few have the 
knowledge to commercialize on fair terms and sustain a livelihood. Even 
the Beatles sued their publisher for unpaid royalties. Furthermore, Linda’s 
story shows that respecting a creator’s rights can sustain livelihoods, even 
if exclusive rights prove unnecessary to incentivize the original creation. 
At the same time, unequal marketplace treatment can discourage people 
from sharing their knowledge, leaving creators to adopt the strategy that 
intellectual property lawyers call trade secret. This defeats a central pur-
pose of culture—sharing, participating, and making meaning together. 
toward a fair culture
The critique of free culture must be supplemented with a more complex 
vision of the relationship between culture and freedom. My vision builds 
upon Lessig’s free culture, but seeks a role for law in promoting equal 
capacity to meaningfully participate in making our culture. Others have 
spoken of the importance of fair culture. A report by the Finnish Min-
istry of Education, Science, and Culture defi nes “fair culture” as “the 
realization of cultural rights and the inclusion of everyone in cultural 
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signifi cation, irrespective of their age, gender, ability, or ethnic, religious 
or cultural background.” 21 I adopt that defi nition here, and elaborate on 
the normative vision that underlies fair culture.
Like free culture, a central value animating fair culture is still free-
dom. But where Lessig found his inspiration for free culture in the writ-
ings of technological guru Richard Stallman, who decried permissions 
to access software code from a largely libertarian position, I fi nd my 
inspiration in Amartya Sen’s concept of “development as freedom,” an 
idea that relies on Sen’s and Nussbaum’s focus on expanding human 
capabilities. Both Stallman and Sen take freedom as their touchstone 
value. “Greater freedom enhances the ability of people to help themselves 
and also to infl uence the world,” Sen explains.22 Sen’s conception thus 
sees freedom not only as an end but also as a means of development. Sen 
praises “agency- oriented” programs for development, whereby the poor 
improve themselves not by being the passive benefi ciaries of “cunning 
benefi t programs,” but rather by freely exercising their capacity to work 
and participate in markets. Hence freedom is both a right and a tool for 
advancing further freedom. Moreover, Sen’s approach recognizes that 
diff erences in individuals’ social, cultural, and economic standing aff ect 
their capacity for exercising freedom. Like free culture, fair culture values 
freedom but, going further, seeks to spread the capacity for citizens to 
meaningfully exercise their freedom.
In earlier chapters I have argued that participatory culture is norma-
tively valuable in its own right. As Amartya Sen has shown, development 
requires far more than meeting basic needs and enhancing GDP. Sen’s 
vision of development as freedom requires improving each person’s capac-
ity to make choices and meaningfully participate in political, economic, 
and cultural life. The capacity to participate in cultural life has particularly 
important implications for human fl ourishing. First, the cultural spheres 
of life are those we typically associate with the communities or experi-
ences that give one’s life meaning. Participating in a religious or cultural 
community; listening to or making music with others; posting a video to 
YouTube of your child dancing or creating a “video response” to someone 
else’s post; reading, watching, and then rewriting Harry Potter—promot-
ing freedom to partake in these activities may be thought of as central to 
what development is for, that is, the opportunity to innovate, share ideas, 
and enjoy life with others. Singing, reading, writing, innovating, and 
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sharing: these cultural activities are crucial to human fl ourishing. Indeed, 
the right to freely “participate in the cultural life of the community,23 to 
enjoy the arts and to share in scientifi c advancement and its benefi ts,” is 
recognized in article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and countless other human rights instruments.24
At the same time, freedom to create and share with others in work 
and play has important implications for other freedoms. In this chapter, 
I elaborate how enhancing participation in culture can also serve as a 
means of development. A central insight of Sen’s theory of development 
as freedom is the recognition of “the mutually reinforcing connection 
between freedoms of diff erent kinds.” 25 Let me consider two important 
connections here. First, cultural participation helps secure livelihood. As 
Solomon Linda’s story illustrates, all people—rich and poor, from North 
or South, white or black—may serve as the source of culture that can be 
shared globally. Additionally, Linda’s story illustrates that tremendous 
wealth may be generated from cultural knowledge production; experts 
value Linda’s single song in the millions of dollars. This wealth may, in 
turn, be used to promote basic needs, such as health and safety. In short, 
at the turn of the millennium, the Participation Age and the goal of pov-
erty eradication have dovetailed. The concept of fair culture yokes together 
meaning and livelihood. Indeed, as knowledge in the new millennium 
leads to social and economic power, the role of culture in development 
promises to be profound.26
Ironically, the law- and- economics analysis often gives short shrift 
to the actual economic consequences of intellectual property. Of course, 
property rights facilitate marketplace transactions that generate wealth. 
But the vision pays little heed to questions about who has access to life- 
saving medicines, who earns money from her creativity or industry, and 
whether the legal system promotes innovation in cosmetics or vaccines 
for tropical diseases. As Linda’s story shows, the answers to these ques-
tions are interrelated.
There is another important connection between participatory culture 
and social and economic well- being. Social power derives from controlling 
knowledge, or discourse. Who is speaking matters. We may reconsider 
one of the most important recent decisions in U.S. copyright law with 
this in mind. For much of a century, the most popular account of life on 
a slave plantation has been Gone with the Wind. That was until one Alice 
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Randall disturbed Margaret Mitchell’s idyll by retelling the story from the 
perspective of a slave protagonist on the O’Hara plantation, and thereby 
laying bare the racism and objectifi cation of the original.27 A U.S. appellate 
court held Randall’s The Wind Done Gone to be a parody, and therefore a 
“fair use” of the original. Most accounts of this case champion the deci-
sion as enhancing free speech in the form of criticism, and promoting the 
production of more intellectual works (viewing copyright as the “engine 
of free speech”). But they have missed the novel’s act of cultural revolu-
tion. The Wind Done Gone represents a shift in the distribution of power 
in cultural production and meaning- making. We must see intellectual 
property law as regulation of meaning and, in turn, of the social relations 
that fl ow from how we envision our world. Indeed, there are even claims, 
likely exaggerated, that the depiction of black presidents in Hollywood 
media paved the way for President Obama (a particularly surprising claim 
given Hollywood’s resistance to calls for greater diversity in its casting).28
These claims refl ect the rise of the late twentieth- century social 
movement that Charles Taylor calls “the politics of recognition.” Taylor 
eloquently described the emergence of a new paradigm for understanding 
equality, where minority groups decried not material deprivation but 
psychological injury deriving from demeaning and misleading cultural 
images expressed in mainstream media and markets. “Nonrecognition 
or misrecognition” of one’s identity, Taylor wrote, “can infl ict harm, can 
be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and 
reduced mode of being.” 29 Power derives from the ability to shape and 
infl uence culture; inversely, those who do not have the power to create 
and contest culture “truly are powerless.” 30
Some critique identity politics for its temptation to place representa-
tion above other concerns, such as the distribution of social and economic 
power.31 The challenge, as Iris Marion Young described it, is when “mis-
recognition” becomes a “problem independent of other forms of inequal-
ity or oppression.” 32 I embrace an understanding of identity politics that 
recognizes the “interpenetration” of culture and economics. Cultural 
representation—in the form of who is represented, how, and under what 
terms—aff ects economic and social power, and vice versa. To be sure, 
analyses of “cultural diff erences” are often overblown and essentializing; 
for this reason, some scholars are wary of cultural analysis altogether. But 
the mere fact that many have taken an overly simplistic or erroneous view 
201111 Pass 3 press.indd   91 2/10/12   2:23 PM
92 fair culture
of identity and culture does not mean that we ought to turn our heads 
from the important ways in which a cultural analysis matters. As I have 
argued earlier, we ought not to discard cultural analysis but rather we 
should employ it more critically, retaining a commitment to recognizing 
the heterogeneity, dynamism, and interconnectedness of cultures. We 
must avoid the trap of viewing “culture” as separate from other factors 
related to inequality. As Arjun Appadurai writes, “The challenge today 
. . . is how to bring the politics of dignity and the politics of poverty into 
a single framework.” 33
This is beginning to happen. Nancy Fraser has led the charge that 
identity politics, with its focus on representation and dignity, abandoned 
the traditional goal of social movements: redressing material inequality.34 
But the more recent linking of identity politics to intellectual property, 
which I describe in this book, brings social movements back, full circle, to 
issues of distribution. In India, local artisans apply for “geographical indi-
cations” in Darjeeling tea and Mysore silk, which would grant an exclusive 
right to peddle goods under these names. In Australia, aboriginal commu-
nities assert copyright in their artwork. And, as described earlier, Ethiopi-
ans have trademarked the names of their specialty coff ees, often praised 
as the best coff ees in the world, in the hopes of retaining more control 
over the global social meaning of the coff ees and the hearty profi ts they 
command in global markets. Diasporas, the Internet, and international 
travel have brought the danger of distant foreign exploitation to the atten-
tion of local artisans. Increasingly today, diverse authors and inventors 
seek recognition and to benefi t materially from their cultural production, 
especially where recognition and material benefi t were denied in the past.
These claims suggest, as a UNESCO Convention on the Protection 
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions makes plain, the 
complementary nature of the cultural and economic aspects of develop-
ment. The UNESCO Convention urges that the cultural contributions of 
the poor be encouraged, recognized, and materially rewarded. These new 
claims for intellectual property understand rights not just in the familiar 
terms of incentives- for- creation, but also as tools for both recognition 
and remuneration. Tracking a shift in human- rights thinking away from 
fi rst- generation rights (civil and political rights) toward second- generation 
rights (culture, development, and distributive justice), new claims for 
intellectual property rights by the historically disadvantaged tether so-
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cial justice movements to the attainment of greater cultural, social, and 
economic power. Intellectual property is increasingly understood as a 
legal vehicle for facilitating (or thwarting) the recognition of diverse con-
tributors to cultural and scientifi c discourse. Call it the property turn in 
identity politics. Wielders of this law increasingly deploy the law to create 
and benefi t from the processes of meaning- making.
Current intellectual property law addresses economic incentives but 
focuses little on livelihood. Current law’s raison d’être is to promote cul-
ture but it pays no heed to the value of participating in communities or 
the importance of shared meaning. Law is concerned with producing 
more goods but is indiff erent to the kinds of goods being produced, or 
more aptly, to which goods fail to get produced in the absence of market 
incentive. This need not be the case. Intellectual property law can be 
understood through a broader cultural and economic lens focused on live-
lihoods, social relations, and well- being. Solomon Linda here becomes a 
metonym for those human beings involved in the transnational processes 
of collaboration, cultural production, and wealth creation. Cultural theory 
takes as a starting point that human beings are creative, continually seek-
ing to make and remake our world, contributing to commerce and culture, 
science and spirituality. Individuals demand and deserve both recognition 
and remuneration for their intellectual production. As a United Nations 
report puts it, “At its best, the Knowledge Society involves all members 
of a community in knowledge creation and utilization. The Knowledge 
Society is not only about technological innovations, but also about human 
beings, their personal growth, and their individual creativity, experience 
and participation.” 35
To repeat: the vision of culture here is not one of enclaves fenced 
off  from one another seeking “protection” or making claims for “sur-
vival.” Recall that “fair culture” is committed to free culture in the sense 
of facilitating open cultural exchanges. Fair culture promotes the view 
that individuals can claim the world’s heritage as one’s own. “Whatever 
we understand and enjoy in human products instantly becomes ours, 
wherever they might have their origin,” Rabindranath Tagore famously 
asserted. “I am proud of my humanity when I can acknowledge the po-
ets and artists of other countries as my own. Let me feel with unalloyed 
gladness that all the great glories of man are mine.” Indeed, the impact 
of “Mbube” has been truly global. The song has appeared at Navajo pow-
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wows, President John F. Kennedy’s last birthday party, and the Apollo 
space launch.36 It has been rendered by generations of artists, from Glen 
Campbell to R.E.M. to Phish. Solomon Linda’s tune, journalist Rian Ma-
lan writes, “has penetrated so deep into the human consciousness over so 
many generations, that one can truly say, here is a song the whole world 
knows.” 37 Furthermore, in order to create new cultural or scientifi c works, 
individuals need access to globally produced knowledge, which serve as 
building blocks for this future innovation. Solomon Linda himself relied 
on American jazz for his innovation.
At the same time, a cultural approach would acknowledge that global 
asymmetries of capability threaten cultural production and sharing, and 
raise important ethical questions about global culture fl ows. Not everyone 
can realize his or her creative aspirations if, for example, the home country 
lacks a research and development infrastructure, funding for innovations, 
adequate health care, access to information, or a lack of access to capital, 
especially venture capital. Moreover, dominant culture industries have 
economies of scale that enable easier production and dissemination of 
cultural products around the world. Thus some cultures are more capable 
than others of being heard and having infl uence.
what is  a “fair culture”?
A “fair culture” should seek to promote free cultural exchange on fair 
terms. A central concern of a cultural approach to intellectual property 
should be how to facilitate cultural production that involves inter- and 
intra- cultural borrowing in a socially just manner. The UNESCO Conven-
tion on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expres-
sions, mentioned earlier, recognizes the twin goals of promoting sharing 
of cultural expressions, on the one hand, and providing fair recognition 
and remuneration, on the other. The convention celebrates “intercultur-
ality”—that is, the exchange of ideas among cultures—and eschews a 
conception of cultures as hermetically sealed off  from one another. Yet 
the convention also recognizes that rapid globalization and new tech-
nologies simultaneously “aff ord unprecedented conditions for enhanced 
interaction between cultures” and “represent a challenge for cultural 
diversity, namely in view of risks of imbalances between rich and poor 
countries.” The convention links culture to development goals and would 
foster respectful and equitable interactions between and within cultures.
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A richer cultural vision of how people create (within and across com-
munities), why people create (to share experiences and make meaning with 
others), and which obstacles threaten cultural sharing (especially unequal 
human capacity and global asymmetries of power) should include the 
following tenets:
Fairness as the capability to participate in cultural production. A narrow 
focus on spurring innovation through intellectual property rights fails to 
diff erentiate between capacities to innovate or, perhaps more importantly, 
capacities to commercialize innovation. Such capacities may be limited 
because of small home markets or the absence of government funding 
for research and development.38 Furthermore, the expansion of intellec-
tual property rights globally has not been coupled with a reinvigorated 
commitment to global development. Foreign aid budgets have largely 
stagnated or declined—and so are hardly likely to compensate for the 
huge net royalty payments for intellectual property now fl owing from 
the South to the North as a result of the Trade- Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, which I consider in more 
detail in Chapters 5 and 7.39 Recognizing the fact of global inequalities 
(both within and across communities) requires focusing on improving 
the capacity to participate in knowledge production. Some examples of 
affi  rmative assistance to boost local innovative capacity include World 
Bank lending programs that build capacity in science and technology, 
government assistance to secure export markets for local producers, and 
the enactment of local laws in developing countries that require developed 
world partners to involve and train local scientists in joint projects con-
ducted in the developing country. Microloans to poor entrepreneurs who 
do not otherwise qualify for bank loans are yet another important tool for 
addressing the capital defi cit that impedes innovation in the developing 
world. Finally, local innovators need to be educated about prospects for 
commercializing their innovations on fair terms.40
Crucial to this goal is improved access to information tools, from 
innovative programs such as “One Laptop per Child,” which produces 
and disseminates laptops endowed with software designed to spur “col-
laborative, joyful, self- empowered learning,” to technology transfer under 
TRIPS, to the development of Web 2.0 software that empowers users to 
make culture themselves. Additionally, being attentive to the most basic 
human capabilities, for example, health, is vital: intellectual property laws 
201111 Pass 3 press.indd   95 2/10/12   2:23 PM
96 fair culture
should thus recognize the moral claims to promote access to essential 
medicines. The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health promotes 
such capacity by ensuring countries’ fl exibility to provide essential medi-
cines to their people. Similarly, a proposal for an international treaty on 
copyright exceptions and limitations would enhance the poor’s access 
to educational materials. All of these eff orts, inside and outside formal 
intellectual property law, seek to promote free culture in fact, not just as 
abstract theory, by improving the human capacity to create.
Fairness as recognition. Even where people do create, law can fail to 
recognize their creativity as authorship or invention. Recognizing poor 
people’s claims to their creative knowledge need not require the creation 
of new intellectual property rights, but likely will entail critically exam-
ining our preconceptions of what is “public domain.” Often, the poor’s 
contributions meet the requisite requirements of novelty demanded by 
intellectual property law—as they did in Linda’s case—but the poor lack 
knowledge of their rights, as well as the skills and capital necessary for 
commercializing their contributions. In Chapter 5, I show that our dis-
tinctions between “traditional” and “modern” knowledge are often over-
drawn. What is often cast as traditional, created by anonymous collectives, 
passed down over generations, and remarkably, static over millennia, is 
in fact often vibrant, novel, and created by recognizable and identifi able 
living individuals. In India the Honey Bee Network, founded by innova-
tion professor Anil Gupta, sets out to show just this: that Indians are 
economically poor but knowledge rich. Twice yearly, Gupta and nearly 
a hundred students and colleagues set out on a “Shodh Yatra,” a trek 
by foot of sometimes hundreds of miles to remote villages in order to 
access the knowledge of India’s poor. The network has helped to locate 
inventors of a natural nonstick coating for pots and pans, a foot- powered 
washing- machine, and, my personal favorite, an “amphibious bicycle” 
created by one Mr. Saidullah so he could cheaply, and quickly, cross the 
river to meet his love.41
Gupta’s Shodh Yatras illustrate well that the rallying call for “Access to 
Knowledge” should not mean simply redistributing the knowledge of the 
West to the rest. We must search out, recognize, and if need be translate 
the knowledge of diverse creators around the world. At the same time, 
asymmetries in cultural and economic power threaten ethical sharing of 
the knowledge of the poor. For its part, the Honey Bee Network seeks to 
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model sharing that is open and yet also fair—like a honey bee, which con-
nects fl ower to fl ower through pollination without diminishing the beauty 
of any one. The network gives prizes to inventors, shares their inventions 
across communities, helps fi nd partners who would commercialize ideas, 
and, on occasion, helps inventors to seek intellectual property rights in 
the inventions.
Issues of fairness through recognition and reward of diverse authors 
apply at home and abroad. Recall that under current copyright law, those 
who use copyrighted material without the authorization of the copyright 
owner, and outside the protections of fair use, are not eligible for copy-
right protection in their creations, however transformative they may be. 
Thus fans who create by using copyrighted work without authorization 
can never be “authors,” unless the court fi nds fair use. This approach to 
improvements in copyright law is distinct from the approach in patent 
law, where the improver may receive a patent for the improvement, but 
must still seek a license from the original patent owner. The result is 
that copyright owners may freely appropriate from fans that create under 
the threat of injunction and have no rights in their contributions. A re-
cent case pitted a fan with encyclopedic knowledge of the Harry Potter 
universe against the series’ author, J. K. Rowling herself. Steve Vander 
Ark had produced and edited on the Internet the Harry Potter Lexicon, 
an A–Z compendium of the spells and bestiary of Potter’s world. Vander 
Ark’s Lexicon was so complete that Rowling and Warner Bros., producers 
of the Harry Potter fi lms, admitted to using the site as a guide during 
the production of the fi lms. Just as Vander Ark free rode on Rowling’s 
creations, Rowling and Warner Bros. also free rode on his.
Fairness as livelihood. Enhanced capacity for participatory culture is 
not only a good in itself, but also, as I have argued here, a key to eco-
nomic development. In a Knowledge Age, wealth increasingly derives 
from the capacity to produce knowledge for the world. From Ethiopian 
coff ee farmers to indigenous Australian artists to Indian scientists per-
fecting methods of farming basmati rice, intellectual property rights, 
from trademark to copyright to patent, can be used as tools for generating 
wealth for the poor.
Fairness as recognizing vulnerability to exploitation. The very essence 
of culture is sharing knowledge and meaning with others. But diff er-
ences in power and past mistreatment aff ect people’s willingness to share 
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culture. That is, fear of exploitation may discourage people to share and 
distribute their knowledge, be it music, literature, or local knowledge of 
the medicinal properties of plants. Anthropologists now report resistance 
to their ethnographic studies, with potential local informants refusing to 
participate in what they perceive to be objectifi cation and global exploita-
tion of their knowledge. Indeed, histories of colonial exploitation may 
go further to explain cultural insularity than do assertions of essential 
cultural diff erences. Promoting fairness among global creators makes for 
good innovation policy, fosters free speech, and promotes better cultural 
relations. Modern intellectual property law ought to be attentive to craft-
ing rules that promote ethical extraction of knowledge. Recent propos-
als in the World Trade Organization to amend the TRIPS agreement to 
require patent applicants to disclose the origin of genetic materials and 
traditional knowledge are premised on this very insight.
We have come to believe that property rights in intellectual creations 
are there simply because they incentivize creative activity. But there is 
an older understanding that fl ows out of notions of unfair competition 
and more visceral feelings of justice. It is now commonplace that in fact 
people create without exclusive property rights—as evidenced by open-
source software, fan fi ction, mash- ups, and Solomon Linda’s story. But 
behavioral economists have identifi ed a natural sense of justice that may 
lead people to “irrational” decisions if they feel that they are being treated 
unfairly.42 Even the premise of the “intellectual property as incentives” 
thesis can be understood as responding to the “vulnerability” of the cre-
ator in the absence of intellectual property rights, given the often high 
costs of production and the typically low costs of copying.43
Focusing on fairness rather than incentives to create also helps reveal 
intellectual property’s role in releasing information to the public. Left to 
themselves, scientists may not share but rather hoard their knowledge, 
fearing exploitation. Patents address this possibility by protecting innova-
tors through property rights. The fi rst copyright statute in England, the 
Statute of Anne, did the same: recall that this “Act for the Promotion of 
Learning” established limited copyrights for authors in order to wrest 
knowledge from the monopoly control of a few publishers. Intellectual 
property law from the beginning was crafted to promote fairness and ac-
cess to knowledge.44 This insight ought to empower us to recognize and 
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accept broader visions beyond the narrow incentives vision alone. Indeed, 
we may usefully reconsider numerous intellectual property doctrines 
through this lens.
Fairness as support for non- market- based cultural production. I have 
emphasized the links between participatory culture, global markets, and 
livelihood. As I will further argue in Chapter 5, markets provide incentives 
for cultural preservation through transformation. For example, obtaining 
geographical indications encourages communities to invent new applica-
tions for old traditions, thus keeping the community alive through dyna-
mism, not stasis. But should markets determine which cultural products 
and activities are supported? I have argued no in the case of essential 
goods, such as drugs to treat tropical diseases (an issue to which I return 
in more detail in Chapter 7). And we have already recognized that states 
commonly support the arts through subsidies, because they appreciate 
the importance of cultivating robust artistic activity. But more detailed 
questions about which cultural activities should be subsidized and how 
far state support should go are more diffi  cult. The aforementioned Or-
phan Drug Act in the United States, for example, may off er subsidies to 
corporations in excess of their costs to make the drugs. Subsidies to prop 
up some withering artistic or literary traditions, or translation eff orts to 
preserve local languages, are perhaps even more diffi  cult to assess. What, 
precisely, does democratizing the capability to participate in making cul-
ture require? For example, how far if at all ought the state go to support 
the niche literary community of Bengali feminist poets?45 Subsidies for 
poetry in the vernacular?
Cultural diversity is a good in itself but markets, especially large 
multinational corporate actors within them, often promote mass culture. 
Preserving diverse cultural traditions, languages, and works may off er 
people near and far, and over generations, new ways of thinking by expos-
ing them to more ideas. State subsidies can serve as a critical mechanism 
for promoting participation, diversity, and cultural vitality, and indeed 
states routinely engage in supporting local cultural industries, often as 
part of a development policy. At the same time, we should be wary of state 
preservation of tradition for its own sake. As I have argued elsewhere, 
we ought to critically probe whether certain traditions are harmful, for 
example to women or children, and are therefore not worthy of preserva-
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tion. Indeed, the theory of participatory culture developed in Chapter 2 
is premised on full participation by all members of a culture in order to 
critically engage traditions and bring about cultural change.
But the case of Bengali poetry does not raise such concerns. Further-
more, we should not confi ne such support to grant mechanisms. Awards 
and recognition systems can also generate cultural creativity outside of 
markets. Support from appreciative communities on the Internet can 
spur one to keep on producing as well. Indeed, despite the common per-
ception of homogenization resulting from globalization, niche cultures 
may fare better in markets today than in the past. The Internet and other 
technological improvements in distributing knowledge make Bengali 
feminist poetry potentially a more lucrative activity today, as the diaspora 
of Bengalis and all other interested parties become easier to connect and 
access. This is the phenomenon known as the “long tail,” where larger 
numbers of people are able to purchase (or support implicitly through 
advertising) “non- hit” items.
This example reinforces a broader point. I do not reject the incentive 
analysis in full, but rather propose that plural values and goals animate 
intellectual property law. Property rights in information clearly can incen-
tivize innovation that would otherwise draw insuffi  cient investment. But 
they can also promote freedom, cultural dynamism, human capabilities, 
and more fair cultural and social relations.
A further clarifi cation: I do not mean to treat intellectual property as 
an end in itself. Rather, the end is participation in meaning- making and 
in having the capacity to earn a livelihood to achieve the life one scripts 
for herself. Intellectual property remains a tool, not a right. But it may 
now be seen as a tool for incentivizing participation in processes of in-
tercultural sharing on fair terms, not just the creation of more products 
by a select few.
criticisms and responses
Skeptics will object. Intellectual property law is a human construction de-
signed to solve a fundamental problem of information economics: without 
intellectual property protections, the ready duplicability of information 
undermines incentives to create information. Armed with this economic 
insight and fortifi ed by a constitutional mandate to “promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts,” some intellectual property scholars—we have 
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labeled them “Intellectual Property Originalists”—would keep intellec-
tual property’s focus solely on incentivizing the production of informa-
tion.46 They would thus resist any call to expand the values of intellectual 
property to the broad array of values I have off ered, from freedom to 
fairness. But let me answer some specifi c critiques here.
Whose values? How do we identify the myriad values to be considered? 
And whose values? The values I champion in these pages, from democracy 
to development, to freedom and equality, refl ect long-standing commit-
ments to Enlightenment, international human rights, and in many cases 
constitutional mandates. Furthermore, social theories from Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach to Sen’s view of development as freedom resonate as 
normative guides for a revised intellectual property. Within these larger 
frameworks, details will be elaborated through political processes. Brazil 
and Thailand, for example, have stronger constitutional commitments 
to public health than do some other nations, as I elaborate in Chapter 7. 
We may also allow for some reconsideration of intellectual property to be 
determined dynamically through the politics of the age, just as the social 
movements of the past infl uenced real property law.
Adding to the law would make it too complex. Introducing additional 
values to intellectual property analysis will necessarily complicate that 
analysis. But if this move adds complexity, it is just the complexity neces-
sary to get things right. Narrowing the calculus to ease the calculation 
will likely lead to the wrong answer. Economy should not come at the 
expense of achieving a just outcome. Moreover, a single- minded focus 
is not true of most other areas of the law. Property rights in land serve 
myriad values, and are justifi ed and cabined accordingly.
Changes would threaten the public domain. Many intellectual property 
scholars have mounted a heroic eff ort to staunch the enclosure of the 
public domain of information, and they worry that broadening our under-
standing of intellectual property will buttress maximalist intellectual 
property claims.47 But a single- minded focus on incentivizing creation 
could also lead to maximalist intellectual property claims, because the 
only limits on intellectual property would occur when (1) additional intel-
lectual property rights are unnecessary to spur creation, and (2) situa-
tions where expanding intellectual property rights for some will interfere 
with others’ ability to create. A broad range of human values, in contrast, 
should help restrain maximalist intellectual property demands. Human 
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rights are a principal source for delimiting intellectual property, not sim-
ply expanding it. For example, the arguments for access to medicines 
(and the compulsory license schemes they often entail) typically rely not 
on claims of authorship or incentive, but rather on the desire to expand 
human capabilities. Similarly, recent eff orts to reconstruct the fair- use 
doctrine as principally an eff ort to head off  a market failure caused by 
excessive transaction costs might jeopardize the doctrine itself. As the 
transaction costs of fi nding the copyright owner and negotiating a license 
decrease in the digital age, the rationale for fair use can vanish, transform-
ing fair use into fared use. A broad understanding of intellectual property 
values might justify fair use in the face of potential obsolescence of the 
doctrine due to technological change. In short, rather than shrinking the 
public domain, my argument may expand it. Recognizing the diversity 
of values underlying intellectual property should lead us to share certain 
rights in intellectual products, rather than reserve them more closely. 
Recall that new theories of property, from personhood to social relations, 
enhanced our ability to explain and justify legal limits on property, even 
while they served to bolster some property claimants.
Intellectual property law should have a limited purpose. The originalist 
objects, claiming that intellectual property was not intended to promote 
such ends. But intellectual property laws have always sought to promote 
development and principles of Enlightenment. Intellectual property has 
long harbored multiple values, such as the First Amendment values im-
plicit in fair use.48 This plural tradition notwithstanding, the fact that a 
legal regime might be created for one purpose should not mean that the 
implications of that regime for all other purposes should be ignored. The 
state raises an army because of the need to assure its security against 
foreign invasions. Yet the state might deploy the army domestically in 
case of natural disasters. And it might need to create limits on how the 
army might operate (such as prohibitions on torture and sexual harass-
ment)—limits stemming not necessarily from self- defense but from other 
human values. Similarly, the fact that intellectual property law might be 
established for instrumental reasons does not mean that other purposes 
should not be considered when we set its metes and bounds.
Why focus on distribution? Why not mete out any distributive justice ex-
plicitly through the tax system? Those who disfavor a social justice agenda 
for intellectual property are not necessarily antagonistic to social justice 
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itself. They would often simply prefer what they fi nd to be a superior fo-
rum for considering such issues: tax.49 But it seems unrealistic to expect 
the eff ects of intellectual property law I have discussed here to be sorted 
out through a redistributive tax regime. First, as in the case of Solomon 
Linda, such a regime would have to be global, redressing unjust appro-
priation across borders. Second, a tax regime that off ered credits to the 
poor would keep them wards of the state, rather than recognizing their 
contributions and fairly remunerating them. It is a very diff erent thing 
to give people a handout rather than acknowledge their contributions to 
cultural life. Such a regime would also negatively aff ect people’s incen-
tives to create and share their knowledge with the world in global markets. 
As I have pointed out, vulnerability to exploitation can serve as a strong 
disincentive to the poor, diminishing their desire to contribute to world 
science and culture. The potential for closing oneself off  to the world, and 
hoarding knowledge, would deprive all of humanity of that knowledge. 
Finally, why compound disadvantage through an intellectual property 
system indiff erent to equality in the usually vain hope that it might be 
sorted out later through a tax system?
Rights intended to aid the poor are more likely to be wielded ultimately 
by those already in power. This suggests that it is analytically diffi  cult to 
distinguish Disney from the dissident, or Monsanto from a mountain 
tribe. In fact, courts can make such distinctions when they are justifi ed 
by other normative reasons. Furthermore, this is the risk of any legal re-
form eff ort—even the public domain movement itself. The campaign to 
preserve the public domain, which has been taken up in everyone’s name, 
in fact may benefi t the powerful, who are in a better position to quickly 
appropriate for themselves ideas and goods in the public domain. An 
intellectual property regime that expressly acknowledges and confronts 
its social and cultural eff ects will be best suited to resolve these issues.
Now in his nineties, Pete Seeger is spearheading what he calls the Com-
mittee for Public Domain Reform. In a letter to the United Nations, he 
decries the standard practice in the music industry of copyrighting songs 
supposedly in the public domain. Many of these works are not public 
domain at all, Seeger argues. He quotes Joseph Shabalala of the South 
African vocal group Ladysmith Black Mambazo, who notes that when 
the word “traditional” is used, “it means the money stays in New York.” 
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Seeger proposes that a share of subsequent copyright royalties “go to the 
place and people where the song originated.” 50
On the ground, international actors are developing new understand-
ings of intellectual property as a tool for promoting not just free culture, 
but also fair culture. No human domain should be immune from the 
claims of social justice. Intellectual property, like property law, struc-
tures social relations and has profound social eff ects. If the twenty- fi rst 
century will be the Age of Knowledge and Participation, surely we must 
acknowledge and grapple with the reality that intellectual property law 
will help defi ne the possibilities and human capabilities of this age. In-
tellectual property regulates the production and distribution of culture. 
Considerations of social justice cannot be peripheral to such a central 
human enterprise.
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Newsweek’s Pakistan edition ran a cover in April 2011 featuring the Muslim superhero 
and superheroine characters from Dr. Naif Al-Mutawa’s comic book series The 99. 
(Courtesy of The 99)
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In 1999, Mattel sued Utah-based artist Tom Forsythe for his series of photographs entitled Food Chain 
Barbie. (Courtesy of Tom Forsythe)
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The energy drink Guaraná Power, 
conceived and produced by a 
farmers’ collective in Maués, Brazil. 
The farmers sought to compete 
with the global company Ambev’s 
popular guarana berry–based drink, 
Antarctica, in order to retain more 
of the profits for cultivating the 
berries. The logo “Guaraná Power” 
is stamped across the more familiar 
Antarctica label. (Courtesy of 
Superflex)
Photo of Solomon Linda (farthest left) and The Original Evening Birds in 1941.
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The cover of the first 
issue of Spider-Man India. 
(Spider-Man ™ and 
© Marvel Entertainment, 
LLC. All Rights Reserved 
and used with permission.)
In collaboration with the Danish artists’ group Superflex, a farmers’ collective 
in Maués, Brazil, brainstor med ideas for developing commercial products 
derived from their crops. Here one member suggests “Mauescafé” coffee. 
(Courtesy of Superflex)
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Mark Chamberlain’s watercolor of Batman and Robin kissing. (Courtesy of Kathleen Cullen 
Fine Arts)
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Comparisons between Tezuka’s Kimba the White Lion and Disney’s 
The Lion King. (Courtesy of MUSHI PRODUCTION Co., Ltd.) 
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“Gee, golly, gosh, gloriosky,” thought Mary Sue as she stepped 
on the bridge of the Enterprise. “Here I am, the youngest Lieu-
tenant in the fl eet—only fi fteen- and- a- half years old.” Captain 
Kirk came up to her.
“Oh, Lieutenant, I love you madly. Will you come to bed with 
me?”
“Captain! I am not that kind of girl!”
“You’re right, and I respect you for it. Here, take over the ship 
for a minute while I go for some coff ee for us.”
Mr. Spock came onto the bridge. “What are you doing in the 
command seat, Lieutenant?”
“The Captain told me to.”
“Flawlessly logical. I admire your mind.” 1
going where only men  had gone before, Lieutenant Mary Sue took 
the helm of the USS Enterprise, performing to acclaim and earning the 
Vulcan Order of Gallantry. This was, of course, fantasy, but doubly so. By 
1974, no woman had commanded the Enterprise bridge, according to the 
offi  cial Star Trek fantasy. Indeed, it would take another two decades before 
a woman would command the principal starship in a later Star Trek series. 
Trekkie Paula Smith, however, was impatient. So she inserted the young 
chapter four
Everyone’s a Superhero
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Lieutenant Mary Sue into the Star Trek universe, not as a communications 
offi  cer, nurse, voice of the onboard computer, or passing Kirk love interest, 
but as commander. In so doing, Smith began the modern incarnation of 
an old and often celebrated phenomenon—retelling a canonical story to 
better represent oneself.2
The name of Smith’s character, Mary Sue, has come to stand for all 
such characters in the universe of fan fi ction. Fan fi ction spans all genres 
of popular culture, from anime to literature. In every fan literature, there 
is the Mary Sue: “She fences with Methos and Duncan MacLeod; she saves 
the Enterprise, the Voyager, or the fabric of time and space; she fi ghts with 
Jim Ellison in defense of Cascade; she battles evil in Sunnydale alongside 
Buff y Sommers.” 3 She stands as the only female member of the fellow-
ship of the ring. According to Wikipedia, a “Mary Sue” is an idealized 
“fi ctional character . . . lacking noteworthy fl aws.” 4 Often she appears in 
the form of a new character beamed into the story or a marginal character 
brought out from the shadows. 
“Mary Sue” is often a pejorative expression, used to deride fan fi c-
tion perceived as narcissistic.5 But we may also consider Mary Sue to be a 
fi gure of subaltern critique and, indeed, empowerment. Cultural studies 
scholars defi ne empowerment “as a function and possibility of participa-
tion in popular culture.” 6 We may see empowerment also in terms off ered 
by the civil rights movements—as increasing social, economic, and politi-
cal power. As exemplifi ed by Lieutenant Mary Sue, this fi gure serves to 
contest popular media stereotypes of certain groups such as women, gays, 
and racial minorities. Where the popular media might show such groups 
as lacking agency or exhibiting other negative characteristics, Mary Sues 
are powerful, beautiful, and intrepid. Indeed, the gendered appellation for 
this form—Mary Sue—refl ects its popularity among female authors, who 
often work against the gender stereotypes of the canon work. Through a 
survey of social science research that reveals how media aff ect our racial-
ized and gendered view of occupations, the connections between cultural 
and economic power become apparent.
The emergence of the World Wide Web has amplifi ed this relation-
ship. In the past, Mary Sue authors might have stashed what they penned 
in a drawer, distributed photocopies, or, at most, published their work in 
an underground magazine. The Web off ers writers a relatively inexpensive 
and simple mass distribution vehicle. Posting a story to a fan- fi ction web-
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site is literally free, at least for those with access to the Internet. Lacking 
the global distribution channels of print media, Mary Sue authors now 
fi nd an alternative in the Web, which brings their work to the world. In 
fact, the increasing power and aff ordability of digital tools may make it 
possible to go beyond rewriting stories in words to permit video and audio 
creations, often through mash- ups of existing copyrighted material. Such 
spin-off s can usher in a whole new universe of imagined possibilities—if 
the law will allow us to go there.
This chapter has two goals, one practical and the other theoretical. 
The fi rst goal is to clarify the law so that writers of Mary Sues will not be 
chilled by possible legal threats to such speech. Such authors should not 
readily “cease and desist,” as copyright owners demand. Rather than illegal 
art, Mary Sues may well constitute fair use. Second, Mary Sues usefully 
probe the theory of fair use itself. Mary Sue can be seen as a metonym for 
fair uses that rewrite the popular narrative. Implicitly, I defend fair use 
against eff orts to narrowly interpret it as merely a defense against a market 
failure caused by high transaction costs, an explanation that would lead 
ultimately to its evisceration as technologies reduce such costs. Under that 
view, the cultural and speech consequences of transformative uses of copy-
righted works lay hostage to the ability of the transformers to pay. I also 
defend against the foremost cultural critique of fair use—that reinter pre - 
tation (or “recoding”) of the text destabilizes cultural foundations.7
Mary Sues challenge a patriarchal, heterosexist, and racially stereo-
typed cultural landscape. These popular stereotypes have subtle yet im-
portant consequences for our social, political, and economic relations, as 
social science research reveals. The phenomenon of rewriting the story to 
revalue one’s place in it is not simply an exercise in narcissism. Mary Sues 
off er important epistemological interventions in the reigning discourse, 
confronting the traditional production of knowledge by reworking the 
canon to valorize women and marginalized communities. They exemplify 
the tactic that Arjun Appadurai describes as commodity resistance—a strat-
egy of popular struggle through the resignifi cation of common goods.8 
One of the most important recent copyright cases, which I touched on 
earlier, revolves around a Mary Sue: Alice Randall’s take on Gone with 
the Wind called The Wind Done Gone. In the latter, a slave protagonist 
illuminates the oppression of the age and African- American characters 
are imbued with complexity and agency.9
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Mary Sues that challenge the orthodox representations in the original 
work should constitute fair use under U.S. copyright law in many cases. 
The skeptic will ask the Mary Sue author: Why not write your own origi-
nal story rather than inserting yourself into a story written by someone 
else? Alternatively, why not license the original? Such arguments go far 
beyond Mary Sues: they represent the fundamental challenges to any fair-
use claim. I respond to these challenges, relying on theories of cultural 
critique and change. Specifi cally, I argue that semiotic democracy10 re-
quires the ability to resignify the artifacts of popular culture to contest 
their authoritative meaning. I also show that concerns regarding any re-
sulting cultural destabilization misunderstand the nature of culture itself.
 marry,  sue!
When Star Trek debuted on television in 1966, it was groundbreaking. Its 
creator, Gene Roddenberry, “envisaged a multi- racial and mixed- gender 
crew, based on his assumption that racial prejudice and sexism would 
not exist in the twenty- third century.” 11 Lieutenant Uhura was the fi rst 
African- American woman to be featured in a major television series.12 Offi  -
cer Sulu off ered a rare Asian- American face outside a martial arts milieu.13
But despite these laudable aspirations, equality was not yet truly 
complete in Federation space. Uhura, for example, was relegated to the 
communications station. Women generally played secondary roles, often 
serving as episode- long love interests for the white male members of 
the crew. Uhura broke ground again when she participated in network 
television’s likely fi rst interracial kiss—with Captain Kirk, of course.14 
(Same- sex romantic relationships, however, apparently did not survive 
into our future.)
Women, gays, and racial minorities have certainly made major strides 
over the past four decades of television. In 1993, for example, an African- 
American actor commanded the station in the Star Trek series Deep Space 
Nine.15 And in 1995, more than two decades after Lieutenant Mary Sue, 
Captain Kathryn Janeway commanded the deck of the starship in Star 
Trek: Voyager, the only Star Trek series to have a lead female captain.16 Yet 
there remains a long way to go, as demonstrated by American television, 
a principal source of information about our world. A recent Children 
Now report shows that male characters remain dominant, consistently 
outnumbering female characters by nearly two to one between 1999 and 
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2004.17 Primetime television portrays “a world in which women are sig-
nifi cantly younger than their male counterparts and where older women 
are hard to fi nd.” 18 Perhaps especially telling is the occupational diff eren-
tiation of men and women: “Male characters outnumbered female char-
acters as attorneys (71% were male), executives/CEOs (80%), physicians 
(80%), law enforcement offi  cers (82%), paramedics/fi refi ghters (84%), 
elected/appointed offi  cials (92%) and criminals (93%).” 19
The racial divide on primetime television remains alarming. While 
40 percent of Americans ages nineteen and under are children of color,20 
nearly three- quarters of all primetime characters during the 2003–2004 
television season were white.21 The racial diversity that does exist is found 
mostly during the evening ten o’clock hour, when American children are 
least likely to be watching: “The 8 o’clock hour remained the least racially 
diverse hour in prime time with one in fi ve shows (20%) featuring mixed 
opening credits casts.” 22 Latino characters are often cast in “low- status 
occupations.” 23 Even when they were represented, Asian- American char-
acters “were far less likely than characters from other racial groups to 
appear in primary roles.” 24 An earlier study by Children Now concluded 
that youth watching primetime television would most likely see a “world 
overwhelmingly populated by able bodied, single, heterosexual, white, 
male adults under 40.” 25 When minority groups are depicted in the me-
dia, they are generally stereotyped, with Asian women, for example, cast 
as “China dolls” or “dragon ladies” and Asian men denied any positive 
sexuality.26 Latinos are commonly depicted as “criminals, buff oons, Latin 
lovers, or law enforcers.” 27
Movies may not be much better. In a study of black female characters 
in the top movies of 1996, 89 percent were shown using profanities, 56 
percent were shown being physically violent, and 55 percent were shown 
being physically restrained. By contrast, 17 percent of white female char-
acters were depicted using profanities, 11 percent were shown being physi-
cally violent, and 6 percent were shown being restrained.28
Popular books evince similar disparities. A study on children’s books 
published in the early 1980s showed that adult male characters appeared 
almost three times more frequently than females.29 Even more impor-
tantly, central characters were almost two- and- a- half times more likely 
to be boys than girls. Consider Winnie the Pooh. The lovable bear is 
Disney’s most valuable character, generating revenues of a billion dollars 
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annually.30 But despite his apparently wide appeal, the bear’s universe is 
quite narrow. Of the nearly dozen characters in the Hundred Acre Wood, 
only one is female—Kanga, Roo’s mother, who often dons an apron.31 
Winnie the Pooh and his friends, of course, were created in a diff erent 
era, written to cheer a young boy, but today these characters appeal to 
both boys and girls.32 
While Winnie the Pooh is the British literary creation popular among 
younger children, older children are currently entranced by the magic 
of Harry Potter. But although the stories are penned by a woman, J. K. 
Rowling, the lead role is played by a boy, and the principal parts are mostly 
male.33 Moreover, the vast majority of Hogwarts teachers and pupils—es-
pecially the principal characters—are white.34
Even magazines written specifi cally for girls fail to guarantee an em-
powering experience. Reviewing Seventeen magazine, sociologist Kelley 
Massoni observes that “men dominate its pages, as both subjects and job 
holders.” It is not only what is depicted that is important; it is also what 
is omitted. Magazines for teenage girls, according to Massoni, “overtly 
suggest, through content and pictures, how women should look, dress, 
and act; they more subtly suggest, through exclusion of pictures and con-
tent, what women should not do, be, or think.” Massoni concludes: “In 
the occupational world of Seventeen, Prince Charming still exists as the 
ultimate goal.” 35 The implicit instruction in the pages of teen- girl maga-
zines: “Marry, Sue!”
Such images are not confi ned to U.S. borders.36 Hollywood and other 
American media multinationals have globalized American television 
shows, the Hundred Acre Wood, and Harry Potter. Disney and Time 
Warner off er their fare on the many television channels they own around 
the world. The fi ctional worlds envisioned therein now charm the real 
world’s youth. Hollywood’s global cultural hegemony translates Holly-
wood’s prejudices to the world.
Psychological and sociological research reveals that cultural represen-
tations may have social and economic consequences.37 Racial and gender 
stereotypes depicted in popular media may impact children’s perceptions 
of career paths. Children “as young as fi ve years of age learn to gender 
stereotype occupations based on the gender of a television role model.” 38
Early media research established a correlation (though not necessarily 
a causation) between large amounts of television watching and stereo-
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typed views of gender occupations and traits. In one study published in 
1980, children in the fi rst, third, fi fth, and seventh grades were asked to 
associate a given trait, such as shyness or confi dence, with a man or a 
woman. Children who were heavy television watchers showed a marked 
increase with age in male stereotyped responses, while children who 
watched relatively little television demonstrated a decrease in such an-
swers with age.39 In another study published in 1974, children between 
the ages of three and six were asked about their career aspirations. The 
result showed that 76 percent of children who were classifi ed as “heavy 
viewers” chose professions stereotypical for their gender, compared with 
50 percent of “moderate viewers” who chose stereotypical professions.40 
The occasional counter- stereotypical media portrayal may not suffi  ce to 
overturn engrained prejudices. In a study published in 1979, fi ve- and 
six- year- olds were shown four fi lms shorter than two minutes each and 
questioned afterward about what they had seen. Each fi lm presented two 
actors who portrayed doctors and nurses in various gender combinations. 
Of the fi lms with a female doctor and a male nurse, 53 percent of the 
children stated that they had seen a movie about a male doctor and a 
female nurse. In contrast, 100 percent of the children correctly identifi ed 
the actors’ genders in the fi lm with a male doctor and a female nurse.41
A recent study also demonstrates stereotypical correlations with re-
spect to race. Researcher Rebecca Bigler and her colleagues invented new, 
fi ctional occupations and presented various combinations of white and 
black persons in those occupations to children. Poorer African- American 
children were less likely to aspire to jobs that had been depicted with white 
workers exclusively. The study authors point out the potential for a vicious 
cycle: African- American children, especially those from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, may preferentially seek out low- status jobs in which minori-
ties are well represented, thus perpetuating the skewed models for new 
generations of poor African- American children.42
The eff ects of media portrayals reach beyond children. One study 
asked college students to complete questionnaires about their racial and 
gender attitudes after they viewed stereotypical or counter- stereotypical 
racial and gender portrayals in a newsletter. Those who fi rst viewed stereo-
typical portrayals were more likely to favor policy judgments against 
blacks or women when asked who bears responsibility for Magic Johnson 
contracting HIV and the police beating of Rodney King, and whether to 
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accept the credibility of Anita Hill and Patricia Bowman in their respec-
tive claims.43
Minorities internalize the stories they read, see, and hear every day. 
A U.S. Civil Rights Commission study found that minority stereotypes 
in the media reinforced the negative beliefs that minorities have about 
themselves,44 echoing one author’s argument that “the television roles in 
which Blacks are cast communicate to Black children the negative value 
society places on them.” 45 The importance of televised role models is not 
lost, even on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It hired 
Nichelle Nichols, who had played Lieutenant Uhura on Star Trek, to help 
recruit women and African- American astronauts.46
Self- Insertion as Self- Empowerment
Lieutenant Mary Sue and those Mary Sues that have followed in her 
wake appear against this backdrop. Yet within fan subcultures, Mary 
Sues are typically derided because of their perfection. Indeed, websites 
off er budding writers tutorials on how to avoid the pitfall of writing a 
Mary Sue.47 “Flaming” and negative reviews are deployed to discipline 
fan- fi ction writers who stray from acceptable additions to the particular 
fi ctional universe.48 Where texts have long been subject to socially regu-
lated readings,49 the fan- fi ction community—formed today principally 
through cyberspace—extends this discipline even to acceptable rework-
ings of the text.
The Mary Sue needs reclaiming not only from the offi  cial guardians of 
the offi  cial story, but also from the unoffi  cial guardians of the unoffi  cial story. 
The fact that Mary Sues are marked by relentlessly superlative qualities 
becomes more understandable when viewed against a popular culture 
that marginalizes certain groups. Flattering self- insertion off ers a partial 
antidote to a media that neglects or marginalizes certain groups. Victims 
of prejudice often internalize its claims; indeed, oppressive societies have 
often relied on this psychological trick to maintain hierarchies.50 A pro-
cess of consciousness- raising and self- empowerment requires that one 
recognize one’s own potential, even if others do not. Denied the principal 
role in the offi  cial canon, Mary Sue is no passive peripheral character: 
“She does, not just simply exists. She slays, she runs a starship, she types, 
she wields a sword.” 51 Mary Sues help the writer claim agency against a 
popular culture that repeatedly denies it.
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Some commentators worry that the “Mary Sue often reinforces the 
impossible idea that women must strive for eff ortless perfection.” But 
would not the intrepid Captain Kirk or the invincible Superman suggest 
the same goal for men? Based on the social science literature canvassed 
earlier, I suggest instead that relentlessly positive portrayals of people 
who look like you may lead to (1) others thinking that people who look like 
you are capable and desirable; and (2) a belief in your own capability and 
self- worth. Rewriting popular culture is a step toward breaking the cycle 
of dominance, as the following three examples demonstrate. 
Same- Sex Romance: Kirk/Spock
Even though Star Trek envisioned a purportedly egalitarian future, the 
reality it posited was far from the ideal. Just as Paula Smith had intro-
duced Lieutenant Mary Sue to make up for the absence of female leaders, 
early fan- fi ction writers often imagined same- sex romantic relationships 
among the ship’s crew. Referenced often as “K/S” for “Kirk/Spock,” such 
same- sex pairings in fan fi ction came to be known as “slash.” 52 Slash 
thus functions as a kind of Mary Sue, refl ecting a desire to introduce 
homosexuality where it has been omitted.
This may be true even when the author is a heterosexual woman. Con- 
sider the following accounts of why women write male same- sex pairings:
• Given the priority given to the hero in the original, the female 
reader may identify with the hero, not the heroine, and then use 
the hero to “‘feel’ the adventure with” another character;
• Rewriting masculinity places emotional responsibility on men;
• The male slash is erotic to the female writer; and
• It rearranges the expected sexuality.53
That is, the ripping, mixing, and slashing of traditional sexual roles 
may allow the writers to reimagine their own places in the sexual order.
Heroes and Heroines: The Adventures of Hermione Granger
Some Harry Potter fan fi ction gives center stage to Hermione Granger. 
Given that the Harry Potter books already depict Hermione with extraor-
dinary, positive characteristics, it may have seemed unnecessary to re-
write her story. But the stories off er two twists on the offi  cial tale. First, 
they make it her story, not someone else’s story in which she plays a part. 
201111 Pass 3 press.indd   113 2/10/12   2:23 PM
114 everyone’s a superhero
Second, the stories often fi nd her a romantic partner, especially Ginny 
Weasley, Draco Malfoy, or Harry Potter. As one critic points out, the last 
pairing is especially satisfying for some: “As the Potter series’ brilliant 
bookworm, Hermione is a role model for smart girls (and boys) who 
fi nd themselves overshadowed by their fl ashier peers. There’s a certain 
appeal to thinking that a young academic could couple with the hero of 
the wizarding world.” 54
Cultural Adaptation: Harry Potter in Kolkata
“Harry gets onto his Nimbus 2000 broom and zooms across to Calcutta 
at the invitation of a young boy called Junto,” reads the text of an Indian 
tale, Harry Potter Kolkataye (Harry Potter in Kolkata).55 Written in Bengali, 
the book brings Harry Potter to Kolkata where he “meets famous fi ctional 
characters from Bengali literature.” Uttam Ghosh, the author, describes 
the story as a “poor man’s Potter,” costing just thirty rupees—less than 
one U.S. dollar.56 But does this poor man’s Potter simply further insinu-
ate a foreign character into the imagination of Bengali youth? To some 
extent, yes, but we must not overlook the power of global mass media, 
which makes Potter diffi  cult to avoid for the middle- class Kolkata youth 
likely to buy the book. Harry Potter in Kolkata is yet another variant of the 
Mary Sue. It introduces a young Indian boy into the Harry Potter legend 
and within a new environment—Kolkata—rather than Harry’s familiar 
England. By situating Harry in Kolkata, it makes it easier to imagine the 
local street corner as a place of magic.
 suing mary
Potter in Kolkata was rapidly taken off  the market. Indian lawyers for 
Rowling and Warner Bros. issued a cease- and- desist letter to the “pirate” 
work’s Indian publisher, which quickly complied.57 J. K. Rowling has gen-
erally tolerated literally hundreds of thousands of other fan- fi ction stories 
based on her characters, including stories that focus on Hermione—but 
these have been largely noncommercial and web- rather than print- based. 
The owners of the Star Trek franchise contemplated legal action against 
Star Trek slash, but did not bring suit because of strategic considerations.
What are the respective legal rights of the owner of the offi  cial work 
and the author of the Mary Sue? I argue that U.S. copyright law permits 
Mary Sues that challenge the orthodox depictions in the original.
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 The Fair Mary
U.S. law permits the copyright owner to claim not only his or her own 
stories, but also the characters in those stories.58 It also grants to the 
copyright holder the exclusive right to make derivative works.59 The un-
authorized author of a derivative work such as fan fi ction cannot claim 
a copyright in that work. This practice places the fan- fi ction writer at 
the mercy of the copyright owner, unless the fan fi ction constitutes fair 
use. Thus, a fan- fi ction writer can pen stories employing copyrighted 
characters only if (1) the copyright owner explicitly permits such fan fi c-
tion, (2) the copyright owner chooses not to pursue legal action against 
the fan- fi ction writer, or (3) the fan fi ction constitutes fair use of the 
copyrighted work.
This third avenue allows fan- fi ction writers the freedom to create 
using existing creative worlds without needing the permission, either 
explicit or tacit, of the copyright owner. If a use is judged “fair,” then the 
copyright owner cannot bar it. Whether a use is fair depends on a number 
of factors, including the character of the work (is the use either commer-
cial or transformative?), the nature of the underlying original work, the 
amount copied, and whether the use injures the copyright owner’s market 
for the original work.60 Courts enjoy wide discretion when weighing these 
factors, referring in their deliberations to the statute as well as to a long 
lineage of interpretive case laws.
Campbell v. Acuff - Rose Music, Inc.
The leading case defi ning the contours of fair use as it applies to critical 
commentary concerns a rap group’s reworking of an earlier song, “Oh, 
Pretty Woman.” In Campbell v. Acuff - Rose Music, Inc., the copyright owner 
of Roy Orbison’s song sued the rap group 2 Live Crew for copyright in-
fringement for its song “Pretty Woman.” The Supreme Court reversed the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision that the use was presumptively unfair because of 
the song’s commercial nature, holding that 2 Live Crew’s parody of the 
original might constitute fair use. Justice Souter, writing for the Court, 
characterized 2 Live Crew’s version as a parody of the original: “[W]e 
think it fair to say that 2 Live Crew’s song reasonably could be perceived as 
commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree. 2 Live Crew 
juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true, 
with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from 
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paternal responsibility. The later words can be taken as a comment on the 
naiveté of the original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that 
ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signifi es.” 61
The Court observed that parodies like 2 Live Crew’s “Pretty Woman” 
transform the original, providing “social benefi t, by shedding light on 
an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.” 62 Even the com-
mercial nature of 2 Live Crew’s work did not defeat the group’s fair- use 
defense, though the Court remanded the case for fact-fi nding, in order 
to determine whether the 2 Live Crew rap parody harmed the copyright 
owner’s market for a non- parodic rap version of the song.63
Similarly, many Mary Sues comment on or criticize the original, 
while creating something new. They highlight the absence of society’s 
marginal voices in the original works, the stereotyped actions or inac-
tions of certain characters, and the orthodoxy of social relationships in 
the original. Lieutenant Mary Sue beamed on board, fi nally bringing a 
leading woman character to the bridge, saving the day while parrying 
Captain Kirk’s advances. The depiction of Lieutenant Mary Sue served 
to challenge the original in a uniquely powerful way. It demonstrated the 
glaring lacuna in the original, despite its pretensions of egalitarianism 
(exemplifi ed in the fi rst Star Trek movie’s risible use of “Mr.” to reference 
both male and female crew members). Such Mary Sues comment on 
the disappointments of the original, particularly its racial, gender, and 
sexual hierarchy.
The Wind Done Gone
Mary Sues help us rewrite not just the future, but also the past. For nearly 
a century, the most popular account of life on a slave plantation has been 
Margaret Mitchell’s literary classic Gone with the Wind (GWTW), a book 
second only to the Bible in worldwide sales.64 That account presented an 
idyll disturbed only by the actions of the North:
In the world of GWTW, the white characters comprise a noble 
aristocracy whose idyllic existence is upset only by the intru-
sion of Yankee soldiers, and, eventually, by the liberation of the 
black slaves. . . . Mitchell describes how both blacks and whites 
were purportedly better off  in the days of slavery: “The more 
I see of emancipation the more criminal I think it is. It’s just 
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ruined the darkies,” says Scarlett O’Hara. . . . Free blacks are 
described as “creatures of small intelligence . . . [l]ike monkeys 
or small children turned loose among treasured objects whose 
value is beyond their comprehension, they ran wild.” 65
In The Wind Done Gone (TWDG), Alice Randall, an African- American 
novelist, retold the tale from the perspective of a slave, Cynara, on the 
O’Hara plantation. Mitchell’s heirs sued for copyright infringement. The 
trial court held that Randall had infringed Mitchell’s work. On appeal, 
the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that TWDG likely constituted a pa-
rodic fair use.66 The two novels’ depictions of race and sex relations could 
hardly be more diff erent, as characterized by the Eleventh Circuit: “It is 
clear within the fi rst fi fty pages of Cynara’s fi ctional diary that Randall’s 
work fl ips GWTW’s traditional race roles, portrays powerful whites as 
stupid or feckless, and generally sets out to demystify GWTW and strip 
the romanticism from Mitchell’s specifi c account of this period of our 
history. . . . In GWTW, Scarlett O’Hara often expresses disgust with and 
condescension towards blacks; in TWDG, Other, Scarlett’s counterpart, 
is herself of mixed descent. In GWTW, Ashley Wilkes is the initial object 
of Scarlett’s aff ection; in TWDG, he is homosexual.” 67
The Sue- ifi cation of the African Americans in the story is unmis-
takable. As the Eleventh Circuit noted, “[i]n TWDG, nearly every black 
character is given some redeeming quality—whether depth, wit, cun-
ning, beauty, strength, or courage—that their GWTW analogues lacked.” 68 
Given the racist caricatures in the original, Randall’s redemption of the 
African Americans is not only understandable but overdue.
Whether Mitchell’s heirs must tolerate The Wind Done Gone did not 
turn on whether either they or even the public liked the retelling. Courts 
have insisted that “public majority opinion” is irrelevant to the question 
of whether a work is a parody;69 making the inquiry an issue of law helps 
insulate uses that society disfavors. Of course, relying on judges to make 
the parody determination inserts judges’ own prejudices into the decision- 
making. Yet on occasion, judges have endorsed as fair use those parodies 
they have found objectionable. For example, the Second Circuit upheld 
an actor’s right to poke fun of the pregnant female body, even though it 
found the act “unchivalrous.” 70
While parodies often constitute fair use, satires often do not (though 
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they may). Satires employ the original work “as a vehicle for comment-
ing on some individual or institution and not on the work itself.” As the 
Supreme Court explained in the Campbell case: “Parody needs to mimic 
an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of 
its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand 
on its own two feet and so requires justifi cation for the very act of bor-
rowing.” 71 That decidedly does not mean that parodies cannot comment 
simultaneously on the underlying work and on society at large. Indeed, 
this is the norm for parodies that courts have found fair. Justice Souter 
recognized that a particular work might exhibit both satire and parody: 
“[N]o workable presumption for parody could take account of the fact that 
parody often shades into satire when society is lampooned through its 
creative artifacts, or that a work may contain both parodic and nonparodic 
elements.” 72 This will be especially true of source works that are cultural 
icons—because of their popularity, critiquing these icons carries a larger 
message. When the canon works stand for an era, a mood, a history, the 
Mary Sue becomes a subversive intervention.
Mary Sues can be commercial and still be fair.73 Indeed, the history 
of fair use is replete with commercial uses, including all of the cases 
cited earlier.74 In Campbell, the Supreme Court declared that “the more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the signifi cance of other fac-
tors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a fi nding of fair use.” 75 
While amateur fan fi ction is typically authored without remuneration in 
mind,76 not all Mary Sues have a noncommercial motive. The possibility 
of remuneration is important, because it spurs creation by allowing writ-
ers a livelihood in such work, while potentially giving them the fi nancial 
means to reach a larger audience. Alice Randall, for example, found a 
commercial publisher for her story, and will have the right to challenge 
Mitchell’s fi lm version with her own.
Even when a work is found to be a parody, courts will analyze the 
eff ect of the parody on the market both for the original work and for 
potential derivatives in the work. But when a new work transforms the 
original in some substantial way, the market harm resulting from the 
copying can be diffi  cult to ascertain. The Campbell court noted that “as 
to parody pure and simple, it is more likely that the new work will not 
aff ect the market for the original . . . by acting as a substitute for it.” 77 
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Mary Sue works—which by their very nature are subaltern critiques of the 
dominant stories—are not likely to supplant the market for the originals. 
Rather, they are likely to serve a diff erent market of specialized consum-
ers who identify more closely with Mary Sue versions than with domi-
nant versions. If part of the market for the original disappears because 
the Mary Sue exposes the original’s prejudices, this is not a harm that 
copyright law protects against. The Copyright Act is properly concerned 
with illegitimate free riding, not the speech eff ects of the use.78 Take, 
for example, scholarly criticism that borrows quotes or images from the 
subject of the critique. That criticism might ridicule or deride the original 
and thus harm the market for that work, yet that market harm should 
not be cognizable in the fair- use inquiry. While scholarly criticism can 
be eff ective, critiques written in the language of the original may prove 
equally persuasive.
Not all Mary Sues that challenge stereotypes constitute fair use under 
existing law. Fair use is a contextualized, fact- specifi c determination re-
quiring courts to carefully consider the factors enumerated in the statute. 
In deciding whether a use is fair or unfair, a court must “work its way 
through the relevant factors, and . . . judge[] case by case, in light of the 
ends of copyright law.” 79 While parodies by their nature require some 
amount of borrowing in order to evoke the original,80 the question of how 
much is too much can only be determined by considering the particular 
context. For example, a Mary Sue masquerading as the canon work would 
likely go too far. Indeed, fan- fi ction authors have developed conventions to 
avoid such false advertising.81 In the case of Warner Bros. Entertainment, 
Inc. and J. K. Rowling v. RDR Books, a federal district court judge ruled in 
2008 that a fan- published encyclopedia of all things Harry Potter did not 
constitute fair use because the fan, Steve Vander Ark, copied too much 
from Rowling’s original works, thus prompting Vander Ark to put more 
of the encyclopedia into his own words before he could sell it.
common critiques of the “mary sue”
Like any claim to use another’s original work, the author of a Mary Sue 
will face three fundamental objections. Let us consider some responses 
here.
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 Why Not Write an Entirely Original Story?
In Campbell v. Acuff - Rose, the Supreme Court indicated its distaste for 
someone who borrows someone else’s copyrighted work merely “to avoid 
the drudgery in working up something fresh.” 82 Indeed, a skeptic might 
ask: Why not simply write your own world? In a letter to her fans, this is 
precisely the advice of the writer Anne Rice: “I do not allow fan fi ction. 
The characters are copyrighted . . . . I advise my readers to write your own 
original stories with your own characters.” 83
Both the preference for parody over satire and the penchant for en-
tirely original stories have typically turned on economic analysis and the 
underlying notion of substitutability. The critical legal inquiry is: Is there 
a viable substitute for the copyrighted work? That is, can the later writer 
employ a public domain work or invent a wholly original work as an alter-
native vehicle for his or her critique? Paul Goldstein expresses confi dence 
that, for satire at least, such alternatives will be readily available: “There 
will rarely be a shortage of works, including public domain works, that 
with some ingenuity can be made to serve as equally eff ective vehicles for 
the intended satire.” 84 If a viable substitute exists, it is no longer necessary 
to use the copyrighted work. The focus on substitutability explains why 
courts generally favor parody over satire. For satire, as Goldstein reminds 
us, a substitute generally exists. But if the point is to comment on a par-
ticular work, and to seek to resignify it for oneself, there is no substitute 
for the use of the original work.
Furthermore, there is only one Superman. In such cases, social com-
mentary gathers its unique power because of its use of cultural icons. 
The abstract statement may not hold the same cultural currency as the 
one directed at, and employing, Superman. Thus, it is not the absence of 
creative genius on the part of the later author that requires the use of an 
earlier work. Rather, while the canon work’s inventiveness or brilliance 
may have contributed to its current cultural status, it is the very popu-
larity of the canon work that is the focus of the Mary Sue. Of course, by 
piggybacking on the canon work, the Mary Sue cannot guarantee itself 
a share in the original’s popularity. But for the author and a particular 
set of readers, the Mary Sue helps reimagine the world by reworking the 
most powerful elements of popular culture.
This dynamic is particularly important where the popular culture is 
widely discriminatory and noninclusive. As Henry Louis Gates, Jr., testi-
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fi ed in a declaration before the Court in the Wind Done Gone case, “Gone 
with the Wind—especially in its book form—is widely regarded in the 
black community as one of the most racist depictions of slavery and black 
slaves in American literature.” 85 In her declaration in the same case, Toni 
Morrison asked simply, “Who controls how history is imagined? Who gets 
to say what slavery was like for the slaves?” 86 Randall’s retelling of the mas-
ter narrative is a hoary tactic: as Gates testifi ed, “African Americans have 
used parody since slavery to ‘fi ght back’ against their masters.” 87 As Keith 
Aoki has described, parody off ers a “cultural space for ‘talking back’ at, or 
through, the pervasive and dense media languages which constitute much 
of our social environment.” 88 Rosemary Coombe powerfully asks: “What 
meaning does dialogue have when we are bombarded with messages to 
which we cannot respond, signs and images whose signifi cations cannot 
be challenged, and connotations we cannot contest?” 89 Theorists, both tra-
ditional and postmodern, affi  rm the discursive nature of creativity: all cre-
ators borrow from earlier masters.90 But contemporary cultural theorists 
recognize as an important discursive tactic the reworking of a discrimina-
tory narrative to retell history and empower oneself.91 Building on Michel 
de Certeau, Henry Jenkins describes fan fi ction as “textual poaching,” in 
which fans “reconstruct meanings according to more immediate inter-
ests.” 92 Rewriting the popular narrative becomes not only an attempt to 
change popular understandings, but also an act of self- empowerment. In 
Gates’s words, “[S]ignifying can also be employed to reverse or undermine 
pretense or even one’s opinion about one’s own status.” 93
But would not women and minorities who fi nd themselves misrep-
resented in culture be better off  creating wholly new stories, rather than 
redeploying the icons already off ered by cultural authorities? This is a 
common criticism of Star Trek slash fi ction, which paradoxically is often 
penned by women but at the same time often excludes women in its glorifi ca-
tion of the male bodies of Kirk and Spock. Though I have already posited 
some possible explanations for this phenomenon, here I consider it as 
an example of a discursive practice known in cultural theory as “brico-
lage”—the act of creating by “making do” with the hodgepodge of cultural 
elements that already exist.94 One study, for example, found that women 
writers of Star Trek slash fi ction focused on the lead males in the show 
because (1) the women characters in the story are not interesting, and (2) 
the writers were just “working with what’s out there” already.95
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Going further, I have posited a theory of cultural belonging and 
participation that goes beyond describing how individuals create within 
culture.96 I argue that, more and more, individuals seek a right to develop 
their autonomous selves within the normative communities that matter 
most to them. Mary Sue fan fi ction affi  rms Jane Austen’s observation that 
“[o]ne does not love a place the less for having suff ered in it.” 97 Writers 
responding to discriminatory texts they nonetheless love may simply seek 
to reclaim the works as their own, and in more affi  rming ways. 
There are, of course, brilliant, entirely original texts that refl ect an 
egalitarian worldview. Yet for whatever reason, few such texts have at-
tained the popular cultural status of a small set of iconic works. Popularity 
may arise through a grassroots, word- of- mouth groundswell, which the 
Internet has made increasingly possible. More often than not, however, 
popularity is carefully cultivated, often requiring a large capital invest-
ment that is out of reach for many marginalized communities.98 Even 
when popular alternatives emerge, they can be co- opted by the dominant 
players simply through acquisition. Take the alternative teenage girl maga-
zine Sassy, purchased by Teen magazine, “which fi rst integrated it as a 
column and later phased it out completely.” Teen itself was later acquired 
and integrated into Seventeen magazine.99
Yet another obstacle to “wholly” invented alternatives is the possible 
use of intellectual property law by dominant players against newcomers. 
For example, Marvel and DC Comics both claim a joint trademark in the 
use of the phrase “Super Heroes” in comic books. Faced with a threat of 
suit, the creator of the comic book “Super Hero Happy Hour” changed his 
comic’s name to “Hero Happy Hour.” 100 While there are reasons to doubt 
the validity of the “Super Heroes” mark (for example, the term “super 
hero” is generic; the mark owners have failed to meet their obligation 
to police unauthorized uses of the mark),101 Marvel and DC can employ 
their questionable trademark against those parties lacking the resources 
to test their claims in court.
 Why Not License the Original?
Why not require that the Mary Sue be licensed from the copyright owner? 
Copyright law assumes that copyright owners will be reluctant to license 
criticism of their work. The Supreme Court so stated in Campbell v. Acuff - 
Rose: “Yet the unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license 
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critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses 
from the very notion of a potential licensing market.” 102 The Court ac-
cordingly concluded that, if there is no derivative market for criticism, 
criticism of the original work cannot interfere with the potential market 
for the copyrighted work. This supports the conclusion that critique of 
the work itself will likely constitute fair use. But some might argue that 
this is too pessimistic. If there is a market for a work, then the copyright 
owner should seek to maximize his or her profi t by exploiting it—even 
if it means tolerating criticism. (An alternative view is that rather than 
calling for fair use for criticism, any reluctance to license criticism should 
simply imply a compulsory license, requiring a royalty payment in lieu of 
a royalty- free use.) For instance, DC Comics, the owner of Batman, Super-
man, and other popular characters, has authorized “Elseworld” alternative 
universes, in which the heroes are villains, and the villains, heroes.103
Two recent moves by corporate America further suggest that “Offi  cial 
Mary Sues” are not entirely unlikely. Marvel Enterprises, Inc., licensed an 
Indian version of Spider- Man, with the superhero donning a traditional 
Indian loincloth and sparring with the Green Goblin recast as a Rakshasa, 
a demon from Hindu cosmology.104 As the Indian publisher announces, 
Spider- Man India interweaves the local customs, culture, and mystery 
of modern India, with an eye to making Spider- Man’s mythology more 
relevant to this particular audience. Readers of this series will see not 
the familiar Peter Parker of Queens under the classic Spider- Man mask, 
but rather a new hero—a young, Indian boy named Pavitr Prabhakar. 
As Spider- Man, Pavitr leaps around rickshaws and scooters in Indian 
streets, while swinging from monuments such as the Gateway of India 
and the Taj Mahal.105
In late 2005, Disney revised its most lucrative story, Winnie the Pooh, 
by replacing the central human fi gure, Christopher Robin, with a “red- 
haired six- year- old tomboy” girl.106 The reaction to Disney’s announce-
ment was mixed. Nicholas Tucker, author of The Rough Guide to Chil-
dren’s Books, declared the new character “a huge error,” explaining that 
the original stories are “built around a boy who arrives and puts things 
right, like little boys do.” 107 Yet another scholar of children’s literature 
doubts whether the absence of female characters in Winnie the Pooh has 
a deleterious eff ect: Kathleen Horning, who instructs children’s book 
librarians at the University of Wisconsin –Madison, reports that, “grow-
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ing up, I had no problem relating to Christopher Robin. He almost had 
a non- specifi c gender.” 108 Do these two events—involving what are likely 
to be the single most popular superhero in the world and the single most 
popular children’s cartoon character—suggest that underground versions 
of popular culture are unnecessary? Indeed, recently even the producers 
of Sesame Street, acknowledging their failure to produce “a single female 
character with anything close to the name recognition of Big Bird or 
Cookie Monster or Ernie and Bert” (not to mention Elmo), introduced a 
new girl character, “Abby Cadabby” (although her iconic status remains 
to be seen). This introduction comes in this progressive television show’s 
thirty- seventh season.109
Despite these examples, the possibility of an offi  cial Mary Sue for 
Winnie the Pooh is unlikely for at least three reasons. First, Disney’s move 
comes after almost eighty years of the male- dominated Hundred Acre 
Wood; Spider- Man’s new ethnicity comes after more than forty years of a 
white- only superhero. It seems unreasonable to expect the world’s women 
and minorities to wait patiently for each such move. Second, the offi  cial 
Mary Sue may still leave much to be desired in the characterization of the 
newly represented group. Third, even where it expands the representation, 
it still leaves large omissions: the tomboy girl replacing Christopher Robin 
was white. And fi nally, the masters of popular characters are unlikely to 
license the most disfavored uses. When the Mitchell estate sought out an 
author for a sequel to Gone with the Wind, it required a pledge that the 
author “will under no circumstances write anything about miscegenation 
or homosexuality.” 110 Similarly, while DC Comics produced an alternative 
strip featuring an evil Batman, it issued a cease- and- desist letter to an 
artist depicting Batman and Robin as lovers.111 An evil Batman, it seems, 
is more palatable than a gay one.
 Won’t “Recoding” Popular Icons Destabilize Culture?
If popular icons are recoded, will a society’s culture suff er? The legal scholar 
Justin Hughes worries that a permissive attitude toward transforming 
social meanings will undermine cultural stability; according to another 
scholar, “Hughes worries that a generally passive audience will suff er as 
cultural minorities disturb their icons.” 112 I disagree for four reasons.
First, human beings have the capacity to hold multiple, even contra-
dictory, meanings simultaneously. Despite the multiplicity of meanings 
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that any given word can hold, communication stumbles on. It may at 
times require disambiguation, but that does not seem an unreasonable 
price for a richer discourse.
Second, the canonical text itself might have multiple interpretations, 
both offi  cial and unoffi  cial. Authors of literary criticism do not seek to 
uncover the one authentic meaning of a text, but rather understand that 
it can accommodate multiple interpretations. Homosexual readings of 
Batman have been off ered since at least the 1950s, yet Batman’s woman-
izing remains a popular motif. Offi  cial owners have themselves promoted 
“forked” meanings—consider Frank Miller’s “grittier” Batman, which 
was off ered by DC Comics to revive the classic character.113
Third, the meaning of a text evolves over time, and cannot be fi rmly 
fi xed to some romantic original intention. Our contemporary under-
standing of culture rejects the static, thing- like terms of early cultural 
anthropology. Today’s anthropologists understand culture as “traveling,” 
engaging “in both internal and external dialogue” along the way.114
Fourth, demeaning representations in popular culture need to be 
challenged. A semiotic democracy in which the power of meaning- 
making has been democratized cannot declare certain icons sacred, es-
pecially those icons that valorize only the already dominant segments of 
society. While many in society may not wish to despoil their romance 
with Scarlett and Rhett Butler, the pair’s position in the fi ction as lords 
of a slave plantation cannot be whitewashed.
Everyone’s a superhero, everyone’s a Captain Kirk.
—Nena, “99 Red Balloons”
Reworking the proprietary icons of our age can lead to both politi-
cal resistance and economic empowerment. Media stereotypes play an 
important role in educating us about the capacities of others. Even more 
alarming, they are a central way in which we learn about our own ca-
pacities. Given a popular media that marginalizes various segments of 
society, the act of reworking popular stories to assert one’s own value is 
empowering: it opens the path to new livelihoods and roles. Self- insertion 
changes popular meanings, laying the foundation for economic change. 
Copying can be an act of both homage and subversion.
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in l ate december 2004 ,  I traveled to India to witness the social rup-
tures that India’s entry into the modern intellectual property world would 
likely trigger. The deadline for developing nations to be fully compliant 
with the Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS), the preeminent global intellectual property law of the Infor-
mation Age, was January 1, 2005. From that date on, India would have 
Western- style intellectual property rights for everything from medicines 
to seeds. For more than a decade, the developing world had resisted this 
moment. Since they had been pressured into signing TRIPS during the 
Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations, countries such as Brazil and India 
had argued that strong intellectual property rights helped the West but 
would devastate the rest.
Sadly, my visit to India that December coincided with an all too literal 
tsunami that shook the subcontinent. The tsunami focused the world’s 
attention on the rural poor in the countries at the perimeter of the Indian 
Ocean. I will seek to keep my focus on these people in this chapter.
Much to my surprise, India rang in the New Year without much ill 
note of TRIPS. In the intellectual property storm, the dust had settled, for 
now. TRIPS was fi nally in India, seemingly to stay, and the intellectual 
property scholars and practitioners there with whom I spoke had little 
interest in prolonging the battles of the last decade. “TRIPS has entered, 
chapter five
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and India took a U- turn because it felt it could not [continue fi ghting 
against TRIPS],” V. C. Vivekanandan, an intellectual property professor 
at NALSAR, a leading national law school in Hyderabad, told me. “It has 
been grudgingly accepted.” 1
But in that characteristically Indian way of absorbing every contra-
diction and all the diversity of life, this was not simply an expression of 
passive acceptance of destiny. After a decade of resisting the Western 
imposition of intellectual property, now many in India—from the intel-
lectual property professors and lawyers in the cities, to the farmers and 
artisans in the villages—were beginning to ask: how can intellectual prop-
erty rights work for us? TRIPS protected the knowledge and economic 
interests of the developed world, the rich corporations of the West. But can 
intellectual property be a tool for protecting poor people’s knowledge as 
well? Some seem to think so. Take the case of an award- winning farmer 
in Kerala who developed a high- yield method for planting rubber trees. 
An intellectual property professor from Kerala related the farmer’s story: 
“Later when somebody tried to plant [rubber trees] in the same way, [the 
farmer] said, ‘No, I will get a patent in this.’” The professor noted, “Five 
years back this concept [of patenting] was totally lacking. This farmer had 
only studied up to [the] sixth or seventh [grade]. But he has some idea 
about this particular law where you can stop somebody else from using 
the method.” 2
Certainly, the shift to appropriating intellectual property in India 
is neither complete nor uncontested. When the Kerala farmer took his 
claims to the Rubber Board, there was fi erce debate among the farmers. 
“One young farmer stood up and said, ‘I [wouldn’t] want any monetary 
benefi t from this. I [would] just want this to be propagated freely. Uncle, 
I [wouldn’t] want a patent. For me the honor of the award [would be] 
enough.’” 3 But if the daily headlines are any indication, the country’s ap-
proach is shifting from this traditional view. The front pages chronicle a 
rising tide of applications fi led with a national registry established pursu-
ant to the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) 
Act of 1999 (also known as the GI Act).4 Required by TRIPS5 originally 
as a means to protect French makers of wines and champagnes, the law 
gives trademark- like protection to distinctive goods or services whose 
quality and reputation derive from the geographical area in which they are 
produced. In a country such as India, which has a vast cultural heritage 
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and a store of traditional knowledge dating back to the Vedas, the GI Act is 
seen as a potentially important source of recognition and income for India’s 
rural poor—the very same poor who otherwise have been displaced and 
forced further into poverty by globalization. One hope is that Geographi-
cal Indications (GI) protection will allow local artisans to stay in their 
communities and fend for themselves, without having to renounce their 
traditional work for life in the overcrowded cities. When I visited India in 
2005, farmers and artisans from across the country were getting in line to 
register their wares, from Darjeeling tea to Alfonso mangoes, Kolhapuri 
chappals, Mysore silk and sandalwood, and the uniquely woven sarees 
from the village of Pochampally, in the shadow of high- tech Hyderabad.6
Turn the clock back ten years. When intellectual property found its 
way into the sanctions regime of the international trade order, there were 
no marchers in the streets to mark the occasion. The White House had 
issued a white paper declaring the need to strengthen intellectual prop-
erty law in the face of the digital revolution. Congress was just about to 
undertake enormous giveaways to intellectual property holders—granting 
famous brands rights even in the absence of consumer confusion, extend-
ing copyright terms by another two decades, and securing technologi-
cal copyright protection schemes against hacking. Courts signaled their 
willingness to accept patents on business methods. In the new economy 
of the information age, patents, trademarks, copyrights, and even domain 
names7 were being distributed with abandon. Conventional wisdom was 
that the digital world to come would require bigger and stronger intel-
lectual property rights.
Amid this euphoria, some scholars recognized a dark side of intel-
lectual property. In this narrative of progress, James Boyle, for example, 
saw us sowing the seeds of our own destruction. Just as the fi rst enclo-
sure of the commons and industrialization had threatened our natural 
environment, this new “land grab” in cyberspace and on our cultural 
commons, Boyle observed, threatened to ruin our cultural landscape and 
deplete our cultural heritage. Boyle’s critical insight was that expanding 
intellectual property rights were fed by the conceit of romantic author-
ship: the idea that individuals (and even corporations) create out of thin 
air rather than borrow from a rich public domain of freely circulating 
sources and inspirations. “The author vision blinds us to the importance 
of the commons—to the importance of the raw material from which 
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information products are constructed,” he wrote in his 1996 book Sha-
mans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information 
Society.8 The process of creation, Boyle noted, requires the conservation 
of cultural raw materials; if these are themselves owned, the process of 
creation may be stunted.
Boyle’s vision of a political movement to protect and preserve the 
public domain, complete with private institutions dedicated to the proj-
ect modeled after Greenpeace, spurred the establishment of the Creative 
Commons. The metaphor Boyle off ered, “cultural environmentalism,” 
helped lay the foundation for the recognition and protection of traditional 
knowledge and natural resources found in the developing world. Tak-
ing a cue implicitly from the environmental justice movement, which 
demonstrated the disparate eff ects of environmental harms on disad-
vantaged minorities, the cultural- environmental movement illustrated 
how third- world peoples are disproportionately disadvantaged by intel-
lectual property law, which historically has not recognized their cultural 
contributions.
Indigenous people and those in the third world benefi ted from the 
attention to our cultural commons. It provided a moral and economic 
basis to reward their cultivation of the world’s biodiversity and ancient 
cultural knowledge about that biodiversity, both of which were required 
inputs for innovation. By “reifying the negative” 9 and focusing needed 
attention on the “other side” of intellectual property,10 Boyle invented the 
public domain.
But now, in the developing world, scholars, lawyers, and activists are 
turning the light on what they call “poor people’s knowledge.” 11 For them, 
this is “the other half of intellectual property”—the knowledge that is not 
protected by TRIPS, but perhaps should be.12 In this chapter, I consider 
how “cultural environmentalism” both bolsters and obstructs the proj-
ect of protecting poor people’s knowledge and promoting development 
through intellectual property. I argue that although the metaphor spurred 
the invention of traditional knowledge as a political and legal category, the 
same metaphor may also inadvertently obscure the inventiveness of tradi-
tional knowledge. Reifying the public domain may have the unintended 
eff ect of congealing traditional knowledge as “the opposite of property,” 13 
presenting poor people’s knowledge as the raw material of innovation—
ancient, static, and natural—rather than as intellectual property—mod-
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ern, dynamic, scientifi c, and culturally inventive. According to this view, 
traditional knowledge holders may receive remuneration for conserving 
biodiversity and contributing the raw materials of innovation, but they are 
not recognized as intellectual property holders in their own right. What’s 
more, a binary view of “intellectual property versus the public domain” 
rejects new claims for intellectual property in traditional knowledge on 
the premise that these rights would shrink the public domain.14
In truth, the line between what law considers “raw material” versus 
“intellectual property” is less stable and more fraught with bias than the 
binary approach would acknowledge. While politically eff ective, reifying 
the negative may have the perverse eff ect of reinventing these categories 
as real and stable, obscuring the degree to which they are constructed 
and insecure.
If anyone understands this, it is Boyle himself. The author of “Fou-
cault in Cyberspace,” 15 Boyle articulated in Shamans, Software, and Spleens 
one of his fundamental concerns: the contested concept of authorship. 
Why was the shaman’s lore unprotected “traditional knowledge” but W. R. 
Grace’s appropriation of that knowledge “innovation”? Why was the pa-
tient Mr. Moore’s spleen “raw material” but the UCLA researchers’ cell 
line derived from the spleen “intellectual property”? These were more 
than the sharp questions of a law professor challenging fi rst- year prop-
erty students. Boyle off ered up the “romantic author” not to justify these 
categories but to deconstruct them. Boyle persuasively argued for the 
need to critically probe authorship and its premise of a “transformative 
originality more often assumed than proved.” 16
How is it, then, that the cultural environmentalism metaphor may 
now be inadvertently helping to reconstruct some of the very same false 
binaries that Boyle set out to tear down more than a decade ago? The 
answer, I believe, turns on the historical contingency of the work, its intel-
lectual history. In Shamans, Software, and Spleens, Boyle was concerned 
about the morality of legally recognizing some members of society as 
authors and not others. He bemoaned the distributive eff ects of such 
intellectual property laws as “colossally unfair” 17 and boldly called for “a 
critical social theory of the information society” 18 that would consider 
these diffi  culties. But by and large, Boyle’s own work did not stray far 
from intellectual property’s economic tradition. While Boyle acknowl-
edged the broad social, cultural, moral, and distributive eff ects of intel-
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lectual property, his primary prescriptions stuck to a law- and- economic 
analysis of intellectual property. Failure to protect a public domain was, 
above all, ineffi  cient. Destroying the raw materials necessary for creation 
would stunt creation itself. This approach was admittedly strategic; Boyle 
openly stated that economic appeals “will sometimes convince when more 
frankly moral appeals do not.” 19 Boyle acknowledged that his approach was 
not radical, but rather that it evinced “a conservative strand,” advocating 
“a return to the rational roots of intellectual property.” 20
Boyle displayed a rare combination: postmodern acuity and politi-
cal savvy. His analogy to the environmental movement was a brilliant 
move. But given the discursive restraints of the time, Boyle was not able 
to fulfi ll his ambition completely. He openly acknowledged “the dangers 
of embracing too closely a language that can express only some of the 
things that you care about.” 21 Boyle was fully aware of the contingency of 
his economic argument, recognizing that “our concerns with education 
and the distribution of wealth, with free speech and universal access to 
information, can never be fully expressed in the language of neo- classical 
price theory.” 22
Today, the space for discussing intellectual property’s distributive 
and social eff ects is expanding. Notably, a vast coalition of hundreds of 
intellectual property practitioners, scholars, and activists from around the 
world are calling for intellectual property to be approached in the context 
of broader societal interests and development- related concerns, and not 
just from the narrow lens of economic incentives for innovation.23 As ever, 
we are enriched by tradition, but not beholden to it. We are still in need 
of “a critical social theory of the information society” for which Boyle’s 
work off ers a foundation. But since then, the discursive space for crafting 
that theory has expanded beyond the narrow confi nes of understanding 
intellectual property rights as incentives alone.
By foregrounding the important role of “raw materials” in the process 
of innovation, cultural environmentalism helped provide a theoretical and 
political basis for recognition and recompense for the purveyors of those 
raw materials—often indigenous peoples who have cultivated the earth’s 
biodiversity and who hold “traditional knowledge” about that biodiversity. 
The invention of the public domain helped to foster “the invention of 
traditional knowledge” as a political and legal category worthy of rights. 
But while theorizing the public domain provided intellectual heft to new 
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claims for traditional knowledge protection, it has also proved a stumbling 
block. Today, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and more 
recently the 2011 Nagoya Protocol to the CBD promote an international 
legal regime that would reward traditional knowledge holders for their 
role in preserving biodiversity and ancient knowledge—that is, for their 
role in preserving the public domain.
But these international legal documents do not expressly recognize 
the inventiveness of traditional knowledge, nor the attendant intellectual 
property rights claimed by the world’s poor as authors and inventors of 
new knowledge. In truth, traditional knowledge is much more dynamic 
and innovative—indeed evolving—than the “environmentalism” meta-
phor, with its connotations of conservation, acknowledges. A legal regime 
that recognizes poor people as agents—that is, as the subjects of intellec-
tual property, and not just as the objects of intellectual property, off ering 
up raw materials for others to transform—is premised on a broader view 
of the relationship between intellectual property and development itself. 
Here yet another side of intellectual property is revealed: its social and 
cultural face, not just its economic aspects. World actors are beginning 
to recognize that intellectual property is about more than incentives for 
innovation. Just like real property rights, intellectual property rights can 
promote freedom and security, potentially enabling knowledge societies 
in which the rich and poor alike may cultivate and materially benefi t 
from their ideas.
viewing the poor as wardens of “traditional” 
knowledge
The invention of the public domain helped lay a foundation for “the in-
vention of traditional knowledge” as a political and legal category worthy 
of rights. Boyle’s metaphor for a politics of the public domain, “cultural 
environmentalism,” helped focus the world’s attention on the value of 
ecological and cultural biodiversity for the process of scientifi c and cul-
tural innovation, and on the need to preserve those resources. Although 
Boyle off ered cultural environmentalism as a metaphor, at points cultural 
environmentalism coincides with environmentalism itself. Recall the sha-
mans of Madagascar. In this poverty- stricken nation, medicine men had 
developed therapeutic uses for the indigenously grown rosy periwinkle. 
Enter Eli Lilly & Company, which transformed this plant and the sha-
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man’s lore into a drug to treat Hodgkin’s disease. At the time, the drug 
was valued at some $100 million annually.24 As Boyle pointed out, even a 
fraction of the company’s profi ts would have been a signifi cant boost to 
the economy of this poor country.25 But through the vagaries of Western 
intellectual property law, the people of Madagascar received none of the 
profi ts derived from this new drug. Western intellectual property, as Boyle 
explained, was premised on an authorial regime that “values the raw 
materials for the production of intellectual property at zero,” yet judges 
Eli Lilly’s contribution, refi ning the shaman’s traditional knowledge, in 
the hundreds of millions of dollars.26
For Boyle, the rosy periwinkle symbolized more than just a moral 
problem, or a problem of postmodern authorship. The rosy periwinkle, 
Boyle wrote, “exemplifi es the utilitarian failures of the current regime.” 27 
Absent any reward for their preservation of biodiversity and traditional 
knowledge, the people of Madagascar had “chopped down most of their 
forests to feed [their] people” 28—an irony Boyle decried. In this context, 
the cultural environment was not merely metaphor. Boyle was concerned 
about the literal environment, the earth’s forests and all of its abundant 
biodiversity, from which medicinal and other cultural knowledge could be 
derived. Cultural environmentalism called our attention to the traditional 
knowledge of the shaman and other people, often poor, who cultivated 
disease- resistant wheat and rice and held the secrets of which plants could 
cure our ills. Going further, cultural environmentalism highlighted the 
need to preserve diverse cultures, the repositories of such knowledge. 
“Who knows what other unique and potentially valuable plants disappear 
with the forest, what generations of pharmacological experience disappear 
as the indigenous culture is destroyed?” Boyle pointedly asked.29
The trope of the romantic author obscured the contributions of bio-
diversity and traditional knowledge to innovation. “Who needs a public 
domain if you can create out of nothing?” Boyle asked.30 By exposing 
how companies such as Eli Lilly did not, in fact, create out of thin air, but 
rather often benefi ted from the rich biodiversity and knowledge found in 
the global South, Boyle made the strongest case for preserving the public 
domain: the public domain saves lives.
Boyle’s theory of the public domain provided intellectual grounding 
to arguments for recognizing the value of the cultural contributions of 
indigenous and third- world peoples to innovation. Both the CBD and 
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the recent Nagoya Protocol to the CBD promote an international legal 
regime that would reward indigenous peoples for supplying the raw ma-
terials of innovation and preserving the public domain. Employing the 
combined language of environmentalism and economics, the CBD re-
fers to local peoples as “resource managers” and their trade as “species 
management,” 31 and grants countries sovereign rights of ownership over 
genetic resources found within their borders. These rights serve as both 
ex post reward for biodiversity conservation and ex ante incentive for 
continued conservation. The CBD would grant both sovereignty in biologi-
cal resources and the right to share in the benefi ts of patented products 
that arise from the appropriation of a country’s biodiversity or traditional 
knowledge. Similarly, a draft Treaty on Access to Knowledge seeks to 
“protect, preserve and enhance the public domain, which is essential for 
creativity and sustained innovation,” 32 by similarly requiring patent hold-
ers to seek prior informed consent for use of biological materials from the 
country of origin and to “equitably share the benefi ts derived from use 
of that biological material.” 33 The dual recommendation of both resource 
sovereignty and equitable benefi t sharing seeks to recognize indigenous 
peoples as the wardens of the world’s “raw materials” and to reward them 
materially for their role in preserving the public domain.
Whereas this theory of the public domain has served to undergird 
claims for traditional knowledge protection, so too has it proved a stum-
bling block. In the last decade, we have seen indigenous peoples and the 
poor, not unlike the Kerala rubber- tree farmer, turning their attention 
to appropriating intellectual property to their own ends.34 Today claims 
by indigenous people and the poor go beyond equitable benefi t sharing; 
increasingly, the poor seek to own copyrights, trademarks, and patents 
in their own cultural and scientifi c innovations.35 Strikingly, the tradi-
tional advocates for preserving the public domain have fl ipped. “Native 
peoples once stood for the commons,” 36 but with the imbalance of TRIPS 
becoming ever more apparent, advocates of the poor are turning their at-
tention to securing affi  rmative intellectual property rights for their own 
cultural and scientifi c innovations. Paradoxically, however, the concepts of 
“traditional knowledge,” the “public domain,” and “cultural environmen-
talism” are now proving to be obstacles to understanding poor people’s 
knowledge as intellectual property. Claims by native peoples to hold intel-
lectual property are resisted as threats to the public domain, or as the 
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false consciousness of neo- liberalism, or as a radical assault on our intel-
lectual property tradition, which encourages and promotes cultivation, not 
stewardship.37
We should be wary of these declarations and “the romance of the 
public domain” itself.38 Anupam Chander and I have argued that, while 
the banner of the public domain is taken up for all of humanity, a binary 
view of “intellectual property versus the public domain” may not be to 
the benefi t of the world’s poor.39 Often, we have explained, the benefi ts of 
an open- access commons go to the richest and the strongest. Diff erences 
in wealth, gender, and class determine whether one will in fact be able to 
convert the riches of the commons into lucrative property. This is what 
we call the “romance of the commons: the belief that because a resource 
is open to all by force of law, it will indeed be equally exploited by all.” 40 
Concerns arising from effi  ciency alone obscure the disparate eff ects of 
the commons on the poor. Staying attuned to the distributional eff ects of 
the public domain, in contrast, may require thinking about poor people’s 
knowledge in “uncommon property” 41 terms, facilitating their capability 
to exert greater control over their property and to extract compensation 
from their knowledge.
The “cultural environmentalism” metaphor reifi es the division be-
tween “raw” and “cooked” knowledge, a conceptual separation long funda-
mental to intellectual property law. Ironically, the cultural environmental-
ism metaphor has fortifi ed the very boundary between authors and raw 
materials that Boyle himself had begun to tear down. Boyle pulled the rug 
out from under the romantic author, exposing the equally important role 
of sources and audiences in the process of innovation. He also underlined 
the vagaries and cultural bias in intellectual property law’s determina-
tions of who were authors and who (Mr. Moore) or what (his spleen) 
were the mere raw materials of scientifi c and cultural production. Boyle 
recognized the problem of “rewarding a narrow set of contributions to 
world culture and science.” 42 But he stopped short of advocating reform of 
a Western intellectual property tradition that was founded on naturalizing 
particular distinctions between nature and culture, idea and expression, 
raw material and innovation. Anchoring his argument in the orthodox 
language of effi  ciency, Boyle praised intellectual property’s tradition of 
striking the proper balance between intellectual property and the public 
domain but argued that the Information Age had upset that balance. 
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Intellectual property policies could continue to promote innovation, he 
argued, if it returned to that balance.43
Poor people benefi ted from this approach to the extent that their con-
tributions toward preserving the cultural environment were unrecognized 
in the past. At the same time, reifying the negative has the perverse eff ect 
of congealing poor people’s knowledge as the object of property, the raw 
material from which real intellectual property is derived, and obscures 
its status as the subject of property, deserving of the label intellectual 
property in its own right.
We must consider how law’s reifi cation of the negative invents tradi-
tion rather than discovers it. The lines between the inputs and outputs 
of innovation are anything but static. At the end of the last century, we 
witnessed the migration of many forms of knowledge from the public 
domain to intellectual property: university research, business methods, 
and even life forms joined the realm of intellectual property. In truth, our 
intellectual property traditions are more complex than political campaigns 
for the public domain allow us to recognize. Viewed in this light, we may 
begin to see how the invention of traditional knowledge as perennially raw 
rather than cooked erects a false wall between modernity and tradition. 
Worse still, it deprives diverse peoples of the world of their humanity 
and cultural creativity. As the Indian eco- feminist and property theorist 
Vandana Shiva describes, biodiversity is not simply the bounty “of nature, 
guided by nothing but Providence.” Far from it, “commons are resources 
shaped, managed and utilized through community control.” 44 A quarter- 
century ago, William Cronon helped give birth to the environmental 
movement with a similar observation of the active role played by Native 
Americans in cultivating the New England environment, which colonists 
had deemed “natural.” “One must not exaggerate the diff erences between 
English and Indian agricultures,” Cronon wrote.45 As Cronon explained, 
“[b]y making the arrival of the Europeans the center of our analysis, we 
run the risk of attributing all change to their agency, and none to the 
Indians. The implication is not only that the earlier world of ‘Indian’ New 
England was somehow static but also that the Indians themselves were 
as passive and ‘natural’ as the landscape.” 46 Today, when law defi nes the 
contributions of the poor as nature rather than culture, the “creativity 
of both nature and other cultures is negated.” 47 Boyle underlined “law 
and the construction of the Information Society.” 48 Our understanding 
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of information and knowledge is not preordained but involves political 
choices. Indeed, this is the insight of Shiva’s own political act of defi ning 
as “biopiracy” the “patent claims over biodiversity and indigenous knowl-
edge that are based on the innovations, creativity and genius of the people of 
the Third World.” 49 “Since a ‘patent’ is given for invention,” she argues, “a 
biopiracy patent denies the innovation embodied in indigenous knowledge.” 50
I do not claim that our ability to distinguish the inputs and outputs 
of innovation is entirely indeterminate. Nor do I advocate for a system 
of law that would shift continuously according to the changing political 
strength of either the rich or the poor in these matters. But I do call for 
legal decision- makers to recognize contingency, bias, and unreasoned 
orthodoxy in the legal defi nitions that begin to appear natural. Today 
we can see how constructing poor people’s knowledge as raw materials 
supports a model of “benefi t sharing,” permitting local communities to 
perhaps receive some compensation from Western patents derived from 
those communities’ resources. But this approach rewards the poor only 
as wardens, not also as cultivators. In some cases, when the poor’s inno-
vation is overlooked, benefi t sharing may be “the equivalent of stealing a 
loaf of bread and then sharing the crumbs.” 51
a truer model:  the poor as cultivators of knowledge
Today the poor seek to learn how to use the tools of intellectual property 
to recognize their own cultural and scientifi c contributions, not just those 
of the West. “Traditional knowledge” is continually being invented. In My-
sore, India, the makers of internationally famous silk sarees have begun 
off ering waterproof sarees. Inlaid marble designers in Agra, home of the 
Taj Mahal, who for years peddled “hackneyed tourist designs” to visitors, 
now apply their craft to create “stunning dinnerware” to be served in the 
fi nest Indian and Western homes.52 Traditional people move, intermarry, 
share ideas, and modify their skills and products to respond to the shifting 
demands of the market and their culture. These activities are not merely 
strategic and pragmatic, but are evidence of a healthy and dynamic cul-
ture. In short, traditional knowledge is more vibrant and innovative than 
is acknowledged by the “environmentalism” metaphor, with its emphasis 
on conservation of nature’s raw materials.
Debates over the protection of traditional knowledge, however, often 
fail to recognize its dynamic character. “Traditional knowledge” typi-
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cally refers to knowledge handed down from generation to generation. 
This knowledge includes such forms of cultural expressions as songs, 
dances, stories, artworks, and crafts, as well as “symbols, marks, and 
other recurring expressions of traditional concepts.” 53 Agricultural, sci-
entifi c, and medical knowledge is also covered.54 It is often believed that 
this knowledge has existed for millennia and, remarkably, that it has 
remained static over time. We are told that proper authorship cannot be 
determined because the knowledge has been passed down through an 
oral tradition and was not written down. Even if inscribed, we may not 
locate a single author; traditional knowledge is often communally held. 
Now mix in the historic conception of indigenous and third- world peoples 
as the anti- West: anti- commodifi cation, anti- property, and anti- markets. 
The result is that, partly because of the diffi  culties of fi tting poor people’s 
knowledge into Western frameworks and partly because this knowledge 
is valued as the opposite of property, the creative knowledge of the poor, 
and their capacity for knowledge creation, are often overlooked. Instead, 
poor people’s concerns are addressed by stimulating technology transfer, 
foreign direct investment, access to Western knowledge, and, at best, eq-
uitable benefi t sharing. Much less attention is given to how law can tap 
the innovation and productive knowledge capacities of the poor.
This paradigm is beginning to change. A recent World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) report on traditional knowledge fi nds that, 
in fact, “much [traditional knowledge] is not ancient or inert, but is a vital, 
dynamic part of the contemporary lives of many communities today.” 55 
This fi nding should not be surprising. Many of the most ancient monu-
ments survived because they remained in use. Traditional knowledge 
techniques also survive in this way, by continuously evolving as humans 
innovate around them to meet current needs and solve contemporary 
problems. Traditional knowledge, WIPO tells us, “is being created every 
day and evolves as individuals and communities respond to the challenges 
posed by their social environment. . . . This contemporary aspect is further 
justifi cation for legal protection.” 56
Return to the example of Mysore silk sarees. The “grand old queen” 
of Indian silk57 has had a makeover since obtaining a geographical indica-
tion, updating its look with trendy new (but, interestingly, natural) colors—
“lilac, ecru, coff ee- brown and elephant- grey”—and with “contemporary” 
designs inspired by temple architecture and tribal jewelry.58 Make no 
201111 Pass 3 press.indd   138 2/10/12   2:23 PM
c an intellec tual propert y help the poor? 139
mistake: tradition is hard work. As an executive producer of Mysore silk 
sarees explained, revamping the designs without losing the sheen of the 
silk took “months of painstaking research and trials.” 59
Consider another example, closer to home. A San Francisco–based 
artist trained in the modernist textile tradition of Ray Eames received 
a felt rug from her Iranian- American husband, which he purchased in 
1999 on his fi rst trip back to Iran after the Revolution. The felt rug, the 
product of a seven- thousand- year- old tradition, inspired the designer to 
apply her contemporary paintings to the rugs themselves—a collaboration 
across cultures and generations. This was an idea that the Internet and 
the Creative Commons could not assist. Indeed, the couple embarked on 
a four- year journey across Iran to learn more about felt rug making, to 
fi nd that only a few living felters remain, sprawled all over that country 
and unconnected to one another. The couple put the felters in touch with 
each other and established an Iranian factory that employed the best of 
their techniques, literally reviving an art on the verge of extinction and 
creating a profi table market for the rugs both within and beyond Iran.60
Tradition is cultivated, not discovered. The concept of traditional 
knowledge, too, is a modern invention. Those studying poor people’s 
knowledge warn of the dangers of “overdrawing the distinction between 
[traditional knowledge] and modern knowledge.” 61 In truth, “no one’s life 
is entirely traditional, and no one’s life is entirely modern.” 62 Indeed, 
forcing ourselves to see the modern aspects of traditional knowledge also 
helps us to view more critically our own romantic notions of Western 
intellectual property as “new.” As Boyle demonstrated so well, the line 
separating the public domain and intellectual property does not often in-
volve the eureka discovery that the trope of the romantic author suggests.
Developing marketable uses for third- world cultural products is 
“ultimately perhaps the most eff ective way to protect their traditions.” 63 
Increasingly, third- world artisans recognize that “[e]xcept in a museum 
setting, no traditional craft skill can be sustained unless it has a viable 
market.” 64 And recent activity suggests that many third- world craftspeople 
and artisans are more accepting of market strategies and practices than 
is generally acknowledged. We see again that commerce and culture are 
not necessarily at odds, as demonstrated by the revitalization of Iranian 
felt rug  making by the introduction of global markets, a process that has 
encouraged preservation through commercialization. And vehicles like 
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geographical indications help preserve geographical diversity.65 Weavers, 
artisans, farmers, and the makers of handicrafts do not have to leave their 
skills or homes for city life. If properly identifi ed, trained, and protected, 
they can remain at home while participating in a global industry.
In short, applying principles of intellectual property rights to poor 
people’s knowledge will encourage third- world development, and not 
just in the defensive sense of resisting TRIPS.66 Partly, the development 
interest here is economic, although it is unclear how much monetary 
value is at stake.67 In 2000, handicrafts alone were estimated to generate 
nearly $3 billion in annual revenue.68 The United Nations estimates that 
developing countries lose about $5 billion in royalties annually from the 
unauthorized use of traditional knowledge.69 Poor people’s turn to prop-
erty is surely about economics, but it is about social and cultural values 
as well. These claims recognize that the relationship between intellectual 
property and development goes beyond GDP. People, rich and poor alike, 
want recognition of their creativity and of their contributions to science 
and culture. This capacity for innovation, work, and cultural sharing is 
part of what makes us human.
WIPO and TRIPS have focused on teaching the poor how to protect 
the intellectual property of the West. We need to turn our attention to 
helping the poor to use intellectual property to protect their own inven-
tions as well. Only some of the people who hold traditional knowledge 
oppose the commodifi cation of their knowledge on religious or cultural 
grounds; but most are poor, lacking in the infrastructure for production, 
and are ignorant of intellectual property laws and commercial knowledge 
of marketing and branding. Intellectual property ownership does not 
come naturally.
In many cases . . . poor people’s knowledge meets the standard 
of novelty that modern IP law demands. . . . The development 
dimension lies in helping poor people to master the commer-
cial/legal tools needed to collect the value of their novelty. This 
is about entrepreneurship, about fi nding clever ways to repack-
age traditional knowledge into products useful for consumers 
in mass markets, and about developing the capacity to produce 
and deliver these products in suffi  cient quantity and quality as 
to satisfy such markets.70
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Increasingly, indigenous people and those in the third world seek 
“training on IP tools and how to use them.” 71 The new Indian Geographi-
cal Indications Act off ers an example. When the act became eff ective in 
2003, few were aware of its implications. Nongovernmental organizations 
thus embarked on extensive campaigns to educate local farmers and ar-
tisans about geographical indications (GIs).72
The TRIPS agreement off ers a foundation for international recogni-
tion of GIs. It defi nes GIs as “indications which identify a good as originat-
ing in the territory of a Member . . . where a given quality, reputation, or 
other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographi-
cal origin.” 73 “Champagne,” “Tequila,” and “Roquefort” are examples of 
the types of goods recognized as GIs. Under TRIPS, member states must 
provide legal means to prevent uses of a designated GI that either mislead 
the public as to the geographical origin of the good or constitute “unfair 
competition” under Article 10bis of the Paris Convention.74 In addition, 
TRIPS Article 23 mandates that further protection be extended to GIs 
for “wines and spirits,” 75 which must be protected even in the absence of 
consumer confusion.76
Two- tiered protection—a higher level of protection for wines and 
spirits and a lower one for everything else—has been a source of continu-
ing confl ict between Europe and the developing world.77 The confl ict is 
due in part to a perceived inequity in the current TRIPS system, and in 
part to the fact that GIs are considered to be where much of the wealth of 
poor people lies: in local production methods and cultural goods, from 
Darjeeling tea to Mysore silk to basmati rice.78 The patent provisions 
of TRIPS have posed clear challenges for developing countries, which 
typically lack capital for R&D- intensive breakthroughs or manufactur-
ing capacity. GIs, in contrast, are hailed as the poor people’s intellectual 
property rights, tools for ensuring recognition of the knowledge of weav-
ers, farmers, and craftspeople rather than just the high- technology con-
tributions of multinational corporations. The structure of GIs does make 
them particularly suited to poor people’s knowledge. First, GIs recognize 
collective intellectual property rights; under the Indian GI Act, multiple 
associations of artisans may be recognized as the authorized producers 
or users of a GI.79 GI applications are also relatively cheap, at least for a 
group of artisans working together. Under the GI Act, it costs a modest 
fi ve thousand rupees (a little more than $100) to apply.80
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Although GIs certainly hold promise for the poor, they have limits. 
The Indian GI Act protects only those goods or processes whose quality 
or reputation is shown to be “due exclusively or essentially to the geo-
graphical environment, with its inherent natural and human factors.” 81 
GI applications require “proof of origin” and a “historical record” 82 of 
continuous use of the goods or process. Registrants obtain the exclusive 
right to use the GI,83 and licensing of GIs is prohibited.84
Such requirements and restrictions take a narrow view of traditional 
knowledge, linking culture to land. The rule against alienability poses 
special concerns. Even if this approach may enable people to remain within 
their communities (and preserve the physical environment, as well), what 
if they move? What rights do traditional weavers from Mysore have if 
they move to North India—or the United Kingdom?85 Of course, there 
are good reasons to prevent the alienation of the GI from the particular 
geographical community. It prevents the scenario in which a large foreign 
corporation hires a member of that community away and then begins to 
produce “authentic” work elsewhere, using that GI—and decimating the 
livelihoods of the traditional community left behind. At the same time, 
such a restriction could stifl e opportunities for individuals who remain 
within a traditional community not by choice, but because of economic 
necessity. People move, intermarry, and change jobs. Culture fl ows with 
them. The GI Act does not recognize this dynamic nature of culture; 
instead it ossifi es authentic production in today’s localities.
Within a recognized “association,” traditional leaders may impose 
their will on members, reifying traditional hierarchies.86 Elizabeth Povi-
nelli notes that cultural rights often lead to the ironic production of au-
thenticity or indigeneity, which conforms to traditional structures from 
the past, rather than celebrating cultures as diachronic peoples who are 
dynamic and heterogeneous.87
The GIs also pose economic concerns. While GIs protect Darjeeling 
tea, for example, they also prohibit the Indian manufacture of Scotch 
whiskey, driving up the cost of Scotch in India. It is possible that the poor 
may reap greater economic rewards in a system with fewer production 
constraints.88 Boyle’s concern about the public domain also applies; at 
which point does too much intellectual property impede the very pro-
cesses of cultural sharing and innovation that law ought to promote, 
especially to aid the little guy in cultural production? These economic 
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concerns raise an important question of liberal strategy. As critical legal 
theorists have aptly warned, we must stand ready to openly question when 
and how “rights” might work to the disadvantage of the poor rather than 
to the poor’s benefi t.89
These concerns notwithstanding, GIs do potentially off er a range of 
benefi ts, from recognizing the innovation of collectives, to preserving 
geographic diversity and stimulating some redistribution of wealth. It may 
be more important to think of GIs as part of a larger framework in which 
the poor learn the secrets of Madison Avenue. If one simply produces 
goods, then any successful product will eventually draw stiff  competition 
from global mass production. But creating a protected brand allows one 
to stave off  complete usurpation by mass- produced substitutes. The GI 
Act works on this principle. It rewards the local community for having 
created a valued reputation and protects that reputation from the forces of 
global commerce. It recognizes that consumers everywhere seek authentic 
products and that they may care about who produces something, not just 
the ultimate product.90 Fair Trade coff ee, Rugmark carpets, and dolphin- 
safe tuna, for example, appeal to people’s desire to consume free from the 
worry about exploitation in the process of production. In response to the 
commercialization of ghetto style by white- owned fashion houses, one 
African American company declares to the consumer its ghetto roots by 
branding itself “FUBU”—For Us, By Us. Such authenticity marks trans-
late into profi ts in the marketplace.
The goal is “to help poor people get along in the modern world—to 
use modern instruments for managing the ownership of knowledge ei-
ther to collect on the commercial value of that knowledge or to prevent its 
use in a way that its owners consider inappropriate.” 91 New organizations 
such as Light Years IP are emerging to address this need, specializing in 
marketing and branding a developing country’s intellectual property.92
The Danish artists’ collective Superfl ex has pioneered this strat-
egy. The Superfl ex “Supercopy” art collaboration employs what it calls a 
“counter- economic strategy” to teach local farmers in the third world how 
to convert their biodiversity and traditional knowledge into branded end 
products that can eventually compete with the products of global multi-
nationals. In one ongoing collaboration, Superfl ex works with a farmers’ 
cooperative in Maués, Brazil. This region in the Amazon is famous for 
cultivating the guarana berry, prized by the local population for its per-
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ceived medicinal and energy- giving properties. The Dutch multinational 
Ambev and Pepsi Co. have successfully marketed global energy drinks 
derived from this plant, most notably Ambev’s “Antarctica” drink. The 
local Maués farmers complained that the multinationals have formed a 
cartel, driving down the price of the guarana berries from $25/kilo to 
$4/kilo. So the cooperative is fi ghting back. In collaboration with Super-
fl ex, farmers held brainstorming sessions to begin developing their own 
product and designing a label for it. One member, for example, suggested 
a coff ee drink called Maués Café, evoking the internationally popular 
Nescafé drink.
Eventually, the cooperative decided to manufacture and distribute 
a soft drink: Guaraná Power. Members designed a label for the drink, 
which comprises a photograph of local farmers affi  xed atop the familiar 
Antarctica label. Guaraná Power’s marketing slogan? “[O]riginal Maués 
guarana for energy and empowerment.”
The Superfl ex collaboration turns on a simple idea: empowerment for 
the poor will entail their learning how to control and market their own 
knowledge products. In the words of Superfl ex (appropriated from Ani 
DiFranco): “Every tool is a weapon if you hold it right.” 93 The Maués collec-
tive spoke with lawyers about intellectual property rights, raised capital, 
paired with a production company in Denmark, and searched for global 
distributors for Guaraná Power.94 Superfl ex’s Guaraná Power gallery fl oor 
reproduces the shop fl oor, taking visitors on a journey from producing to 
bottling, labeling, refrigerating, and tasting Guaraná Power.
The poor must be recognized as both receivers and producers of 
knowledge. Failing to promote poor people’s capacity for creative work 
and their participation in global culture and commercial markets hinders 
development as freedom. As Sen writes, “the rejection of the freedom to 
participate in the labor market is one of the ways of keeping people in 
bondage and captivity.” 95 In the Knowledge Age, wealth lies not simply in 
access to other people’s knowledge (although this is certainly important), 
but also in the ability to produce new knowledge and to benefi t from this 
creation, culturally and economically.
201111 Pass 3 press.indd   144 2/10/12   2:23 PM
145
in may 1967  the accl aimed  Indian director of The Apu Trilogy, 
Satyajit Ray, received a “joyous carillon of a cable” 1 from Hollywood: Co-
lumbia Pictures would back The Alien. Ray would have a free hand. Both 
Marlon Brando and Steve McQueen were keen to play a leading role. Saul 
Bass would mastermind the special eff ects.2 And what luck—Peter Sellers 
was in Hollywood at that very moment, playing an Indian in a comedy, 
and was anxious to meet Ray for the second time to discuss playing the 
Indian philanthropist in the fi lm. As Ray later wrote, “With the hum of 
the machinery in my ears, I arrived in Hollywood on June 1.” 3
By 1967, Satyajit Ray was already widely considered a genius fi lm-
maker and the “father of Indian cinema.” 4 His fi lms, rooted in the lives of 
Bengalis in post- Independence India and fi lmed in the Bengali language, 
depict ordinary lives: children fated to die of poverty, women trapped 
in subservient familial roles, a new generation of middle- class Indians 
seeking liberation from their elders and the traditions of the past. In his 
fi rst feature fi lm, Pather Panchali,5 Ray brilliantly directed impoverished 
Bengali villagers living in the rural countryside in the 1920s. In the fi lm a 
wrinkled old woman brushes her teeth with her fi ngers and spits outside 
the house door; the main character, a young girl named Durga, succumbs 
to illness because of the family’s poverty. The acuity with which Ray cap-
chapter six
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tures their humanity is lyrical. Countless fi lmmakers around the world 
fondly recall their fi rst viewing of the fi lm.
Needless to say, Ray’s fi lms (some thirty- seven in all) bore little re-
semblance to the grandeur of Hollywood cinema—or, for that matter, to 
the glitzy, upper- middle- class escapades glorifi ed by escapist Bollywood 
fi lms. But a chance correspondence between Ray and his friend Arthur 
C. Clarke, the British science- fi ction writer and author of 2001: A Space 
Odyssey, put Ray on a fateful journey across the Atlantic in the hopes of 
partnering with Hollywood to create his fi rst science- fi ction fi lm. The 
fi lm was to be called The Alien.6 The screenplay would be based on a 
short science- fi ction story titled “Bankubabur Bandhu” (translated as 
“Banku’s friend”) that Ray had written in Bengali for his family maga-
zine, Sandesh, a few years earlier. For most fi lms Ray would not even 
have considered American backing—but a science- fi ction fi lm like The 
Alien would require special eff ects that Indians could not aff ord. Indeed, 
to this day Bollywood avoids the genre because of prohibitive costs. Ray’s 
story revolved around a spaceship that lands in a pond on the outskirts 
of a Bengali village. Locals begin worshipping it as a temple, which they 
think has risen from the Earth. The alien befriends a young village boy 
named Haba, and the story is largely about their friendship, and about the 
humorous pranks the alien plays on the local villagers, from reviving a 
farmer’s dying crops to pestering a mean farmer by ripening his mango 
tree out of season.
Fascinated with Ray’s idea, Clarke put him in touch with an Ameri-
can friend living in Sri Lanka, Mike Wilson. (Clarke was living in Sri 
Lanka at the time, as he did for most of his life.) Wilson had just written, 
directed, and produced a fi lm about a Sri Lankan secret agent—unabash-
edly named James Banda (this should have been a warning sign to Ray). 
Wilson took a keen interest in Ray’s idea and swiftly fl ew out to Calcutta, 
where he propped himself in the renowned director’s apartment for two 
weeks until Ray fi nished a script. Wilson fl ew the script to Hollywood 
and pressed Columbia Pictures to take up the project. By then Ray had 
become uncomfortable with Wilson’s aggressive partnering. Ray traveled 
to Hollywood in 1967 to discuss the project with Columbia Pictures, but 
his high hopes were quickly defl ated. For starters, mimeographed copies 
of The Alien script were fl oating around the Columbia Pictures offi  ces 
emblazoned with the legend “Copyright Mike Wilson and Satyajit Ray.” 
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When Ray confronted Wilson, Wilson insisted that he had put himself on 
the copyright to protect Ray’s interests. Later, Columbia Pictures asked 
Ray whether he had received any of the $10,000 advance they had given 
to Wilson for them to share—Ray had not. The relationship between 
Ray and Wilson further deteriorated, and Columbia Pictures never made 
the fi lm.
Still, Ray had not completely ruled out The Alien project when, in 
1982, Steven Spielberg’s E.T.: The Extraterrestrial7 premiered. The fi lm, 
which began as a Columbia Pictures project, bore a striking resemblance 
to The Alien. Most telling, in Ray’s words, was that the alien is “small and 
acceptable to children and possessed of certain superhuman powers—not 
physical strength but other kinds of powers, particular types of vision, 
and that it takes an interest in earthly things.” 8 Both Ray’s and Spielberg’s 
aliens “had a sense of humor, a sense of fun, a mischievous quality. I 
think mine was a whimsy,” 9 said Ray. Ray’s friend, Arthur C. Clarke, also 
immediately saw the resemblance between the two fi lms, and he urged 
Ray to write to Spielberg and point out the similarities. “Don’t take it ly-
ing down,” Clarke advised. But while Ray did later say that “E.T. would 
not have been possible without my script of The Alien being available 
throughout America in mimeographed copies,” 10 he did not pursue the 
matter further. E.T.’s release deepened Ray’s dismay over the culture of 
Hollywood. Spielberg himself later denied any suggestion of plagiarism, 
saying he was in high school when the script had fi rst been circulated in 
Hollywood. But that is not quite accurate—Spielberg graduated from high 
school in 1965, and by 1967 (when Ray visited Hollywood) Spielberg was 
already working in Hollywood, to the extent that he released a short fi lm 
in 1968 through Universal Studios. By 1969, Spielberg was the youngest 
director at a major Hollywood studio.11
the black atlantic
As part of his “Black Atlantic” thesis, Paul Gilroy observed how musical 
infl uences fl owed across the African diaspora. In this chapter, I consider 
transnational cultural fl ows infl uencing fi lms from Bollywood to Holly-
wood. Just as Gilroy celebrated “the inescapable hybridity and intermix-
ture of ideas” 12 with respect to literary and musical works, so too should 
we embrace—descriptively and prescriptively—the transcultural fl ow of 
ideas regarding the stories we tell in the movies. This chapter fl atly rejects 
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those notions of cultural purity and essentialism that would forbid ideas 
from fl owing from East to West, and vice versa. In so doing I adopt an 
explicitly transcultural and intercultural perspective. Culture will and 
must be shared widely and freely both across borders and within them.
But in this chapter I consider another view of the black Atlantic, 
focusing on claims of copyright piracy and exploitation that lurk in the 
shadows of global cultural exchanges. Simply put, free fl ows of culture are 
not always fair fl ows of culture. Global cultural changes take place against 
a backdrop of sharp diff erentials in power and knowledge, which aff ect 
the way authors are recognized and rewarded. In this chapter I seek to 
highlight how global inequalities combined with long-standing cultural 
biases may impede the free and fair exchange of culture.
It is by now a commonplace observation in copyright scholarship that 
all creativity is derivative. Yet romantic notions of authorship and origi-
nality continue to have a strong hold on the imagination. The fl ip side is 
also true: the dramatic image of copyright pirates brashly ripping off  the 
masterworks of original creators is equally alluring. One thesis of this 
chapter is that cultural stereotypes help feed the myth of the romantic author, 
on the one hand, and that of the inglorious pirate, on the other. Cultural 
biases buttress the strong copyright claims of some creators—primarily 
those in the West who are seen as “creative” and “original”—and under-
mine claims for cultural dynamism and borrowing made by other cre-
ators—primarily those in Asian developing countries, which are thought 
to breed cultures of slavish imitation and obedience to tradition. These 
myths mask the underlying dynamic nature of innovation, which relies 
on transcultural fl ows of knowledge. More insidiously, these stereotypes 
help to mask exploitation of the weak by the strong.
One goal of this chapter is to fl ip some common perceptions about the 
world’s innovators and pirates. A recent spate of copyright suits by Holly-
wood against Bollywood sounds a familiar theme, denouncing Asians as 
imitators and accusing them of ruthlessly copying fi lm plots and lifting 
scenes from American hits such as Mrs. Doubtfi re and My Cousin Vinny.13 
But claims of cultural appropriation go back far, and travel in multiple 
directions. As we have seen, even the revered American director Ste-
phen Spielberg has been accused of lifting E.T. from Satyajit Ray’s 1962 
script for The Alien. Later in this chapter I will recount how Disney’s 
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The Lion King bears striking similarities to the Japanese anime televi-
sion series Kimba the White Lion, directed by Japan’s master animator, 
Osamu Tezuka.14
Neither Ray nor Tezuka sued the American fi lmmakers—and this 
chapter is by no means an eff ort to revive any legal case. This is not a brief. 
Rather, my task is to consider copyright’s role in promoting free and fair 
cultural exchange within a global marketplace of ideas that is marked by 
sharp diff erentials in power, wealth, and knowledge. The problem in the 
cases I will recount is not that ideas and expression fl ow across state lines. 
To the contrary, copyright law ought to promote cultural exchange, not 
stymie it. Yet a free culture ought also to be a fair culture, in which people 
around the world are fairly recognized and remunerated for their protect-
able work. In this chapter I show how cultural stereotypes combined with 
actual inequalities across cultures often thwart mutual recognition of 
diverse authors and their contributions to our shared culture. In so do-
ing, this chapter considers some of copyright’s blind spots to diff erences 
in global power, and law’s assumptions about culture and authorship.
I fi rst consider the romantic authorial claims of a prime mover in 
Hollywood: Disney. While Disney has come to stand for the romantic au-
thor deserving of near perpetual copyright protection, in fact this anima-
tion giant grew by appropriating the master works of others, from Hugo 
to Kipling, which quickly fell into the public domain when copyright 
terms were shorter. In other instances, Disney may have fl at- out stolen 
the copyrighted works of foreign authors.15 Cultural stereotypes of the 
Western creator as an “original genius” help to mask Disney’s own cul-
tural borrowings and appropriations.
In stark contrast, Bollywood fi lmmakers are frequently charged as 
brashly pirating the screenplays of their Hollywood counterparts. I sug-
gest, however, that while Hollywood fi lms certainly infl uence the plot of 
a number of Bollywood fi lms, many Bollywood fi lms are original, and 
those that do appropriate are far from simple copies. In short, culture 
does not accurately tell us who is innovative and who is uninspired. At 
the same time, culture does play a part in explaining how and why people 
appropriate others’ cultural works. Cultural appropriation helps to under-
stand the life of another; putting oneself in another’s shoes reveals both 
what makes us similar and how we stand apart.
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Animating this chapter is an understanding of copyright in broader 
terms than the traditional, narrow vision of law as merely a tool for incen-
tivizing the innovation of cultural products. Copyright is far more than 
that. Copyright governs the creation, distribution, and participation in 
culture and art, which John Dewey memorably described as “the most 
eff ective mode of communication that exists.” 16 Critics today are appro-
priately questioning the narrow economic incentive thesis, exploring the 
plural motivations that spur creativity.17 In this book, I have argued that 
the very essence of culture is sharing meaning with others and promot-
ing mutual understanding. Consequently, we must take participation in 
cultural production more seriously, so that our law will not just incentivize 
the production of more cultural goods, but also promote global participa-
tion in making our cultural world, from music to fi lm to stories.
Cultural pluralism—a global culture in which all peoples have an 
opportunity to be creative authors of their own lives and of our world—
is both an end in itself, and a means to economic development in the 
Knowledge Age. Cultural pluralism is an end of freedom in the sense that 
making and sharing meaning with others—from singing together to re-
counting stories—is fundamentally what human freedom is for. The cul-
tural sphere of life encompasses those joys and relationships that make a 
human life truly worth living.18 At the same time, participation in cultural 
production today has signifi cant social and economic eff ects. Promoting 
the recognition of diverse authors and creators of cultural works fosters 
dignity and respect for others as creative intellectuals and as fellow hu-
man beings with worthy stories to tell. What’s more, in today’s Knowledge 
Age, substantial revenues fl ow from the production and control of cul-
tural goods exchanged through global markets. Finally, cultural pluralism 
promotes mutual understanding through cultural exchanges. As Dewey 
eloquently put it, “The art characteristic of a civilization is the means for 
entering sympathetically into the deepest elements in the experience of 
remote and foreign civilizations.” 19 Today, the arts remain central to the 
project of fostering mutual understanding of and sympathy for others. 
The 2008 Academy Award–winning fi lm Slumdog Millionaire20 put people 
around the world into the shoes of three impoverished and orphaned 
children born in the slums of Bombay. Literature and fi lms help convey 
tragedy through comedy, humanize those born on far sides of the Earth, 
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and reveal what is common in our sentiments and aspirations. As Martha 
Nussbaum writes, “We do not automatically see another human being as 
spacious and deep, having thoughts, spiritual longings, and emotions. 
It is all too easy to see another person as just a body—which we might 
then think we can use for our ends, bad or good. It is an achievement to 
see a soul in that body, and this achievement is supported by poetry and 
the arts, which ask us to wonder about the inner world of that shape we 
see—and, too, to wonder about ourselves and our own depths.” 21
Martin Scorsese, for example, recounts seeing Satyajit Ray’s fi lm 
Pather Panchali in New York City in the early 1960s: “I was 18 or 19 years 
old and had grown up in a very parochial society of Italian- Americans and 
yet I was deeply moved by what Ray showed of people so far from my own 
experience.” Scorsese “was very taken by the style of these fi lms—at fi rst 
so much like the Italian neo- realist fi lms, yet surprising the viewer with 
bursts of sheer poetry.” 22 Scorsese later helped convince the Academy of 
Motion Picture Arts and Sciences to award Ray an honorary Oscar. The 
Academy fi nally did give Ray the honor, in 1991, just before his death at the 
age of seventy.23 Ray called the Oscar “the best achievement of my movie- 
making career,” 24 equating it with a Nobel Prize for fi lmmakers. What most 
touched Ray is that audiences and critics worlds apart could appreciate his 
art. “The most distinctive feature [of my fi lms],” said Ray, “is that they are 
deeply rooted in Bengal, in Bengali culture, mannerisms, and mores. What 
makes them universal in appeal is that they are about human beings.” 25
And yet, much art today is not so transcendent. Hollywood is criti-
cized as being all too parochial in its choice of subjects. Worse still, at the 
dawn of the twenty- fi rst century, there is still too much art that demonizes 
rather than humanizes the other. Heroes are white and villains are black, 
Asian, or Middle Eastern. Women are objects, not subjects, still largely 
seen as the ultimate trophy in a contest among male protagonists. Bolly-
wood fares no better. Often these fi lms depict women as being pure as 
the Goddess Sita, long- suff ering and sexually objectifi ed (wet saree scenes 
are abundant).26 Such problems are not limited to popular culture. Even 
great literature is rife with gross imbalances and, indeed, racist mis-
characterizations, as we learned with Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the 
Wind.27 In short, art can insult, mischaracterize, colonize, and provoke 
misunderstanding.
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Copyright relations, too, can upend cultural production and further 
the divide between East and West, North and South, rich and poor. That 
is, copyright can help to promote either recognition or misrecognition of 
global others. The special eff ects that Satyajit Ray, one of the greatest fi lm-
makers of all time, sought to include in his science- fi ction fi lm were out 
of reach of Indian production budgets; he needed a Hollywood partner. 
Yet his encounter ultimately led to disappointment. Indeed, the exploita-
tion of Ray’s copyright from the beginning of the project dissuaded him 
from becoming involved in the project altogether. Poor copyright relations 
meant Ray’s fi lm never got made.
There is a connection between the depiction of Indians in Hollywood 
fi lms at the time and Hollywood’s treatment of Ray himself. Ironically, on 
Ray’s visit to Hollywood in 1967, Peter Sellers invited Ray to watch him on 
the set, where he was playing “an Indian in a Hollywood setting” in the 
fi lm The Party.28 Indeed, Ray had initially tapped Sellers for The Alien29 
because he had seen Sellers play an Indian before, in The Millionairess.30 
A Hollywood- fi nanced movie would need a big- name actor like Sellers to 
seal the deal, and Sellers was keen to play a role in The Alien, telling Ray 
that a fortuneteller had told him to take the part; it was “fate.”
Yet Sellers evinced a great naiveté about his own role in perpetuat-
ing negative stereotypes of Indians abroad. Watching Sellers fi lming The 
Party, Ray began to question Sellers’s judgment. As Ray recounts, he 
witnessed “quite the most tasteless, heavy- handed caricature of an Indian 
ever put on the screen.” 31 “I was so disgusted that I would in any case have 
found it most diffi  cult to work with him,” 32 Ray later said of Sellers. A year 
later Ray watched a screening of The Party while on tour in Sydney and 
took Sellers’s depiction as a personal insult. In The Party, Sellers plays a 
two- bit Bollywood actor who is mistakenly invited to an A- list Hollywood 
party. At the party, the Indian ogles a big- breasted blonde; she takes a 
fancy to him and invites him home. But standing at the door of her apart-
ment, he declines to enter.33 Ray recounts the fi lm’s end: “I’m sorry,” says 
Bakshi to the girl who has taken a fancy to him and has asked him into 
her fl at. “I’m sorry, but I must go back to my monkey.” “Monkey!” “Yes. 
My pet monkey, Apu.” 34 Ray believed the name of the monkey, Apu, was 
not mere coincidence (Ray’s celebrated troika of fi lms chronicling the life 
of one boy, beginning with Pather Panchali,35 is called The Apu Trilogy). 
His Hollywood experience, Ray later wrote in a letter, was “the beginning 
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of a period of profound uneasiness. . . . I was too deeply disturbed, and for 
another—I was in a strange sort of way fascinated by the sinister turn of 
events and waited to see which way and how far it would go.” 36
hollywood
Examples of global cultural borrowing and appropriation abound. Con-
sider the classic case of the romanticized “author”—Disney. Disney’s 
mega- hit animated fi lm The Lion King37 has earned over a billion dollars 
thus far and is one of the most beloved animated fi lms in the Disney canon. 
The Lion King musical won several Tony awards and is one of the longest- 
running shows on Broadway. What is far less known, however, is that the 
fi lm has been beset by allegations of piracy from global creators. As we 
have already seen, recently Disney paid a hefty settlement to the heirs of 
Solomon Linda, the late South African musician who composed the fi lm’s 
musical hit, “The Lion Sleeps Tonight” (originally titled “Mbube”) in 
1939. Linda and his family received virtually nothing for the song until a 
Rolling Stone journalist revealed the song’s origins in 2000, together with 
the sordid history of exploitation of Linda’s copyright across the “Black 
Atlantic,” from Africa to the United Kingdom to the United States.38
But charges of plagiarism had been leveled at Disney well before 
the Linda family’s suit. On the heels of the fi lm’s release in 1994, well- 
known Japanese manga (comic) artists and fans organized public protests 
against The Lion King, which bears a striking resemblance to the popular 
television series Kimba the White Lion39 by the master Japanese animator 
Osamu Tezuka.40 Tezuka has long been hailed as the father of Japanese 
anime and the “Walt Disney of Japan.” His well- known anime series 
Kimba the White Lion, based on his manga serial Jungle Emperor 41 of the 
early 1950s, aired as the fi rst color animated television series in Japan in 
the early 1960s and circulated widely among animation buff s internation-
ally. English and Spanish versions of the series were created in 1966, and 
Kimba the White Lion was aired as a syndicated program by NBC in the 
United States for more than a decade.42 (Other Japanese anime programs 
on American television at that time include Speed Racer and Tezuka’s 
own Astro Boy, which aired in primetime on NBC.43) Tezuka reportedly 
spent a year researching Africa before penning Jungle Emperor, which he 
considered his crowning achievement.44 As one scholar writes, “There is 
not a single Japanese who does not know Tezuka and Jungle Emperor.” 45 
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(The claim may not be overblown: comics penetrate more broadly in Ja-
pan than in the West. It is frequently said that everyone reads comics in 
Japan.46) Tezuka’s own admiration for Disney had been great, so much 
so that upon hearing the allegations that creators of The Lion King had 
copied from Tezuka, the president of Tezuka Productions said the revered 
Japanese artist would have been fl attered if that were the case.47 (Tezuka 
died in 1989, before The Lion King was made.)
Devotees of Tezuka are less sanguine about the similarities, which 
are abundant:48
• The basic story plot and setting are the same: an African emperor 
lion dies early, leaving a young cub. The son struggles with him-
self over his responsibilities to lead the animal kingdom. The son 
eventually returns from exile and overthrows the evil lion who 
has usurped power in the son’s absence.
• Nearly every animal character in Kimba the White Lion has an 
analogue in The Lion King. For example, in both versions a ba-
boon serves as an old sage, the henchmen for the evil lion are 
hyenas, and the hero lion’s adviser is a parrot.
• The evil lion in Jungle Emperor, “Claw,” is blind in one eye; the 
evil lion in The Lion King, “Scar,” has a scar across one eye.49
• In both stories the lion cub doubts his ability to lead his people 
and his father comes to him as a vision in the moon to embolden 
him.
• The names of the leading lion cubs are similar—Kimba and 
Simba.
• Both lion cubs eventually grow up and mate with their childhood 
playmate, a lioness cub.
• The setting of the film and the television series is similar—a 
rocky terrain, not the more common desert habitat that lions 
roam.
• Both Kimba and Simba become vegetarian and eat insects to help 
save the other animals.
• A stampede scene during the lion cubs’ early years is a pivotal 
moment in the cubs’ lives.
• In both the TV series and the later film, a lightning bolt starts a 
forest fire and rain puts it out.
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• Most importantly, there are several scenes of nearly identical cine-
matic and artistic expression in the films.50
The similarities even inspired a Simpsons parody of The Lion King’s Mu-
fasa, which appears in a cloud and says to Lisa, “You must avenge my 
Death Kimba . . . I mean Simba!” 51
To be sure, there are diff erences between the Kimba series and The 
Lion King. Most notably, humans played a signifi cant role in the Kimba 
story, which considered the benefi ts of human civilization over the law 
of the jungle. Indeed, just as Ray’s original The Alien was inspired by the 
Bengal famine of 1943, Jungle Emperor had a particularly local focus on 
the costs and benefi ts to Japan of modernization and Westernization. The 
Lion King, in contrast, has no humans or similar themes. Nonetheless, 
observers call the similarities “striking.” 52 The San Francisco Chronicle 
reported that Tezuka Productions had “received calls of congratulations 
from several people who assumed the fi rm had licensed the project to 
Disney.” 53 In 1994, Machiko Satonaka, a well- known Japanese comic artist, 
published in a major Japanese daily newspaper an open letter signed by 
two hundred Japanese animation artists, who claimed that “[s]imilarities 
between The Lion King and Jungle Emperor cannot be dismissed as mere 
coincidence,” and that as Japanese who respect Walt Disney, they were 
“saddened by such similarities.” 54 To the outrage of Tezuka fans, Disney 
not only denied lifting any of the plot or characters from Jungle Emperor 
or Kimba, but went even further, claiming not to have even heard of 
Tezuka or Kimba the White Lion. “Frankly, I’m not familiar with [the 
TV series],” stated Rob Minkoff , co- director of The Lion King with Roger 
Allers, in response to the allegations.55 Fans in Japan and the United 
States were angry, not at Disney’s being inspired by Tezuka’s work, but by 
Disney’s failure to acknowledge Tezuka and his infl uence. To make mat-
ters worse, The Lion King was billed as the fi rst Disney animated feature 
that presented an original story.56 Former Disney studio chair (now CEO 
of Dreamworks Animation) Jeff rey Katzenberg called the fi lm Disney’s 
“fi rst cartoon feature not based on a fable or a literary work.” 57 The fi lm’s 
creators say the story was inspired by Joseph and Moses in the Bible and 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet.58
Animation experts and historians have argued that Disney’s claim 
of ignorance of Tezuka is likely disingenuous, given the prevalence of 
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the master animator’s work in the United States from the late 1960s on 
and the frequency of Disney’s own executives’ travel to Japan, including 
to Tokyo Disneyland.59 The Lion King’s co- director Roger Allers himself 
lived in Tokyo and worked in animation there in the 1980s, during which 
time Tezuka was alive and already well known as “Japan’s Walt Disney.” 
A remake of Jungle Emperor aired in prime time on Japanese television 
contemporaneously.60 Alternatively, some argue that Disney’s purported 
ignorance of Tezuka at the very least undermines its claims of superior 
knowledge of all things animation.61 Anime historian Fred Patten con-
cludes that at least some people working on The Lion King knew about 
Kimba the White Lion.62 Patten surmises that these animators either sub-
consciously copied, or paid silent homage to, Tezuka’s work with in- group 
references to it in The Lion King.63
Few stories of artistic inspiration and cultural appropriation are 
simple or unidirectional. Tezuka, who died in 1989 at the age of sixty, 
met Walt Disney and describes his own artistic debt to Disney in his au-
tobiography. Tezuka describes the arrival of Bambi64 to Japan after World 
War II, and admits traveling from Osaka to Tokyo and staying in a ho-
tel near the theater so he could see Bambi “over one hundred times.” 65 
Subsequently Tezuka licensed the rights to Disney’s Bambi to make his 
own adaptation. At a comics festival in Los Angeles in 1978, Tezuka de-
scribed Jungle Emperor as both an homage and a critique of Bambi, which 
Tezuka believed did not suffi  ciently consider the possibility of mutual 
recognition between animals and humans.66 Perhaps, then, similarities 
between Kimba the White Lion and The Lion King derive from their both 
being based on Disney’s own Bambi67 (hence the similarities to Tezuka’s 
work may refl ect the “circle of creativity”). Two or more original works 
may have much in common because each borrows from the same works 
in the public domain. In this case, both Kimba the White Lion and The 
Lion King have their source in Bambi, common folktales, and the story 
of Hamlet. In short, as in so many other cases, the search for authorship 
of The Lion King may resemble a vain “search for the source of the Nile 
and all its tributaries.” 68
Notably, in all three cases—The Alien, Kimba the White Lion, and “The 
Lion Sleeps Tonight”—new works in the United States appear to have 
been derived not from the work of unknown foreign artists, but from the 
artistic expressions of great masters: Ray, Tezuka, and Linda, respectively. 
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Ray was already an internationally recognized and award- winning fi lm 
director by the time he made the acquaintance of Hollywood. Tezuka, 
the creator of yet another well- known anime classic, Astro Boy (recently 
remade by Hollywood in 2009), created Japan’s fi rst television animation 
studio in 196169 and is often referred to as the “Godfather of Anime,” as 
well as “Japan’s Walt Disney.” The creator of more than seventy titles 
and 150,000 pages during his lifetime, Tezuka was the subject of a retro-
spective at the Asian Art Museum of San Francisco in 2007 (the fi rst ever 
such exhibit outside of Japan), titled Tezuka: The Marvel of Manga.70 And 
Linda’s original composition, “Mbube,” was recorded and had become 
Africa’s fi rst pop hit.71
These stories resemble the case in which Italian director Sergio Leone 
took in broad daylight the copyrighted work of Japanese fi lmmaker Akira 
Kurosawa, another great auteur of the twentieth century (Kurosawa, too, 
received an Oscar for lifetime achievement).72 Kurosawa’s fi lms docu-
ment well the mutual infl uence of global artists. Kurosawa himself was 
highly infl uenced by the American Westerns of John Ford, as well as the 
literature of Shakespeare and Dostoevsky. In off ering his own perspective 
on the Western in fi lms like Seven Samurai and Yojimbo, Kurosawa trans-
formed the genre. Yul Brynner, who starred in the Hollywood adaptation 
of Seven Samurai,73 The Magnifi cent Seven,74 identifi ed Seven Samurai as 
“one of the great Westerns of all time, only it was made by the Japanese, 
in the Japanese medium.” 75 Many sought permission to remake Kuro-
sawa’s works, but when Leone copied Yojimbo76 and remade it as A Fistful 
of Dollars77 without permission, Kurosawa protested. In a letter to Leone, 
Kurosawa wrote of A Fistful of Dollars, “It is a very fi ne fi lm, but it is my 
fi lm. Since Japan is a signatory of the Berne Convention on international 
copyright, you must pay me.” An out- of- court settlement determined that 
Kurosawa would receive 15 percent of Fistful’s worldwide receipts, with a 
guarantee of around $100,000.78 Ironically, the reworking of the Ameri-
can Western by a Japanese director not only recast the Western itself, but 
also inspired the creation of another genre, the “Spaghetti Western,” for 
which Leone is most well- known. Furthermore, some remakes such as 
The Magnifi cent Seven and A Fistful of Dollars became iconic fi lms them-
selves and made stars of actors like Steve McQueen and Clint Eastwood, 
both of whom became icons of American manliness.
There are many charges that Bollywood has appropriated Hollywood 
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hits in broad daylight—what one observer wryly describes as “(re)making 
hay while the sun shines.” 79 But examples of allegations against Holly-
wood for similar activity are less familiar. What about our conceptions 
of originality and romantic authorship leads us to more easily view some 
cultures as creative and original, and others as appropriators and copiers? 
Disney has long been considered the epitome of the romantic author: a 
wholly “original” genius. But the world’s most famous copyright owner 
has often made a fortune by mining the works of past creators that have 
passed into the public domain. “There would hardly be a Disney at all if 
not for the works by Rudyard Kipling, H. C. Andersen, Victor Hugo, and 
Robert Louis Stevenson, all of whom make it possible for Disney to make 
animated features of wolf- boys, mermaids, hunchbacks, and Long John 
Silver,” 80 Eva Hemmungs Wirtén reminds us. Wirtén criticizes Disney’s 
hypocrisy for benefi ting from iconic works that quickly fell into the public 
domain under old copyright laws with short copyright terms, while hold-
ing its own works tightly and nearly into perpetuity. If current law had 
governed when Disney made The Jungle Book,81 the corporation would 
have had to either wait another forty years before releasing the fi lm or 
negotiate permission from Kipling’s heirs.82
My point is not that Disney erred in producing new works based on 
the old. To the contrary, this is a natural part of the creative process and 
should be encouraged. Enabling individuals in the present to interact 
with cultures of the past leads to rich rewards for all cultures, ranging 
from fostering communities with shared values to allowing current gen-
erations to critically reconsider the values of the past. At the same time, 
we ought to reconsider biases in our understanding that lead us to more 
readily recognize some creators as original thinkers and others as slavish 
imitators. Walt Disney and the Disney Corporation have been romanti-
cally embraced as epitomizing creativity and originality. Yet some have 
accused Disney of plagiarism, not of works in the public domain, but of 
foreign copyrighted work. Furthermore, we ought to pause and consider 
how cultural stereotypes may lead copyright law to misrecognize alto-
gether some “foreign” authors whose contributions to world culture are 
more readily ignored—or at least not granted attribution and royalties.
How do diff erences in power and knowledge aff ect people’s willing-
ness to share culture? Global inequalities render some more vulnerable 
to exploitation of their rights. Fear of exploitation may discourage people 
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from sharing and distributing their knowledge, be it music and literature 
or local knowledge of the medicinal properties of plants. The University of 
California, Berkeley, historian of science Abena Dove Osseo- Asare docu-
ments how those with knowledge of traditional medicine in Ghana, for 
example, have kept that knowledge close for fear of being exploited.83 
Modern global copyright law must confront this reality of diff erence in 
the world and explore creative legal tools that would incentivize people 
to share across cultures, class divides, and colonial histories. Promoting 
fairness among global creators makes for good innovation policy, fosters 
free speech, and encourages better cultural and social relations. Mod-
ern intellectual property law ought to be attentive to crafting rules that 
promote the ethical extraction of knowledge. In our global Knowledge 
Economy, both economic and human development depend on fair cultural 
exchanges in global markets.
Considerations of global justice and fairness may shed light on our 
traditional understanding of incentives themselves within copyright law. 
We have come to believe that property rights in intellectual creations 
are there simply because they incentivize creative activity. But there is 
an older understanding that fl ows out of notions of unfair competition 
and more visceral feelings of justice. It is now commonplace that in fact 
people create without exclusive property rights—as evidenced by open-
source software, fan fi ction, and user- created mash- ups. But behavioral 
economists have identifi ed a natural sense of justice that may lead people 
to “irrational” decisions if they feel that they are being treated unfairly.84 
Even the premise of the “intellectual property as incentives” thesis can 
be understood as responding to the “vulnerability” of the creator in the 
absence of intellectual property rights, given the often high costs of pro-
duction and the typically low costs of copying.85 Studies show it is not 
necessarily true that individuals will refuse to create without incentives, 
but it may well be the case that creators will not innovate or share if they 
are continually treated unjustly in an unregulated marketplace.
The next section examines some of the dynamics of cultural borrow-
ing in the other direction, from Hollywood to Bollywood. Stereotypes of 
Asian “pirates” permeate and Bollywood itself is plagued with a reputation 
for mimicry, not creativity. But sometimes the claims of piracy may be 
overblown. Furthermore, global borrowing by Bollywood from Hollywood 
must be understood in the context of cultural hegemony and resistance.
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bollywood
Bollywood is the world’s largest fi lm industry,86 and Bollywood fi lms are 
“the most- seen movies in the world.” 87 Some one thousand fi lms are pro-
duced annually in Bombay and other major fi lm centers in India; Bolly-
wood fi lms enthrall moviegoers not only all over India and among the 
Indian diaspora, but also “in such unlikely places as Russia, China, the 
Middle East, the Far East, Egypt, Turkey, and Africa.” 88 The industry earns 
more than $2 billion annually.89 Handsome dancing heroes like Amitabh 
Bachchan and Shahrukh Kahn and Ms. Universe–worthy starlets from 
Aishwarya Rai Bachchan (“the world’s most beautiful woman” 90) to Ma-
dhuri Dixit shake their hips and entertain literally billions. In 2001 when 
U.S. troops drove the Taliban out of Kabul after the September 11 attacks, 
the fi rst fi lm to play in that city was a Bollywood epic.91
Cinema was born in India, in Bombay, roughly contemporaneously 
with its birth in other parts of the world. In 1896 the fi rst “cinematogra-
phe” show premiered on the Indian subcontinent at the Watson’s Hotel 
in Bombay, just three months after a premier in Paris. “The marvel of the 
century” proclaimed the Times of India.92 But only British elites attended 
the premiere, because the hotel barred Indians. Shows were fi rst screened 
to Indians a week later at the Novelty Theatre in Bombay. Later, Bombay 
also became the site of one of the fi rst fi lms made in India. Bombay’s 
position as a gateway for commerce and trade created by the British East 
India Company made it a natural portal for the reception of fi lm technol-
ogy. The city’s own access to capital and vibrant creative culture of theater 
groups and writers made it fertile ground for the eventual development 
of a full- fl edged indigenous fi lm industry,93 now oft- referred to as “Bol-
lywood” (though the city has now shed its British name of Bombay in 
favor of the Indian “Mumbai”).
The visionary idea of an indigenous Indian fi lm industry came from 
the early and infl uential fi lm pioneer Dhundiraj Govind Phalke. In 1910 he 
watched the fi lm Life of Christ in a Bombay theater and had a transforma-
tive experience. “While the life of Christ was rolling before my physical 
eyes, I was mentally visualizing the Gods, Shri Krishna, Shri Rama-
chandra, their Gokul and Ayodhya,” Phalke recounts, continuing: “I was 
gripped by a strange spell. I bought another ticket and saw the fi lm again. 
This time I felt my imagination taking shape on the screen. Could this 
really happen? Could we, the sons of India, ever be able to see Indian im-
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ages on the screen?” 94 Phalke openly linked the creation and sustenance 
of an indigenous fi lm industry with nationalism and self- determination. 
Home Rule depended on Indian support of this industry, Phalke said.95 
In 1913 his fi rst fi lm, Raja Harishchandra,96 debuted in Bombay. The story 
was based on the Indian epic poem the Mahabharata, and the fi lm was 
advertised as “the fi rst fi lm of Indian manufacture.” 97 The fi lm was silent; 
sound and music did not arrive to the Indian cinema until 1931. But its 
focus on Indian stories had a profound and lasting infl uence.
The organization and structure of the Indian fi lm industry in Bombay 
are distinct from those of the mega–production studios in Hollywood. 
Unlike Hollywood, where big motion picture studios fi nance everything 
from production to fi lm distribution, Bollywood is a fragmented industry. 
Independent entrepreneurs fi nance Bollywood fi lms, while others pay for 
the rights to distribute and exhibit them. During World War II, illicit war 
profi teers looking to invest their black- market fortunes began an unholy 
alliance between the underworld and Bollywood. Mobsters still serve as 
a signifi cant (though declining) source of the fi nancing for Bollywood 
fi lms, creating instability, lawlessness, and violence in the industry. Mob 
infl uence even aff ects the artistic content of the fi lms. Some consider 
Bollywood’s inclination to remake Hollywood hits—rather than experi-
ment with original stories—to be a direct result of mafi a pressure for 
surefi re hits.98
On paper, Indian copyright law is not much diff erent from the law of 
Western countries. Indian copyright law traces its origins to the British 
Empire. The fi rst copyright laws developed in India under British rule 
substantially paralleled Britain’s copyright law of 1911. India’s fi rst copy-
right act after Independence, the Copyright Act of 1957, retained many of 
the prior provisions. India’s most recent amendment to its Copyright Act, 
in 1999,99 brought the law in line with the Agreement on Trade- Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).100 Despite the laws on the books, 
however, the lack of enforcement of copyright laws is a continuing com-
plaint and source of strain on India’s trade relationship with the United 
States, prompting the United States to place India on the Section 301 
“watch list” for lax enforcement of copyright.
For its own part, Bollywood appears to be of two minds about copy-
right. On the one hand, Bollywood fi lmmakers rely on copyright law to 
protect against video piracy. Pirated DVDs of Bollywood fi lms are freely 
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available in India and abroad, with resulting losses to the industry that 
some claim are at least $80 million a year.101 With the advent of cable tele-
vision, pirated copies of fi lms have been shown on television, sometimes 
on the very day the fi lms were released in movie theaters. Still, enforce-
ment of copyright claims is lax because such claims remain a low priority 
for the police and the courts.102
In contrast to Bollywood’s stance against video piracy, many charge 
that the industry has not been respectful of the copyright claims of artists 
within or outside of the industry. Actors, directors, and writers frequently 
work without any written contracts. Scripts are few and far between, and 
directors develop fi lms on the fl y. Musicians have been particularly vo-
cal about the unjust appropriation of their work, claiming, “Plagiarism 
is routine.” 103 One Bollywood director, when scolded for such copying in 
the industry and when asked “Where is your artistic skill?” replied, “My 
skill is knowing what to steal.” 104
In recent years, since 2000 when the Indian government granted 
industry status to Bollywood, fi lmmakers have been able to seek more 
secure sources of funding, from banks, foreign investors, and India’s 
own corporate titans such as the $8 billion Tata Group and the $13 billion 
Reliance Industries. In 2011 Indian billionaire Anil Ambani of Reliance 
Industries invested some $825 million in Steven Spielberg’s DreamWorks 
SKG Studios.105 The huge sums now available within India for investment 
in Bollywood could potentially transform the Indian fi lm industry. Recall, 
for example, that Ray initially reached out to Hollywood because he lacked 
the technology and funds necessary to make a successful science- fi ction 
fi lm—indeed, Indians have continued to avoid this genre of fi lms and 
others, including animation, for the same reasons. New sources of fund-
ing off er new creative opportunities.
Major Hollywood studios, including Warner Bros., Sony Pictures, 
Twentieth Century Fox, and Disney, are also now investing in Bollywood. 
This comes as no surprise—Hollywood has long sought, albeit unsuc-
cessfully, to tap into the vast fi lm market of India, where movies are as 
much a national pastime as cricket. Strikingly, Hollywood, which controls 
a whopping 80 to 90 percent of the European fi lm market, has failed to 
penetrate the Indian market with its own fi lms. Hollywood fi lms make 
up only 10 percent of the Indian fi lm market.106 This surprisingly low 
level of penetration is the result of neither quotas nor nationalist cen-
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sor boards. Hollywood fi lms simply do not seem to appeal to Indian 
moviegoers. Hollywood fi lms released in India with straight- up dubbing 
have fl opped.107 As one Bollywood director puts it, “Hollywood fi lms are 
considered ‘dry’ here.” 108
Hollywood’s new strategy? Invest in Bollywood fi lms instead. In 2009, 
Warner Bros. released Chandni Chowk to China,109 only the third Bolly wood/
Hollywood collaboration in history. But the fi lm, starring Bolly wood 
megastar Akshay Kumar, was a box- offi  ce fl op. A comedy about an In-
dian vegetable seller from New Delhi’s Chandni Chowk neighborhood 
who ends up in China (Hollywood’s ambition appeared to be to tap two 
of the world’s largest moviegoing markets with this one fi lm),110 it did not 
draw anywhere near the audiences that Hollywood had hoped it would.111
Hollywood executives recognize that Indian movie audiences are 
growing quickly; indeed, before the recent global economic downturn, 
Indian domestic box- offi  ce returns were growing at a rate of 15 percent, 
compared to a 2 percent growth rate in the United States during the 
same period.112 One result of such new alliances, of course, is that more 
Bollywood profi ts will now fl ow back to the West rather than remain at 
home. Another result of American alliances is increased pressure on 
Bollywood to clean up its act with respect to copyright. Hollywood began 
paying close attention to Bollywood several years ago, with the success 
of Mira Nair’s Monsoon Wedding113 and Aamir Khan’s Lagaan,114 which 
in 2002 was nominated for an Oscar for Best Foreign Film. The atten-
tion has not all been positive, as Hollywood directors soon realized that 
Bollywood has been appropriating ideas from Hollywood in their own 
fi lms. Bollywood adaptations include Deewana115 (similar to Sleeping with 
the Enemy116), Akele Hum Akele Tum117 (resembling Sleepless in Seattle118), 
Chachi 420119 and Aunty No. 1120 (both similar to Mrs. Doubtfi re), and Gha-
jini121 (an homage to Memento122). But these resemblances do not always 
violate copyright. Indian copyright law, like copyright law everywhere, 
protects original expression but not ideas. Directors of Indian fi lms based 
on Hollywood hits claim their fi lms are “inspired” by the ideas in the 
Hollywood fi lms, but that their own expression of the idea is unique. 
The fi lm Chachi 420, for example, is similar to Mrs. Doubtfi re only in 
plot (an estranged father dresses as a nanny to spend more time with his 
child), but no original expression is taken from the Hollywood fi lm. Says 
Bollywood director Subhash Ghai: “There are only 36 plots in the world 
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drama, and you can make 36,000 stories out of those. So stories don’t 
change; science changes, times change and values change.” 123
The critical and box offi  ce success of Slumdog Millionaire, in particu-
lar, has piqued Hollywood’s interest in Bollywood once more.124 Though 
Slumdog Millionaire was not technically a Bollywood movie (the fi lm’s 
director, Danny Boyle, is British), it succeeded internationally by employ-
ing typical Bollywood themes of urban poverty and corruption, staged 
with Indian actors, Bollywood- style melodrama, and stop- action dance 
numbers set to the music of acclaimed Bollywood musical director A. R. 
Rahman. Again, however, the attention has meant a spate of copyright 
claims by Hollywood against Bollywood. Recently Hollywood ran ads in 
the Times of India warning Bollywood not to go through with a rumored 
Indian version of The Curious Case of Benjamin Button.125 The actual simi-
larities between the recently released Bollywood fi lm Paa and Benjamin 
Button are trivial.126 The fi lm Benjamin Button is adapted from a 1922 
short story of the same name written by F. Scott Fitzgerald, which tells 
the tale of a man who ages backward. Paa, in contrast, is a literal story 
of a boy with progeria, the disease many believed inspired the Benjamin 
Button story, but which is never expressly mentioned in Fitzgerald’s tale 
or the Hollywood version of it. Paa trades largely on the gimmick of hav-
ing Bollywood’s most famous actor, Amitabh Bachchan, play the child 
affl  icted with progeria, while his real- life son, Abishek Bachchan, plays 
the child’s father.
Recently, the Delhi High Court threw out another case, by Warner 
Bros. against the producers of the Bollywood fi lm Hari Puttar: A Com-
edy of Terrors,127 fi nding the fi lm bore little resemblance to the Harry 
Potter series.128 This was not a copyright case but a trademark dispute. 
Warner Bros., which owns a trademark in Harry Potter, argued that the 
name Hari Puttar was confusingly similar to the Harry Potter mark and 
threatened to dilute the famous original mark. But the Delhi High Court 
ultimately agreed with the defendants that the name, which referred to 
a Punjabi boy whose full name was Hariprasad Dhoonda (“Hari” is a 
common short form for Hariprasad and “Puttar” means son in Punjabi), 
would not likely be confused with J. K. Rowling’s famous boy Potter. 
Notably, the court found that the diff erence in the class, language, and 
exposure of the audiences for the Potter fi lms and the Puttar fi lm were 
relevant, supposing that “an illiterate or semi- literate movie viewer, in 
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case he ventures to see a fi lm by the name of Hari Puttar, would never be 
able to relate the same with a Harry Potter fi lm or book. Conversely,” the 
court continued, “an educated person who has pored over or even browsed 
through a book on Harry Potter or viewed a Harry Potter fi lm, is not likely 
to be misled . . . for, in my view, the cognoscenti, the intellectuals and 
even the pseudo- intellectuals presumably know the diff erence between 
chalk and cheese or at any rate must be presumed to know the same.” 129
But a settlement for $200,000 in the summer of 2009, awarded 
to Twentieth Century Fox from the Bollywood producer of Banda Yeh 
Bindaas Hai,130 accused of stealing from My Cousin Vinny,131 seems to 
have sent a strong signal to Bollywood. Now two Indian producers have 
bought the rights to the two Hollywood fi lms they want to copy (includ-
ing a license from Orion Pictures to remake the Hollywood fi lm Wedding 
Crashers132), a move largely unheard of before. Many in Bollywood welcome 
the idea of paying royalties to Hollywood.133 The acclaimed musical direc-
tor A. R. Rahman, who composed the original music for Slumdog Million-
aire and scores of Bollywood fi lms, opined that “it’s high time everyone 
cleaned up his act and people started getting fair to creative people.” 134
Bollywood ought to play by the rules: remakes that take original, 
protectable expression and that are not fair use should be licensed. Yet 
we may also ask whether claims of piracy by Bollywood may not at times 
be overblown, if not also partially misconceived. Consider the following:
 1. The most inf luential films in post- Independence Indian cinema 
are not remakes. Of the top- ten- grossing Bollywood films in 2008, 
only one or two are remakes of Hollywood hits. The top- grossing 
Ghajini, starring Aamir Khan, has a plot nearly identical to the 
American film Memento; another, titled Race,135 admits inspira-
tion from the 1998 Hollywood film Goodbye Lover.136 But most of 
that year’s blockbuster films were not expressly or obviously de-
rivative of earlier American works (for example, Singh Is King and 
Jodhaa- Akbar—with the latter, starring Hrithik Roshan and Aish-
warya Rai Bachchan, the sixteenth- century love story between the 
great Mughal emperor, Akbar, and a Rajput princess, Jodha).137 
Indeed, the most influential Hindi films have had expressly In-
dian storylines: Devdas (1935, remade in 2002, about star- crossed 
lovers torn asunder by class differences); Mother India (1957, in 
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which a poor peasant woman, Radha, raises two sons and over-
comes her difficulties against all odds); Guide (1965, the story of 
a clever village tour guide mistaken for a holy man); Sholay (1975, 
marking the advent in Hindi films of the “angry young man” 
who grows up in poverty and avenges the murders of family 
members killed by underworld bandits); and Lagaan (2001, 
chronicling how Indian villagers in nineteenth- century India 
rose up against crippling colonial taxation).138
 2. Remakes are common in both Hollywood and Bollywood. Bolly-
wood is not alone in turning to remakes as a guarantor for finan-
cial success. Hollywood, too, equally driven by concerns for the 
bottom line, frequently turns to remaking classics, local and 
global. As mentioned earlier, in 2009 Hollywood offered an of-
ficial remake of Osamu Tezuka’s Astro Boy. Recall, too, that re-
makes may themselves later become iconic “classics,” from The 
Magnificent Seven to A Fistful of Dollars. These and even more 
recent examples also challenge the conception that it is only 
American culture that inf luences the rest. Clearly Asian film has 
had a strong influence on Hollywood as well. To take another 
example, Martin Scorsese’s Academy Award–winning film The 
Departed (starring Leonardo DiCaprio and Matt Damon) was a 
remake of the Hong Kong crime film Mou Gaan Dou (2002), 
known by the English translation Internal Affairs.139 The Departed 
won the Oscar for Best Picture in 2006. And the 2002 Holly-
wood horror film The Ring is a remake of the 1998 Japanese 
horror film Ring.140
 3. Learning through pastiche. Writers, musicians, and filmmakers 
practice their craft, and eventually develop their own voice, by 
adapting existing works. Today, new technologies from digital 
video recorders to the Internet make the art of filmmaking acces-
sible even to the poor in the developing world, democratizing not 
only broader consumption of cultural goods, but cultural produc-
tion as well. Notably, indigenous film industries have grown 
through the fruitful combination of cheap technological infra-
structure and a rich creative heritage—often Bollywood films—
from which to adapt more local stories. Nigeria now boasts one 
of the world’s largest film industries (earning it the nickname 
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“Nolly wood”), largely through perfecting this very modus ope-
randi, that is, by combining cheap video technologies and “a 
creative history of appropriation and localization of Bollywood 
films.” 141
  The Indian scholar Lawrence Liang describes a similar phe-
nomenon in India, where an alternative film industry has 
emerged in the unlikely small town of Malegaon, located some 
eight hours away from Mumbai. Several years ago a local entre-
preneur in this town of predominantly migrant Muslim loom 
workers found himself with a case of empty videocassettes. 
Deciding the cassettes would be more valuable with content 
on them, he made a “local” version of a well- known Bollywood 
film.142 The concept took off and now the town is famous for a 
f ledgling film industry that thrives on making local adaptations 
of Bollywood hits. Where the Oscar- nominated film Lagaan 
focused on oppressive taxes under the British Raj, for example, 
the Malegaon adaptation confronts issues of local access to city 
services.143 Far from criticizing the Malegaon copy, Aamir Khan, 
the director of Lagaan, has praised the use of “video theaters 
as a film school.” 144
 4. Copying requires creativity. Imitation is often a more creative act 
than we recognize. Take again the example of the f ledgling Male-
gaon film industry. Liang lauds the creativity of the poor, who 
remake Bollywood films but on shoestring budgets of a mere 
$1,000 per film.145 One film, for example, reshot a helicopter 
scene in a Bollywood movie using a plastic toy helicopter that cost 
less than a dollar. The Malegaon example, Liang argues, suggests 
that the “creativity that goes into the making of the remakes lies 
as much in the way that the film is made, as in the content of the 
film.” 146
 5. “Indianized” Hollywood films have minimal effect on the market 
for the originals because Indian audiences do not otherwise see the 
Hollywood films. Bollywood filmmakers often seek to retell a 
Hollywood film story, but in a way that appeals to Indian audi-
ences. Usually this is done by “adding emotions,” family relation-
ships, and an extra hour of song and dance numbers. Bollywood 
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film writer Anjum Rajabali emphasizes the difference in genres 
this way: “Relationships! That seems to be the primary criteria 
when Indianising a subject. Lots of strong, close, intense relation-
ships that will have interesting moving stories/graphs of their 
own. Adding family is one important thing. That is why I think 
subjects like James Bond, detective stories, westerns and the like 
don’t work as they are here. Who were James Bond’s parents? 
Does Clint Eastwood of The Good, The Bad, & Ugly love anyone? 
What about his brothers or sisters?” 147 
  Perhaps this overstates cultural differences between India 
and the United States. More persuasively, Indian directors argue 
they are offering a remake because Indians are simply not going 
to see the original Hollywood film. The Indianized remake, 
then, allows these audiences “to see a great story in their own 
language.” 148
 6. Bollywood remakes stave off Hollywood cultural imperialism. Per-
haps more controversially, copyright law may give some consider-
ation to the ways in which local adaptations of dominant, global 
cultural works from Hollywood enable local communities to re-
sist cultural hegemony and talk back to the dominant Hollywood 
culture. Recall that women, gays, and minorities in the United 
States and elsewhere actively remake dominant cultural stories 
from Harry Potter to Star Trek through writing and sharing prac-
tices (such as fan fiction) so as to bring their own subjectivity to 
bear on the traditional tales.149 The process of “Indianizing” a 
Hollywood film is a similar practice.
Some argue that Bollywood should make its own original stories 
and not engage with those of the West. But as Liang argues, they assume 
that poor countries can aff ord to “disavow the global,” which he says they 
cannot. “[I]n many countries,” writes Liang, “the very question of what 
it means to be modern has always been defi ned in relation to an idea of 
the global.” 150 Thus, for countries to be modern, they have no choice but 
to engage with the West. At the same time, viewing Western fi lms forces 
poor audiences “to confront their physical and cultural marginality every 
time they attend the cinema,” writes Liang.151 Preparing local adaptations 
of Hollywood fi lms, by contrast, allows Indians to experience a “global” 
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story or phenomenon, but on more locally relevant and palatable terms. 
The nationalist vision that inspired Indian fi lm pioneer Phalke thus con-
tinues to play a role in Bollywood’s continued success. Phalke’s concern 
was for the psychology of a nation that sees itself represented on-screen.152 
The message? A white English boy cannot always be the hero.
copyright and asian values
The current legal claims against Bollywood echo a long-standing meme 
about Asians as copiers, and Asian culture as one more suited to imita-
tion than innovation. In the infl uential book by William P. Alford, To 
Steal a Book Is an Elegant Off ense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese 
Civilization (1995), Alford attributes the long absence of intellectual prop-
erty law in China to the country’s unique civilization and Confucian 
values. “Lying at the core of traditional Chinese society’s treatment of 
intellectual property was the dominant Confucian vision of the nature 
of civilization and of the constitutive role played therein by a shared and 
still vital past,” Alford writes, continuing: “Only through encountering 
the past—which provided unique insight into the essence of one’s own 
character, relationships with other human beings, and interaction with 
nature—could individuals, guided by nurturing leaders, understand how 
properly to adhere to those relationships of which they were a part.” 153 
Alford concludes that this understanding of the moral foundation played 
by the past confounded intellectual property protection in China: “The 
indispensability of the past for personal moral growth dictated that there 
be broad access to the common heritage of all Chinese.” 154 Alford points 
out that Chinese engagement with the past did not necessarily mean 
lack of originality in new works.155 Yet he still contends that “interaction 
with the past is one of the distinctive modes of intellectual and imagina-
tive endeavor in traditional Chinese culture.” 156 He concludes that, “in 
the Chinese context,” use of the past “was at once both more affi  rmative 
[than in the West] and more essential.” 157 Alford describes as “Confucian” 
scholars’ “disdain for commerce” and the idea that they “wrote for edifi ca-
tion and moral renewal rather than profi t.” 158
But let us examine these claims further. Is the past not just as im-
portant for self- understanding beyond China’s borders? And are Chinese 
scholars really unique in their altruistic desire to create knowledge for oth-
ers? In fact, cultural stereotypes have the eff ect of buttressing arguments 
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for strong copyright (Westerners are profi t maximizers who will only 
create for monetary reward) and weakening arguments for limits (West-
erners are relationally unconnected and have no need to access the past). 
In contrast, those who value community, shared meaning, and knowledge 
creation to benefi t the public are cast as foreign and premodern.
Civilizational views about copyright are misleading because they elide 
the plural values in all cultures, which rightfully recognize the values of 
innovation and participation, as well as of shared meaning and common 
heritage. The Nobel laureate Amartya Sen has highlighted how cultural 
stereotypes about Asians have been wrongly used to justify a denial of 
human rights in Asian countries. As Sen points out, the mistaken idea 
that Asians do not value human rights is voiced by authoritarian Asian 
leaders and skeptical Westerners alike. In so doing, Westerners inad-
vertently buttress Asian authoritarians. More perniciously, civilizational 
rhetoric elides plural, critical traditions committed to freedom, rationality, 
equality, and tolerance that have long been present in Asian histories. As 
Sen demonstrates, Asian nations, religions, and traditions are rife with 
confl icting and diverse views on these topics.159 He points out, for example, 
that scholars often cite Confucian values when considering China, but 
seldom invoke Buddhist philosophy. Great Indian leaders such as Ashoka 
and Akbar championed and practiced pluralism in governing their vast 
empires long before those values were adopted in the West. As Sen con-
cludes, “so- called Asian values that are invoked to justify authoritarianism 
are not especially Asian in any signifi cant sense.” 160
Something similar is true in the case of copyright and so- called Asian 
values. As one scholar has recently argued, Chinese commitments to 
access to knowledge are infl uenced by Buddhist enlightenment philoso-
phy, not just Confucian commitment to tradition and authority.161 Read 
in this light, the focus on public access to knowledge may be understood 
as part of a larger endeavor to promote enlightenment and freedom, not 
just as obedient acquiescence to authoritarian elders. Recognition of each 
culture’s plural traditions and values is crucial because it off ers a more 
critical lens with which to assess our own societies. If access to shared 
culture is understood only as being fed by authoritarian values, we will 
naturally reject a robust public domain in the name of freedom. But if 
we understand diverse motivations, including those stemming from uni-
versal concerns for enlightenment and access to knowledge, then such 
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commitments cannot easily be cast aside. Furthermore, claims that in-
tellectual property laws are more “foreign” on some soils than others 
understate the extent to which intellectual property is something we must 
all be taught—it does not come naturally. Indeed, today in the United 
States copyright industries expend great eff ort and money to teach (or 
indoctrinate) young children about the wrongs of piracy. And American 
university academics continue to resist encroaching norms that pit the 
pursuit of knowledge for the benefi t of the public against the stepped- up 
eff orts of university technology transfer offi  ces to teach researchers to 
patent their inventions.
Some have suggested that China now has an “innovation defi cit” 162 
and needs to develop its own creative industries. While rates of innovation 
may indeed vary across the world, this may refl ect a variety of factors, 
including access to knowledge, capital, education, and markets. These 
varying rates may also refl ect culture, but we should be careful not to 
paint culture with too broad a brush, identifying one group as natural 
innovators and another as natural copyists. In fact, there is a great deal 
of creative activity taking place in Asia, not just in fi lm, but in every area 
from computer gaming to fashion. For example, Farmville, “the most 
popular game on Facebook,” with over 45 million unique monthly play-
ers, admittedly “rips off  Happy Farm, a hugely popular online game in 
China.” 163 Each season, fashion industry buyers from the United States 
and Europe travel to Tokyo, whose youth are “trailblazers of street fashion” 
and “the envy of Western designers,” “to buy up bagfuls of the latest hits. 
The designs are then whisked overseas to be reworked, resized, stitched 
together and sold under Western labels.” 164 If innovation and progress are 
our ultimate goals, we must take greater care to recognize how diff erences 
in global power and knowledge, combined with cultural stereotypes, aff ect 
the production and distribution of culture today.
The eff ects of today’s global copyright laws extend well beyond incentives 
to create. Copyright law implicates mutual recognition or misrecognition 
of others. Furthermore, this law determines who will benefi t from the 
wealth deriving from knowledge production today. In short, copyright 
law has both dignitary and distributive eff ects. Arguments to buttress 
the intellectual property rights of Western creators typically presume 
these creative professionals are more deserving of protection than others 
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because their creations are “original,” while those of developing (especially 
Asian) countries are derivative. But this distinction overlooks the extent 
to which much of human creativity is derivative (recalling Paul Gilroy’s 
description of culture as “routes,” not “roots” 165). More importantly, the 
distinction elides the extent to which all humans are creative and active 
producers of knowledge of the world. Cultural stereotypes about original-
ity and piracy do a disservice to our understanding of the universal aspects 
of human creativity and the ways in which power may upend the ultimate 
goals of promoting cultural exchange and mutual understanding. We 
need to take into account the ways in which actual global inequalities, 
combined with long-standing cultural biases, may impede the free and 
fair exchange of culture.
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thembisa mkhosana has aids.   If she lived in the West, this diag-
nosis would likely not be life- threatening. Advances in antiretroviral treat-
ments today mean that patients who can aff ord to pay for the treatments 
can live a healthy, full, and long life with the disease. But Thembisa, a 
mother of two living in a village on the outskirts of Cape Town, South 
Africa, will likely die from her illness. While miracle medicines exist, she 
cannot aff ord them. She is hardly alone. Few in Africa, where the majority 
of HIV/AIDS patients in the world live, have the resources to buy the most 
eff ective antiretroviral medicines on the free market. The medicine that 
Thembisa needs to live costs $10,000 a year, a price that neither she nor 
her government can aff ord.
Thembisa has been lucky until now. Since 2003, when she was fi rst 
diagnosed with the disease, she has been treated at a Doctors Without Bor-
ders clinic. Born out of relief eff orts by French physicians in Biafra and a 
cyclone in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1970, Doctors Without Bor-
ders has long provided medical help in the aftermath of tsunamis, wars, 
and pandemics. Today it treats over a hundred thousand HIV- positive 
patients in the developing world, administering fi rst- and second- line 
antiretroviral treatments. Thembisa initially responded well to these treat-
ments. They enabled her to go back to work and, most importantly, care 
for her two children. But now she has developed resistance to the drugs. 
chapter seven
An Issue of Life or Death
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Indeed, most AIDS patients develop resistance within fi ve years of start-
ing these treatments. And while third- line ARV treatments are available 
in Europe and the United States, they are not available in South Africa, 
where few could aff ord them.
Why does Doctors Without Borders off er only the fi rst- and second- 
line retrovirals and not the third- line antiretroviral treatments that might 
save Thembisa? The fi rst- line and second- line drugs cost a relatively small 
$80 per person annually. They are out of patent, while the third- line (and 
fourth- line and fi fth- line) drugs remain in patent—that is, the drugs 
are still under the control of companies, which have not yet off ered the 
medicine under terms that would bring continued treatment within her 
reach. The result is that while AIDS is a treatable, chronic condition in 
the developed world, in the developing world, second- line treatments are 
the end of the line. The World Health Organization antiretroviral therapy 
guidelines off er a grim suggestion in cases like Thembisa’s: “If a patient 
has exhausted all available antiretroviral . . . treatment options . . . it be-
comes reasonable to stop giving ARVs and to institute an active palliative 
and end- of- life care plan.” 1 Thembisa’s caregivers from Doctors Without 
Borders feel defeated. “Seeing a patient you have been treating since 2003, 
and now this patient is failing on her second combination, you feel you 
are a failure,” says Mpumi Mantangana. Thembisa’s only concern is her 
family. “I know that I’m going to die,” she says, but “who is going to look 
after my children?” 2
Not too long ago, an HIV- positive diagnosis was tantamount to a 
death sentence—for people in the East and the West, in the South and 
the North. The drug companies that perfected the antiretroviral therapies 
invested princely sums to fi nd these miracle cures. To justify their invest-
ment, they rely on the promise of a patent—the twenty- year exclusive 
right to make, use, and sell an invention that is novel, non- obvious, and 
useful. The patent allows the drug company to charge high sums for the 
medicine, and thereby recoup its enormous investments in scientists and 
drug trials, while also turning a profi t for shareholders and investing in 
research toward future breakthrough drugs. Thus patents have saved 
countless lives, including Thembisa’s thus far.
But this structure has its limits. Indeed, the evidence is mounting 
that in crucial ways patents fail to promote the health of people in the 
developing world, and in some cases in the developed world as well.3 
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First, the exclusive patent right allows a monopoly on the production of 
the drug, which generally leads to higher prices for the cure. The enor-
mous diff erences in price—$80 per annum compared to an annual per 
person cost of $10,000 in the case of Thembisa’s medicines—creates vast 
inequities between those who are wealthy enough to purchase the cure 
(or to have one purchased for them by their government), and those who 
must suff er, often knowing that a cure exists but lies beyond their means.
Some will say that Thembisa cannot be worse off  for the patent be-
cause but for the patent, there would be no drug that she was struggling 
to obtain. But this denies that patents are but one among many alter-
natives for stimulating and rewarding innovation, including prizes and 
subsidies. Furthermore, drug companies often benefi t from enormous 
public investment, including basic research conducted in universities 
and research supported by nonprofi t foundations and governments. I will 
explore these points further in this chapter.
Second, patents do save lives, but primarily only the lives of those who 
are willing and able to pay. In truth, drug companies do not target entire 
populations of developing countries. To the contrary, they quite openly 
identify a market in only a small portion of a developing country’s popu-
lation. One major Western drug company calculates the eff ective drug 
market in India to be seventy to eighty million people—that is, less than 
10 percent of that country’s population. An anonymous pharmaceutical 
executive put it in these terms: “There could easily be 70 to 80 million 
people [in India] who can aff ord expensive medicines, just as they go out 
and buy expensive cars, branded clothes and consumer goods. . . . That 
is equal to the size of a UK or a Germany.” 4
The third point is related to the second: the patent system skews in-
novation to serve rich- country markets. The result is that Western drug 
companies are not producing the medicines most needed in the devel-
oping world, where few can aff ord to pay. As a 2006 World Health Or-
ganization study showed, intellectual property is not a signifi cant factor 
in contributing to innovation for diseases that disproportionately aff ect 
developing countries, such as malaria and tuberculosis. A Lancet study 
concluded that only 1 percent of the 1,556 drugs developed in the last 
twenty- fi ve years targeted so- called neglected diseases such as malaria and 
tuberculosis, even though these diseases account for over 10 percent of the 
global disease burden.5 Indeed, these diseases have earned the name “ne-
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glected diseases” because so little of the world’s proportion of R&D dollars 
is dedicated to them.6 Global diseases are generally categorized as Type I 
(diseases spread evenly through the developed and developing worlds); 
Type II (diseases that are predominantly in the developing world but on 
which a substantial proportion of R&D sums are spent—the sole example 
here being AIDS), and Type III (diseases for which 95 percent of the global 
burden falls in the developing world, and little if any global R&D funds 
are spent).7 As a recent World Health Organization report on patents and 
incentives concluded, “There is no evidence that the implementation of 
the TRIPS agreement in developing countries will signifi cantly boost 
R&D in pharmaceuticals on Type II, and particularly Type III diseases,” 8 
explaining that “[i]nsuffi  cient market incentives are the decisive factor.” 9
The failure to develop an AIDS treatment for children serves as a 
glaring example of this lacuna in the incentive theory underlying pat-
ents. There are 2 million children with HIV in the world and 90 percent 
of them live in sub- Saharan Africa. Without treatment, a third of those 
children with the virus will die before their fi rst birthday. And in fact, 
few if any have access to treatment, not simply because treatments are 
unaff ordable, but also because Big Pharma has not found it profi table to 
develop pediatric treatments for this primarily poor group. 
Fourth, patents only incentivize drug production in countries that 
already have the necessary technical capacity and capital investment for 
breakthrough research. Indeed, in countries with lesser technical capacity, 
patents may impede their ability to gain technical knowledge by copying 
more advanced industries abroad. Simply put, the elusive promise of a 
patent will not spur the creation of new treatments if a country lacks 
technical know- how. Thus patents in the developing world not only inhibit 
technology transfer to poor countries; they also engender dependence on 
developed countries and their drug companies—companies that, as we 
have seen, are not particularly interested in serving the populations of 
the developing world.
Fifth, the economic incentive theory does not justify worldwide recog-
nition of a patent. In Thembisa’s case, for example, the existence of U.S. 
and European patents was enough to spur the creation of drugs that could 
save her life. Under the incentive theory, the incentives existed for these 
drugs to save European and American lives. The fact that Thembisa’s life 
has been saved thus far is only incidental. So why don’t the companies 
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that hold the patents on the third- line treatments donate the medicines 
to the world’s poorest nations at cost? Are they really hoping to make 
money from these people? There are some likely reasons that companies 
have been slow to off er their drugs at a fraction of the cost they charge 
in the wealthier parts of the world. First, as we have seen, drug company 
executives hope to profi t by catering to the small markets of the very rich 
in these places. Second, these executives worry that low prices in the de-
veloping world will call into question monopoly prices in the developed 
world. Moreover, they are concerned about grey- market reimportation of 
the cheaply produced drugs into richer countries. Yet the hope of catering 
to a sliver of the developing world market ought not to prevent the use of 
mechanisms such as compulsory licenses for generic drug production 
to service the majority of the poor. In fact, the creation of generic drug 
markets for the poor ought not signifi cantly impact the bottom line of Big 
Pharma, which derives only 5 to 7 percent of its profi ts from this part of 
the world. The grey- markets concern is a valid one—but, as we shall see, 
the World Trade Organization has begun to craft creative solutions to this 
problem (requiring generic drugs made for developing world markets to 
be distinctively labeled, for example).
Patents are a question of life and death. In the developed world, eff ec-
tive markets spur the investment of billions of dollars in R&D, leading 
to the creation of breakthrough drugs. As a 2006 World Health Organi-
zation report on intellectual property and public health concluded, “In-
tellectual property rights have an important role to play in stimulating 
innovation in health- care products in countries where fi nancial and tech-
nological capacities exist, and in relation to products for which profi table 
markets exist.” But in the developing world, patents actually impede the 
distribution of drugs to the poor. In the words of one observer: Innova-
tion is meaningless if newly developed products remain out of reach. 
Furthermore, patents do little to spur cures for the ills that aff ect the poor; 
neither do patents incentivize domestic production where local industry 
lacks technological capacity, basic research, and the capital required for 
breakthrough innovation. That is, according to the same World Trade 
Organization report, in developing countries “the fact that a patent can 
be obtained may contribute nothing or little to innovation if the market 
is too small or scientifi c and technological capability inadequate.” 10 
In 2005 the Nobel Prize–winning relief organization Doctors With-
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out Borders put the matter more starkly, warning the WTO that when 
monopoly pricing takes medicines fully out of the reach of the poor, pat-
ents can kill.11 The result? We have a global patent system that works some 
of the time and in some parts of the world. But in critical humanitarian 
and economic respects, our patent system is broken.
patents,  participation, and development
These are powerful critiques of the economic incentive theory of patents: 
Patents fail to incentivize research that addresses poor people’s diseases; 
patents off er little incentive for R&D in poor countries, which lack basic 
technological capacity; the patented drugs produced by multinationals 
are priced out of reach of the poor; and fi nally, Big Pharma will not allow 
generic drug production in the developing world, even though doing so 
would not adversely aff ect its incentives. But there are additional critiques 
of our current patent system that we may articulate and consider, critiques 
that expand our response to Thembisa and her tragic situation beyond the 
success or failure of intellectual property rights as incentives.
In this book I have emphasized cultural participation as both a means 
and an end of development. Producers of music, art, and scientifi c in-
novations today seek economic development in the sense that they are 
asking for fair remuneration for their intellectual production from global 
markets. At the same time, participation in the production of the world’s 
knowledge is an end in itself. All human beings seek to “think for them-
selves,” to apply their ingenuity to better their own lives and the lives 
of those around them. This is what development is for. Amartya Sen’s 
agency- oriented conception of development as freedom recognizes that 
individuals in the developing world do not simply wish to sit back and 
be the “benefi ciaries of cunning benefi t programs,” but rather seek to 
enhance their capacity to live a life that is happy and fulfi lling, to care for 
themselves, and to interact with others, near and far.
Patents are crucial to realizing this vision of participatory democ-
racy and development. At the most basic level, patents on medicines af-
fect individuals’ capacity to live “a human life of normal length,” which 
Nussbaum places at the very top of her list of central human capabilities. 
Health without fear of dying prematurely is the essential foundation on 
which a full life can be built. With access to eff ective and aff ordable 
medicines (themselves spurred by patents), Thembisa can care for her 
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children and be a productive participant in her community and national 
economy. But let me be clear: we are not interested only in Thembisa’s 
potential contributions, seeing her as a means and not an end, or simply 
in the economic costs to society of her illness. The “[e]conomic eff ects of 
the AIDS epidemic are important not so much on their own but primar-
ily because of their consequences on human lives and happiness and 
freedoms,” Sen reminds us.12 Most importantly, we must be concerned 
when patents impose signifi cant costs on Thembisa’s happiness, thwart-
ing her hopes of raising her children and living a full and independent 
life of her own making.
It must be acknowledged that patents are not the lone culprit in keep-
ing medicines from the poor. The point is often made that a vast majority 
of essential drugs are off  patent, and yet these remedies nonetheless fail to 
get distributed to the destitute because of poor mechanisms for delivery 
and use of the drugs, inadequate treatment facilities, and lack of patient 
education. Yet we cannot ignore the role of patents. As I have detailed, 
the eff ects of patents on the poor’s access to medicines range from ne-
glecting diseases of the developing world like malaria and tuberculosis to 
ratcheting up the costs of medicines so that they are simply out of reach.
Patents are constitutive of cultural democracy and development in 
another fundamental way. Patent law is a critical tool for structuring a 
society’s capacity to innovate. Nations have long understood that their 
patent policy has helped determine the success or failure of their indige-
nous creative industries and the social welfare of their people. Indeed, for 
most of world history patent systems were tailored to the developmental 
needs of each nation, with even many European countries enacting weak 
patent laws in their early days in order to borrow and copy freely from 
more advanced nations abroad. Switzerland, for example, protected its 
successful watch- making industry with patents in mechanical inventions, 
while simultaneously seeking to copy and learn from the more advanced 
German chemical industry by excluding patents in chemical products.13 
India famously overhauled its patent laws in 1970 after a 1959 study con-
cluded that the old law, a remnant of colonial days, “has failed in its main 
purpose, namely, to stimulate invention among Indians” and “to secure 
the benefi ts thereof to the largest section of the public.” 14 The study, led 
by a commission under Supreme Court Justice Rajagopal Ayyangar, con-
cluded that the inherited British patent law—which recognized sixteen- 
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year patents in most inventions, including pharmaceutical drugs—was 
remarkably unsuited to a newly independent India, which lacked the 
technological know-how to spur indigenous scientifi c industry, and whose 
population was too poor to pay the high prices for medicines that such 
a patent regime engendered. The Ayyangar report found that the main 
benefi ciaries of the old patent law were foreigners, not Indians—indeed, 
91 percent of patents owned in India by the end of 1958 were held by 
foreigners.15
Notably, the report’s main recommendation, that India retool its pat-
ent law to weaken patent protection—particularly with respect to food and 
drug products—in order to stimulate indigenous industry and facilitate 
cheaper medicines for all, drew largely from the actions of many Euro-
pean governments at the time. Germany, the report noted, recognized 
patents in chemical processes but not products—thus allowing multiple 
companies to produce the same drug product. Observing that European 
countries of the time enacted patent laws that promoted their own in-
dustrial and social interests, the Ayyangar report concluded that India 
ought to do the same. In particular, the report recommended amending 
the patent law by:
 1. Defining with precision those inventions that should be pat-
entable and by rendering unpatentable certain inventions for 
which the grant of patents would retard research or industrial 
progress or be detrimental to national health or well- being;
 2. Expanding the scope of “anticipation” so as to comprehend 
not merely what is known or published in this country, but also 
that which is known or published outside India;
 3. Providing remedies for the injustices that India, like other 
countries, experiences from foreign- owned patents that are 
not employed within the country, but which are held either to 
block the industries of the country or to secure a monopoly 
of importation;
 4. Including special provisions regarding the licensing of patents 
for inventions relating to food and medicine; and
 5. Offering remedies for other forms of abuse resorted to by pat-
entees, to secure a more extended monopoly or a monopoly for a 
longer duration than what the statute grants.16
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The Indian Patent Act of 1970 adopted many of the Ayyangar report’s 
suggestions. The crucial distinction made in the Indian Patent Act of 1970 
was to recognize patents in pharmaceutical processes but not products. 
So long as a company could develop an alternate way of producing a drug, 
it was legal. In addition, process patents were relatively short—fi ve years 
from the date of grant or seven years from the date of fi ling, whichever 
was earlier—and an automatic “licence of right” was to be available three 
years after the grant of the patent. This legal framework, along with gov-
ernment investment into laboratories, allowed Indian pharmaceutical 
companies to reverse- engineer nearly every drug produced by foreign 
multinational companies. A booming generic drug industry in India en-
sued. Competition from generics in turn drastically lowered drug prices 
and facilitated access to medicines for the poor—not just in India, but also 
in poor export markets, from Asia to South America to Africa. Because 
India had been one of the few countries with the ability to manufacture 
generics not only for its domestic population, but also for other develop-
ing countries, competition from India’s generic producers lowered prices 
dramatically throughout the developing world. Over a ten- year period, 
the introduction of Indian generics in Africa reduced the price of AIDS 
treatments from $15,000 to $200 annually, bringing life- saving treatment 
within the ordinary person’s reach. Indian pharmaceutical companies 
quickly became “the pharmacy of the developing world.” Doctors Without 
Borders estimates that over 80 percent of the antiretrovirals it prescribes 
to over 100,000 patients in the developing world are generics made in 
India. Indeed, by 2005, India had the fourth largest pharmaceutical in-
dustry in the world, from which it earned $3 billion annually.17 As Tanuja 
Garde concludes, the Indian Patent Act of 1970 “arguably achieved the 
goals of the Ayyangar Report’s recommendations: the number of licensed 
drug manufacturers in India increased from 2,237 in 1969–70 to around 
16,000 in 1992–93,” and “while multinational corporations enjoyed about 
80–90 percent of the pharmaceutical market around 1970, by 1993, In-
dian fi rms accounted for over 60 percent of the market.” 18
The nation- specifi c approach to intellectual property was premised on 
the conventional wisdom that strong intellectual property rights are bene-
fi cial for countries that are primarily producers of knowledge—that is, 
the developed world. Similarly, this conventional wisdom recognized that 
intellectual property rights would not benefi t the developing world, which 
201111 Pass 3 press.indd   181 2/10/12   2:23 PM
182 an issue of life or death
was primarily a net importer of knowledge. Thus, developing countries 
followed a minimalist approach to intellectual property in the interest 
of promoting their ability to borrow and build on the knowledge of the 
developed world. Indeed, in the case of copyrights even the United States 
took a minimalist approach to intellectual property protection during its 
fi rst hundred years. It was in our best interest to freely copy the knowledge 
of the richer parts of the globe—we could not have so quickly built our 
own knowledge industry had the rules been otherwise. In India’s case, its 
ability to produce generics and to learn through this process has helped 
to lay the foundation for several of its pharmaceutical companies to be-
come global players today. The United States is now the biggest market 
for Ranbaxy, India’s largest pharmaceutical company. Most of Ranbaxy’s 
production is either drugs licensed from foreign pharmaceutical compa-
nies or generics of off - patent drugs. India’s second largest pharmaceutical 
company, Dr. Reddy’s, similarly found success by providing cheap gener-
ics to developed world markets as well as to developing world governments 
seeking to address their public health woes. The formula was simple, and 
it worked: minimalist intellectual property regimes allowed developing 
countries to stand on their own feet, develop indigenous knowledge and 
industry, and meet the needs of their own people without being depen-
dent on foreigners.
But this conventional wisdom about intellectual property and develop-
ment was turned on its head at the end of the last century. In 1995, with 
the establishment of the World Trade Organization, intellectual property 
rights were for the fi rst time considered an international trade issue, and 
came to be governed by a new international law, the Agreement on Trade- 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, otherwise known as the TRIPS 
agreement. The TRIPS agreement imposed, for the fi rst time in history, 
high minimum standards for intellectual property protection that all 
members of the WTO were required to recognize and enforce, on pain of trade 
sanctions. The upshot is that today 90 percent of the world’s countries 
must follow a one- size- fi ts- all approach to intellectual property, regard-
less of the country’s level of development. The agreement represents a 
radical departure from a centuries- old approach that had allowed coun-
tries to develop intellectual property rules conducive to their particular 
developmental needs.
Among other things, the TRIPS agreement now requires its members 
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to recognize patents in all areas of technology, including in processes and 
products, for twenty years (the only exception being for the least developed 
countries, which have until 2016 to implement patents in drug products 
if they had no such law in the past). Thus, whereas countries such as In-
dia were free to make generic drugs prior to 2005—to serve India’s own 
population and much of the developing world’s populations, as well—the 
legality of much of India’s past generic production is now uncertain. And 
while the TRIPS agreement provides for compulsory licenses to address 
public health needs and in the case of national emergencies (which I will 
describe shortly), the procedures required to exercise such options are 
sometimes onerous, and the political pressure on nations not to issue 
compulsory licenses is immense.
There are some salutary aspects of this situation. As the incentives 
for India’s pharmaceutical industry likely shift to promoting the creation 
of new, innovative drugs rather than generic versions of existing drugs, 
the Indian pharmaceutical industry may move more into knowledge pro-
duction, not just its circulation (although Indian companies have not had 
any successful breakthrough invention thus far). But the hope that this 
industry may better address developing world diseases may be overly 
optimistic. Indian pharmaceutical companies will face the same market 
pressures as Western pharmaceutical companies: to produce drugs for 
the markets that can pay the largest sums—which has historically meant 
developed world markets.
In immediate terms, the added delays and demanding criteria for 
creating generic versions of new drugs will mean that AIDS patients who 
develop resistance to older drugs will not have cheap access to newer AIDS 
drugs as they become available. In fact, Thembisa and tens of thousands 
of poor people like her who benefi ted from India’s patent law prior to 
2005 may be unable to access such drugs for the period of the patent, 
that is, twenty years.
This tragic result illuminates how tying countries’ hands in this 
way—and in particular, tying the hands of developing countries—thwarts 
democratic participation and development in the most fundamental 
sense. First, a one- size- fi ts- all approach to patent protection confl icts with 
nations’ particular constitutional and fundamental normative commit-
ments. The Indian Patent Act of 1970, for example, refl ected more than 
just a utilitarian calculus regarding good innovation policy. More funda-
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mentally, the law bore in mind a national, democratic commitment to the 
principle of access to medicines for all. As Indira Gandhi articulated it, 
Indians envisioned a nation in which “medical discoveries would be free 
of patents and there would be no profi teering from life or death.” 19 Today 
nations have much less room than ever before to adjust their intellectual 
property laws to promote their democratically deliberated interests and 
commitments.
Nevertheless, a number of countries are courageously striving to be 
TRIPS compliant without compromising democracy at home. One way 
countries can still seek to meet their basic constitutional and fundamental 
obligations is by adopting stringent patenting standards; another is utiliz-
ing the “fl exibilities” or exceptions built into the TRIPS agreement, espe-
cially those allowing for compulsory licensing to promote public health. 
India, for example, which recognizes a “right to life” in article 21 of its 
constitution, has recently witnessed a spate of high court cases that pit 
its new TRIPS- compliant patent law against this constitutional commit-
ment. Thus far, the high courts have sided with the constitution, reading 
limitations in the new patent law in light of that country’s constitutional 
commitment “to provide easy access to the citizens of this country to life 
saving drugs and to discharge the Constitutional obligation of providing 
good health care to its citizens.” 20 Brazil and Thailand have eff ectively 
used compulsory licensing to meet the needs of their respective national 
health programs (I will discuss their eff orts shortly). Yet despite work-
ing within the TRIPS framework, these countries have been sued by 
multinationals and pressured and threatened by Western governments 
for defending the rights of their citizens against Big Pharma. In short, 
the “one- size- fi ts- all” approach to patent law threatens democracy itself.
from market failure to moral failure
The current international regime governing access to medicines must 
be fundamentally reconsidered. The fi rst step, which the World Health 
Organization and other international actors have recently begun, is to re-
evaluate whether patents really are the best or even a good comprehensive 
innovation policy. As we have seen, the evidence suggests grave limits to 
relying solely on patents to promote innovation that benefi ts rich and poor 
alike. In the next section I outline some important alternative innovation 
policies that may do a better job of promoting medical research relevant to 
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the poor, and which ought to facilitate generic drug production enough to 
bring medicines within reach of the poor. In this section I consider how 
the very means for evaluating the eff ectiveness and justness of our patent 
regime must also expand beyond simply calculating outputs.
We have been here before. In 1971, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
declared that property rights could not stand in the way of the health 
and well- being of the poor. In State v. Shack, a farmer employed migrant 
workers for his seasonal needs, housing them at a camp on his property. 
Defendant Tejeres sought out a migrant worker who needed the removal 
of twenty- eight sutures. Shack, an attorney, sought to discuss a legal 
problem with another migrant worker. Tejeres and Shack insisted on 
delivering their aid and information to the workers in the privacy of the 
workers’ living quarters. When they entered the property, however, the 
owner called on a state trooper to evict them. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that the owner’s rights in his land could not “stand between 
the migrant workers and those who would aid them.” 21 Memorably, the 
court declared: “Property rights serve human values.” 22
State v. Shack sits fi rmly in the property law canon. It represents 
property law’s “social enlightenment”—the recognition that in a complex 
and increasingly interconnected society, property rights will inevitably 
confl ict with other vital interests, from the property rights of others, to 
health, to speech, to civil rights. And like landlord/tenant cases such as 
Javins v. First National Realty Corp., which responded to the civil rights 
struggles of the previous decade, Shack paid heed to social facts about the 
plight of migrant farmworkers. The court in Shack was openly moved by 
governmental recognition of the poor living and social conditions of the 
nearly one million migrant farmworkers arriving as seasonal workers 
to the United States. The court noted that private property rights could 
not be used to prevent this “highly disadvantaged segment” of society, 
which was “rootless and isolated . . . unorganized and without economic 
or political power,” from accessing the assistance to which the state held 
they were entitled.23
Fast- forward thirty years: in the new millennium, the world’s atten-
tion has again turned to poverty and social relations between the fi rst and 
third worlds. Today, the Internet and digital technology enable informa-
tion to trespass legal and technical barriers, and social workers such as 
Doctors Without Borders seek to bring medicines to those suff ering from 
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AIDS and other illnesses in the third world. Again, property rights would 
stop them, although this time they are copyrights and patents rather than 
rights in land. And again, we witness a social movement articulating 
fundamental rights to health and well- being—and the tragedy of property 
rights thwarting them. This movement has gathered pace since poor coun-
tries signed onto TRIPS in 1995, which, again, requires all WTO member 
states to recognize patents in everything from medicines to seeds.
Today, estimates are that approximately ten million people die need-
lessly every year because they cannot access existing essential medicines 
and vaccines. The WTO has recognized this humanitarian crisis and, to 
its credit, has declared that the TRIPS agreement must be interpreted 
in a way to protect public health and promote development. Recognizing 
“the gravity of the public health problems affl  icting many developing and 
least- developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics,” 24 in November 2001, with 
the commencement of the “Development Round” of World Trade Orga-
nization negotiations, member countries adopted the groundbreaking 
“Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.” The “Doha 
Declaration” unequivocally holds that patent rights cannot trump the 
rights of millions of people to health and dignity, or the rights of states 
to meet the humanitarian needs of their peoples. Signifi cantly, it clari-
fi es that TRIPS “does not and should not prevent members from taking 
measures to protect public health.” 25
The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health comes closest to 
off ering a State v. Shack for intellectual property. Affi  rming that TRIPS 
“can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner . . . to 
protect public health and . . . to promote access to medicines for all,” 26 the 
Doha Declaration began a process of social enlightenment of intellectual 
property. With it, the WTO announces that intellectual property, too, 
serves human values. The declaration acknowledges that incentives are 
necessary to stimulate pharmaceutical production because they enable the 
drug companies to recoup their research and development costs, but it also 
recognizes that the strict patent regime imposed by TRIPS—twenty- year 
terms on patents in all technologies—will lead to hikes in the prices of 
drugs and limited access to life- saving treatments for the poorest people. 
The Doha Declaration reaffi  rms that developing countries can exercise 
fl exibilities built into the TRIPS agreement to meet the public health 
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needs of their citizens, in particular highlighting that any member state 
has a right to grant compulsory licenses on medicines—essentially re-
verting that country’s patent law to pre- TRIPS days—so as to allow the 
production or importation of cheap generic drugs. The declaration assures 
that each member state has “the freedom to determine the grounds upon 
which such licenses are granted”—stipulating that this includes but is 
not limited to cases of national or medical emergency—and there is no 
exhaustive list as to which diseases can be treated.27
Furthermore, the Doha Declaration recognized that not all coun-
tries were equally positioned to issue compulsory licenses. Noting “that 
WTO members with insuffi  cient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector could face diffi  culties in making eff ective use of 
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement,” the Doha Declaration 
recognized that the least developed nations are dependent on other coun-
tries, like India, for the supply of cheap generic drugs.28 The declaration 
directs the TRIPS Council to ensure that countries can use compulsory 
licenses not only to produce drugs, but also to import them, and a subse-
quent amendment to the TRIPS agreement in 2005 sought to promote 
just this sort of endeavor (although the eff ectiveness of this amendment 
is as yet unclear, as I will discuss shortly).29
The Doha call for limiting patent holders’ rights in drugs to accom-
modate public health crises cannot be explained by traditional law and 
economics analysis. The Doha Declaration permits compulsory licenses 
to correct a moral failure, not a market failure. If only economics are con-
sidered, there is no failure: medicines are already reaching those needy 
people willing and able to pay. According to such logic, it is perfectly fi ne 
that nearly the entire continent of Africa is priced out of some drugs. 
But the Doha Declaration makes a diff erent assessment, arguing that 
intellectual property holders’ rights do not include the ability to preclude 
access to essential medications for millions.
I off er State v. Shack as an important precedent, but not as a per-
fect analogue. Furthermore, I recognize that in intellectual property law 
circles there is understandable discomfort with the property metaphor. 
Property rights are relative in theory but absolute in the popular con-
sciousness. Even so, today intellectual property rights may be limited in 
theory, but they are succumbing to a more absolutist conception in fact. 
The social movement to limit intellectual property rights to serve human 
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values confronts the increasing absolutism of intellectual property rights. 
The movement also calls attention to the need to analyze intellectual 
property in various contexts: when a life depends on immediate access 
to essential medicines, for example, twenty- year patents are perpetual. 
Most importantly, the social movement to bring essential medicines to 
the poor harbors all the same basic insights of Shack: it recognizes that 
the poor are disparately aff ected by intellectual property rights, that there 
is a real and growing confl ict between the fundamental right to health 
and claims of intellectual property, and that intellectual property rights 
may be respected without sacrifi cing other fundamental values. To that 
end, and as mentioned earlier, the Doha Declaration clarifi es that TRIPS 
allows for each member state to grant compulsory licenses in the event 
of a national emergency or a public health crisis—that is, the right of a 
state to impose a license on an essential drug for a “reasonable royalty” 
to the patent owner.
Unfortunately, in the decade since the adoption of the Doha Dec-
laration, several fi rst- world members of the World Trade Organization 
have taken actions against the spirit of the agreement, threatening the 
ability of developing countries to reconcile their TRIPS obligations with 
their constitutional and democratic commitments to the health and well- 
being of their people. The United States and the European Union have 
entered into bilateral free trade agreements with developing countries 
that impose intellectual property obligations more stringent than those 
in TRIPS (called “TRIPS- Plus”). In addition, countries such as Brazil and 
Thailand, which have exercised compulsory licenses wholly consistent 
with the TRIPS agreement, have nevertheless been criticized and threat-
ened with trade sanctions for doing so. In the face of such pressures, it is 
worth reviewing some of the strategies available to developing countries 
seeking to improve access to medicines post- TRIPS.
strategies for promoting global public health
Patents have proven to be a poor mechanism for distributing and deliver-
ing drugs that treat common diseases, such as AIDS or cancer, to those 
too poor to pay. Patents have also proven to be inadequate tools for spur-
ring research into what are known as neglected diseases, such as malaria 
and tuberculosis, which predominantly affl  ict the poor. As the economist 
Jagdish Bhagwati puts it, the market- based intellectual property system 
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has thus far failed because in poor countries there is “need but no eff ec-
tive demand,” where demand is defi ned as willingness and ability to pay.30 
What tools are available to help address the gaps in access and incentives 
produced by the current legal and policy environment?
Access- Enhancing Tools
Compulsory licenses. The Doha Declaration recognizes that countries have 
the “right to grant compulsory licenses,” and “the freedom to determine 
the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.” 31 In fact, the decla-
ration simply reaffi  rmed nations’ rights already outlined in the TRIPS 
agreement. In particular, article 31 of the TRIPS agreement allows mem-
ber states to grant compulsory licenses to authorize the making of generic 
drugs in the event of “national emergency” or “extreme urgency,” or in 
the context of “public non- commercial use” 32—that is, where a govern-
ment distributes medicines under a national health policy. In all three 
cases, TRIPS requires governments to fi rst engage patent holders, for a 
reasonable amount of time, in negotiations over drug pricing. Yet this 
requirement may be waived at the discretion of the member state.33 No-
tably, and contrary to popular perception, the TRIPS agreement does not 
limit states’ use of compulsory licenses to any particular diseases, such 
as HIV/AIDS or malaria. Neither does TRIPS direct that compulsory 
licenses may be used only to access “essential” or “life- saving drugs.” 
To the contrary, member states have broad fl exibility to use compulsory 
licenses to meet their public health needs as they themselves determine 
these needs. The declaration reaffi  rms “the right of WTO Members to 
use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide 
fl exibility for this purpose.” 34
In 2007 the Thai government sought to exercise these fl exibilities to 
meet its obligations under its national health plan. Thailand’s national 
health scheme covers 80 percent of its total population—that is, some 63 
million people. Like most low- and middle- income countries, Thailand’s 
number one killer is not AIDS, but heart disease. Using the discretion 
aff orded to its government under TRIPS, Thai authorities issued a com-
pulsory license on the antiplatelet drug clopidogrel, which is used to treat 
heart disease. With the compulsory license, the drug price fell from two 
dollars a pill to two cents per pill—a savings of 99 percent. This is far 
lower than any discounted price the government would have been able to 
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negotiate with the patent owner. Thailand also issued compulsory licenses 
to authorize generic production of the heart medication Plavix and the 
AIDS drug Kaletra. Uproar from Western governments ensued. Critics 
argued that compulsory licenses ought to be limited to AIDS drugs alone. 
But in fact no such limitation exists under TRIPS. In fact, the World 
Health Organization has recognized heart disease as the leading cause 
of death for adults, with 80 percent of these deaths occurring in low- 
and middle- income countries. The Thai government was simply acting 
to meet the public health needs of the Thai people. Furthermore, Thai 
democracy is itself at stake—Thailand’s constitution guarantees citizens 
an “equal right” to receive health services. Thus while a small minority 
of Thai citizens can and do pay the monopoly drug prices charged in the 
developed world, the vast majority of the nation’s people must depend on 
the state for their health care, including medicines.
For such compulsory licenses to be eff ective, of course, there must be 
a generic drug industry ready to make the drug. In the case of clopidogrel, 
there was robust competition among generic drug makers in India, be-
cause India did not recognize drug patents when the drug was introduced 
in 1987. As a result, more than forty Indian fi rms were producing the 
drug in 2007, and fi erce competition among them forced the drug price 
down dramatically.35 The scope for continued generic production of new 
drugs introduced after 2005 remains unclear because of international 
patent obligations. But as we will see, governments like India and Brazil 
have nonetheless sought to limit new patents by adopting high patent-
ability standards as well as procedures for contesting patent applications, 
all within the framework of TRIPS. The leaders of these countries hope 
to exclude from patentability those innovations that are not truly novel 
and thus preserve room for continued generic drug production, albeit on 
a more limited basis.
Brazil has also taken a lead in using or threatening to use compul-
sory licenses to provide access to medicines for its citizens. The Brazilian 
government is recognized the world over for its public health program to 
combat AIDS—the state provides free treatment to all who need it. An 
estimated 600,000 Brazilians are infected with AIDS, and the nation’s 
program is credited with maintaining the life of some 170,000 AIDS 
patients annually. But the government has only been able to meet the 
public health needs of its citizens through the repeated use or threat of 
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compulsory licenses on patented AIDS drugs. In recent years the coun-
try’s president has himself issued a compulsory license on AIDS drugs 
in the hopes of treating affl  icted Brazilian patients.
Some express the concern that compulsory licensing will adversely 
aff ect pharmaceutical companies’ incentives. Generic drug prices avail-
able under compulsory licenses are certainly far lower than specially ne-
gotiated prices with drug companies would be. Yet studies suggest that 
the incentive eff ect of compulsory licenses on drug companies is in fact 
negligible because profi ts from poor populations in countries such as 
Thailand and Brazil rarely enter into Big Pharma’s expected profi t calcu-
lations in the fi rst place. By and large, Big Pharma ignores these markets 
altogether, catering only to the rich minority populations in these places. 
As James Love, an advocate for global access to medicines, argues, there is 
little to no incentive eff ect of using compulsory licenses “where consump-
tion of high priced patented medicines [is] basically zero.” 36 This was the 
case for Plavix in Thailand—the drug simply was not available to those 
under the national health scheme—and has been the case for AIDS drugs 
in Thailand, Brazil, and South Africa. Love concludes, “In these and in 
countless other cases, the harm from the lack of access is huge, and the 
incentive eff ects are incredibly small. These empirical realities are quite 
important in evaluating the trade- off s.” 37
It is important to note here that compulsory licenses are in fact a com-
mon tool used in the context of patents even in the developed world; they 
are by no means limited to use by the developing world. The U.S. govern-
ment has famously issued compulsory licenses—from the early twentieth 
century when it broke the Wright Brothers’ patent in the airplane in order 
to build fl eets of planes during World War I, to the beginning of the new 
millennium when it threatened to break the pharmaceutical company 
Bayer’s patent in the medication Cipro during the anthrax scare. Notably, 
the U.S. Supreme Court recently opened the door even further to compul-
sory licenses with its 2006 opinion in the case of eBay v. MercExchange. 
The Court in that case held that a fi nding of patent infringement does 
not automatically demand an injunction to stop infringement. In cases 
where equity demands it, a compulsory license may be the better remedy. 
In the United States, compulsory licenses have been invoked to balance 
the equities and further the public interest, even where incentives and 
markets would be substantially aff ected.
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Compulsory licenses for least developed countries. TRIPS Article 31(f) 
requires that compulsory licenses be used for the supply of a country’s 
“domestic market” only.38 Yet as the Doha Declaration recognized, the 
least- developed countries could not take advantage of the compulsory 
licensing provisions in TRIPS because they lack the manufacturing capa-
bility to produce generics in their home countries. As mentioned earlier, 
in 2003 the WTO temporarily resolved this conundrum through a waiver 
agreement allowing countries such as India to use compulsory licenses for 
export markets as well. But the waiver (now an amendment to the TRIPS 
agreement) has so far largely failed to move drugs to the poorest coun-
tries—indeed, to date it has only been invoked one time. In 2007 Rwanda 
issued a compulsory license to import an AIDS drug manufactured by a 
Canadian pharmaceutical company; per the waiver’s procedural require-
ments, Canada also issued a compulsory license to produce and export 
the drug. Such cumbersome procedures—requiring both the exporting 
and importing countries to issue compulsory licenses—have stalled the 
eff ective use of this tool by some of the countries that need it the most.
High patentability standards and progressive procedures. The success 
of compulsory licensing depends on having countries that can produce 
generic drugs. The Indian Patent Act of 1970 allowed India to produce 
generic drugs for its own population and for the rest of the developing 
world. But the introduction into all WTO countries of TRIPS standards, 
which went into eff ect in 2005 in all but the least developed countries, 
puts considerable pressure on generic drug industries in countries like 
India. Since that date, India has had to recognize patents in novel and 
nonobvious processes and products in all fi elds of technology. In amending 
its patent law in 2005 to be TRIPS compliant, however, Indian legislators 
wisely introduced progressive provisions into its law—both substantive 
and procedural—that maximize their ability to reject non- novel patents, 
thus opening the door to future generic medicines. For instance, one 
important substantive provision in India’s new patent law is section 3(d), 
which prohibits a practice pejoratively known as “evergreening,” where 
drug companies seek to extend the life of current patented products by 
seeking to patent slight modifi cations to existing drugs. A common ever-
greening practice, for example, is to seek a patent on a salt form of a drug. 
Salt forms typically have no added therapeutic value, but they do extend 
the shelf life of a drug. Brazil has a similar provision against evergreen-
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ing in its new patent law, and recently both Brazil and India have rejected 
patents on various “new” fi rst- and second- line HIV treatments, arguing 
that the patent applications showed no improved therapeutic eff ect.
An important procedural addition to India’s amended patent law is its 
provision for both pre- grant and post- grant opposition to a patent. Notably, 
“any person” can challenge either a patent application before it is granted, 
or a patent after it is granted. Brazilian patent law has similar provisions. 
These procedural rules have opened the door for civil society groups such 
as patients’ rights advocates to directly challenge patents that aff ect mil-
lions of lives. The combination of the anti- evergreening provision and 
pre- grant opposition has led to some notable successes in both India and 
Brazil. A recent case brought by a coalition of AIDS patients to the Delhi 
Patent Offi  ce resulted in a statement by the patent offi  ce that it must “give 
a strict interpretation of patentability criteria” because a decision in this 
matter “shall aff ect the fate of people suff ering from HIV/AIDS for want 
of essential medicine.” 39 In 2007 Novartis sought an Indian patent in 
imatinib mesylate, a salt form of imatinib, a cancer drug that sold under 
the brand name Gleevec. There, too, a plaintiff  group representing can-
cer patients challenged the law under section 3(d), and in June 2009 the 
Indian Intellectual Property Appellate Board rejected the patent, holding 
that Novartis was unable to show increased “effi  cacy” in the salt form. An 
Indian high court also held that the new patent act must be interpreted 
in such a way as to uphold India’s constitutional right to health.
Improved technical assistance. The Doha Declaration extends the date 
of implementation to 2016 for the world’s least developed countries. If 
such countries have not already recognized patents in pharmaceutical 
drugs, they have until 2016 to enact legislation recognizing such patents. 
Despite this safety hatch, however, the United States and other countries 
have pressured some least developed countries to hasten their adoption 
of patents for drugs.40
An important step for preserving access to medicines in these poorest 
countries of the world is for intellectual property authorities, particularly 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), to provide balanced 
“technical assistance” to the developing and least developed countries 
regarding how they can tailor their intellectual property systems to pro-
mote local developmental needs while still complying with TRIPS. The 
new patent laws in Brazil and India, with their anti- evergreening and 
201111 Pass 3 press.indd   193 2/10/12   2:23 PM
194 an issue of life or death
patent opposition procedures, may serve as models for progressive patent 
legislation in this regard.
Leveraging publicly funded research to promote the public interest. Eight 
years ago, several Yale University students turned an insight into a tool 
that could promote access to medicines for millions. They recognized that 
a patent held by Yale University on a crucial AIDS drug could be used as 
leverage to force downstream pharmaceutical companies to ensure access 
to the drugs in poor countries. The students’ insight was this: universities, 
which are openly dedicated to serving the public interest, are important 
players in the access- to- drugs dilemma. As a matter of fact, university 
research is essential to drug development. A U.S. Senate committee report 
in 2000 found that university research was “instrumental” in developing 
fi fteen out of the twenty- one drugs considered by experts to have had the 
highest therapeutic impact.41
Recognizing that research universities with patentable knowledge 
were a powerful tool, the students launched a student movement known 
as Universities Allied for Essential Medicines, or UAEM. As part of this 
movement, they also developed an even more powerful tool—called the 
Equitable Access License (EAL)—that universities can use to negotiate ac-
cess rights for the poor when they sell or license their patents in upstream 
research to private drug companies, which in turn use this knowledge 
to develop medicines. The EAL proposes that universities license their 
knowledge to private companies in exchange for an agreement that third 
parties can engage in generic drug production in developing countries, 
regardless of those countries’ patent laws or whether the owner of the 
drug fi les a patent in those countries. Just as in the copyright fi eld law-
yers have shown how, through the use of Creative Commons licenses, 
copyright owners can donate portions of their works to the public (for 
example, for noncommercial use), UAEM encourages universities to use 
licenses to enable generic drug production in the developing world, much 
as was done prior to TRIPS.
Rolling back TRIPS. The TRIPS agreement has a distasteful history. It 
is now well known and accepted that the TRIPS agreement was not freely 
negotiated between the developing and developed world, but rather was a 
result of coercion and a WTO bargaining process that lacked transparency 
and favored a privileged few. A common critique of the agreement—that 
intellectual property rights disproportionately favor knowledge- rich coun-
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tries and disfavor knowledge- poor countries—is bearing out in the fl ows 
of cash from the developing world to the developed world after TRIPS 
was signed. In 1999 alone, well before full compliance with TRIPS was 
mandatory, the developing world paid some $7.5 billion more in royalties 
and license fees than it received. In short, TRIPS triggered a massive 
transfer of wealth from poorer to richer states. Worse still, “TRIPS- plus” 
standards imposed by bilateral free trade agreements impose intellectual 
property obligations on countries well beyond those set out in the TRIPS 
agreement, obligations that have cut signifi cantly into the fl exibilities 
provided in TRIPS. Brazil, for example, was pressured into recognizing 
drug patents even before 2005, the deadline given it by the TRIPS agree-
ment, and its government spent approximately $420 million in higher 
drug prices between 2001 and 2005 because of the preponement. Not sur-
prisingly, Brazilian civic groups are challenging the validity of this law.42
Innovation- Centered Tools
Thus far I have considered mechanisms for promoting access to existing 
medicines under the current international patent system. But access is 
only part of the problem of our current exclusive reliance on patents for 
promoting innovation. The patent system has also failed to incentivize 
socially benefi cial innovation where there are no eff ective markets—that 
is, where the poor have a need but are unable to pay to meet it. As more 
and more economists, philosophers, and legal experts have come to recog-
nize this glaring gap in global innovation policy, highlighting the world’s 
“missing knowledge,” alternatives to patents for promoting socially bene-
fi cial innovation are emerging.
Prizes. Government- awarded prizes would be funded by taxpayers in 
the developed world and would be targeted to addressing pressing social 
needs, such as the need to cure the neglected diseases of the poor. Prize 
systems have several immediate benefi ts over patents. First, R&D for drug 
innovation would be delinked from drug price. Government- sponsored 
prizes would incentivize innovation and compensate drug companies for 
conducting research and holding clinical trials as part of their eff orts to 
treat neglected diseases. Such a system may prove cheaper than the patent 
system, because the prize would be calculated to reward social benefi t in 
terms of lives saved or enhanced, unlike a patent system that arbitrarily 
allows drug owners to charge monopoly prices for the period of the patent, 
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regardless of social cost or benefi t. Second, payment would not fall on the 
sick themselves (a double burden on the sick poor) but would come from 
better- off  citizens in the developing world. While some would object, argu-
ing that prizes create a tax on the rich to benefi t the poor (and worse still, 
that this tax is to benefi t foreigners), this is in fact not unlike the current 
patent system, where R&D is largely funded by citizens in the developed 
world. Third, prizes help to more closely direct innovation that is socially 
benefi cial and addresses unmet needs—unlike patents, which currently 
skew incentives to favor therapies for the rich (like cures for baldness) 
over other therapies. Finally, prizes are a good tool for promoting access 
to medicines. Unlike patents, which create exclusive rights and monopoly 
prices that few can aff ord, developers of new drugs under a prize system 
would receive a lump- sum reward and no exclusive rights to control price, 
leaving the medicines themselves to be free for generic production and 
thus facilitating widespread access to them. Medicines developed under 
a prize regime would be owned by the people.
Granted, there are serious concerns about prizes, and some areas 
in which prizes do not signifi cantly present an improvement over the 
patent system. Both patents and prizes, for example, introduce potential 
redundancy of eff orts among competing fi rms, whereby too many fi rms 
work toward the same goal, but with the possibility of only one winner. 
The question of how to reward follow- on inventors is also diffi  cult under 
both patent and prize systems. But these hurdles may be overcome. The 
legal scholars William Fisher and Talha Syed suggest, for example, cap-
ping the number of fi rms permitted to work simultaneously on a disease 
treatment.43 Finally, there is the diffi  cult question of what research to 
incentivize with a prize. The patent system does not require state coor-
dination of innovation—private companies determine what to research. 
Surely we ought to be concerned about the myopia of states with respect 
to directing innovation too closely. But a prize system alongside a patent 
system would at least help states direct innovation toward social causes 
that are clearly both desirable and overlooked by the current patent system.
Patent pools. I have mentioned the lack of pediatric AIDS drugs be-
cause Big Pharma sees no eff ective market for them—yet another example 
of what the World Health Organization calls the “missing knowledge” 
that gets passed over by the market- based intellectual property system. 
Patents pose a further burden in such cases because follow- on creators are 
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stymied by the existence of patent thickets, where overlapping patents in 
the underlying technology exist and must be overcome in order to develop 
a pediatric drug. In the case of a patent thicket, even if a subsequent drug 
developer sought to license technology from one or two patent holders, 
they would still face potential lawsuits from several other patent holders
—and thus may back down from their eff ort completely. To address such 
patent thickets with respect to AIDS therapies and pediatric doses, in 
particular, UNITAID, a French health funding agency, has established a 
patent pool of the key pharmaceutical companies holding AIDS treatment 
technologies. With the aid of groups such as Doctors Without Borders, 
UNITAID has publicly asked nine companies to contribute patents for 
twenty- one products and their combinations into a pool to facilitate re-
search for fi xed- dose therapies and pediatric treatments. Like in a typical 
patent pool, relevant patent holders agree to license their technologies to 
both facilitate innovation and generate revenue. Royalty fees go to a pool 
manager, who divides the proceeds among the pool members. Thus far, 
the U.S. National Institutes of Health and Gilead Sciences have donated 
patents to the pool.
A Health Impact Fund. A recent proposal by philosopher Thomas 
Pogge and economist Aidan Hollis seeks to enhance pro- poor medical 
care through a market- based solution. Their proposed Health Impact 
Fund would create a fund from donations from world governments—ide-
ally, every government would contribute .03 percent of their gross national 
income to the fund. Firms that register a patent with the fund agree to 
sell their drug globally at cost, in exchange for a share of the fund, for a 
limited period, in proportion to the drug’s assessed health benefi t. The 
guaranteed benefi ts from the fund would serve as a market incentive to 
Big Pharma to develop novel drugs for the poor; at the same time, the 
fund’s commitment to at- cost distribution would provide access to the new 
medicines for the poor. While the Health Impact Fund has been widely 
praised and is getting serious attention in global circles, some concerns 
about the fund remain, including whether the potentially high costs of 
the fund are the best way for nations to spend their money.
In 1952 Jonas Salk developed the world’s fi rst safe and eff ective polio vac-
cine. Today it seems unthinkable to innovate without the promise of a 
patent, but just sixty years ago, one of the most important humanitarian 
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innovations of the twentieth century was the result of the tireless commit-
ment of Salk, a medical researcher at Pennsylvania State University who 
labored single- mindedly for seven years with the sole purpose of playing 
a signifi cant role in the eradication of a global plague. That year polio had 
reached its height in the United States, aff ecting some 52,000 people. The 
most famous victim of the disease was President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
who initiated an organization focused on developing a cure for the disease. 
What inspired Salk’s innovation was not the dream of a property right, 
but rather an eleemosynary interest in applying his ingenuity to better-
ing humankind. When a television news reporter asked him whether he 
owned the patent in the vaccine, a mystifi ed Salk replied, “Who owns the 
patent? The people do.” Salk could not imagine claiming an exclusive 
right on knowledge so important to humanity, replying, “Could you pat-
ent the sun?” Since then, hundreds of millions of people have received a 
polio vaccine, and today, the disease has been largely eradicated.
Our theories of innovation and creativity matter. Our two- dimensional 
theory of intellectual- property- as- incentives has, in just several decades’ 
time, come to infl uence the way many scientists and artists alike engage 
the world. Standing in sharp relief from the public commitment and 
meaningful work of Salk sixty years ago, today many do not think twice 
about the claims from Big Pharma that they will not innovate at all, or 
worse still, that they will not share their drugs in markets like Thailand 
that issue compulsory licenses. We need to probe these incentive argu-
ments on their own terms. In fact, the evidence shows that patents off er no 
incentive for developing drugs for neglected diseases that predominantly 
affl  ict the poor. Additionally, compulsory licenses in developing countries 
do little harm to innovation, because drug companies do not sell to those 
markets in the fi rst place. But the problem lies much deeper than this. The 
legal philosopher Seana Shiff rin condemns a legal system that condones 
a situation where “talented people ransom their talents, withholding their 
creative products in order to demand greater compensation.” Shiff rin 
asks whether a legal system that acquiesces to such immoral demands 
is not itself unjust.44
A one- size- fi ts- all patent system for drugs in the developing world 
is unjust on additional grounds, beyond incentives. Patents that impede 
access to the poor thwart both local democracy and human development. 
Nations must have the freedom to democratically construct patent poli-
201111 Pass 3 press.indd   198 2/10/12   2:23 PM
an issue of life or death 199
cies to meet their humanitarian needs. For centuries countries had this 
freedom—nations from Germany to Switzerland took advantage of their 
freedom to ignore patents and copy freely knowledge that came from other 
parts of the globe. Indeed, the self- determination to construct one’s own 
patent law refl ects more than a simple utilitarian calculus to promote 
indigenous innovation. Patent policy aff ects the ability of a country to 
stand on its own two feet, independent of foreign knowledge and industry.
Economists call the millions of people who need a drug but cannot 
aff ord it “dead weight loss.” But the millions who die needlessly because 
of the patent system are more than an ineffi  ciency in the system. This 
loss of human lives fundamentally thwarts human development at the 
most basic level. Furthermore, lack of access to essential medicines is 
patently unjust because it is preventable. Wholly unlike physical property, 
which will naturally lose its value if overrun by large numbers, the unique 
property of knowledge is that its value is not diminished by greater use—far 
from it, the knowledge value only grows as it is used by more people, in 
additional, diff erent ways. As Thomas Jeff erson wrote so eloquently centu-
ries ago, “He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself 
without lessening mine, as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light 
without darkening me.” 45 We must both adopt alternative mechanisms for 
developing and distributing medicines to the poor (including prizes), and 
fully support the use of compulsory licenses by developing countries to 
treat their sick poor. Patent law cannot draw the line at rectifying market 
failure. Our law must contend with moral failure as well.
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this is a book about bricolage— how we create our lives from the 
diverse range of material around us. The creation of a book is no diff erent, 
and for each page I can recall the varied conversations with colleagues, ex-
changes with my students, and experiences with my children that shaped 
the contents herein. Popular culture and politics, too, profoundly aff ected 
this work. During the writing of this book, the United States elected its 
fi rst black president, after a campaign that employed YouTube and social 
networks. Decades-long dictatorships in the Middle East were brought to 
their knees by Internet activists informing and coordinating those who 
marched in the streets. Michael Jackson died. I joined Facebook. And my 
babies began growing up, working their way through the fantasy world of 
Winnie the Pooh and later, Harry Potter. I watched them build new worlds 
with wood blocks, Legos, and the Wii. So much has changed even during 
their short lives so far. While my daughter’s fi rst word was “dog,” my son’s 
fi rst word just a few years later was “pbskids.org.”
I was traveling for much of the writing of this book, because my 
husband and I were invited to be visiting law professors at the Yale Law 
School and the University of Chicago Law School. Traveling, as James 
Cliff ord suggests, can be culturally productive. My encounters with the 
faculty and students of the Yale Law School were particularly helpful as 
I began formulating this book. It was a lunch conversation with Bruce 
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Ackerman that pointed me toward Habermas and a chat with Jack Balkin 
that led me to conclude, in his words, that “Kant Can’t Dance”—that is, 
that modern social theory has not adequately taken account of dance 
and cultural performance. So Michael Jackson and Jack Balkin together 
infl uenced sections on dance in this book. (Talk about a mash-up.) Jack’s 
helpful observation, and reminder, that this is a book about “culture, 
not intellectual property” provided a valuable guidepost throughout my 
journey. Bob Ellickson counseled against the narcissism of the new “i” 
and “My” generation, keeping me alert to the repercussions, good and 
bad, of Web 2.0. Akhil Amar and Amy Chua gave generous advice about 
book publishing. Laura DeNardis, Lea Shaver, and the Yale Information 
Society Project (ISP) provided a wonderful intellectual breeding ground 
for the early days of this project. Harold Koh, then dean of the Yale Law 
School, continues to be a mentor extraordinaire.
At the University of Chicago, I had the fortune to work with Martha 
Nussbaum, whose scholarship has long been an intellectual inspiration. 
Martha’s imprint can be seen throughout this book—not just her theory 
of human capabilities, but also her engagement with dance, music, and 
drama as a vehicle to freedom and equality. She generously read several 
chapters and has advised me on many levels throughout the writing of 
this book. We discussed Rawls and Habermas on the top of Mount Ta-
malpais, and performance theory on the Tahoe Rim Trail. Emily Buss 
heightened my sensitivity to copyright’s eff ects on children, and conver-
sations with her led me to study more closely the relevance of theories of 
child development to intellectual property law. The manuscript started 
to take real shape in Chicago and I gained tremendously from the critical 
insights of so many on the faculty there, especially Daniel Abebe, Rosalind 
Dixon, Lee Ann Fennel, Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Huq, Saul Levmore, Richard 
McAdams, Randy Picker, Julie Roin, Adam Samaha, Omri Ben-Shahar, 
Lior Strahilevitz, and David Weisbach. Jonathan Masur’s invitation to 
host a mob blog debate on the University of Chicago Law faculty blog on 
“cultural versus economic theories of intellectual property” gave me a 
further opportunity to explore and develop the broad themes of the book 
with invited scholars, including Robert Merges of UC Berkeley, Rochelle 
Dreyfuss of NYU, Graeme Dinwoodie of Oxford, and Mario Biagioli—
then of Harvard, now my colleague at UC Davis. All of these wonderful 
interlocutors helped me to revise and refi ne my arguments.
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It was back at my home, at the UC Davis School of Law, where I fi nally 
fi nished this book. I am grateful to my colleagues at UC Davis, who have 
made the Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall an exceptional intellectual envi-
ronment for me. I cannot imagine a dean more supportive than Kevin 
Johnson. My beloved colleague, the late Keith Aoki, was a constant source 
of ideas and support. If I had only known my time with him would be so 
limited, I would have spent every day talking to him to learn from that 
brilliant mind. Tom Joo did the Herculean task of closely and critically 
reading a number of draft chapters, for which I am so thankful. Peter Lee 
is always ready to chat about IP, and Jack Ayer and Joel Dobris provide me 
a constant stream of fresh examples from the news and the Net. Mario 
Biagioli’s arrival at UC Davis, and with him a new Center for Science and 
Innovation Studies (CSIS), has had a transformative eff ect already on our 
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Marisol de la Cadena, Joe Dumit, and Kriss Ravetto. Kelly Twibell at the 
Center for Child and Family Studies at UC Davis supplied insights into 
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Above all, this book is a conversation with my mentors and colleagues 
in the intellectual property academy, to whom I owe my greatest debt. 
Indeed, the book began the day in 2006 when Larry Lessig asked me 
to write a paper refl ecting on the ten-year anniversary of James Boyle’s 
public domain scholarship. The paper I wrote for that celebratory event, 
“Cultural Environmentalism @ 10,” held at the Stanford Law School, 
appears here as Chapter 5. The gathering was a veritable “Who’s Who” 
of intellectual property scholars and I gained much from my exchanges 
there, especially those with Yochai Benkler, Jamie Boyle, Maggie Chon, 
Terry Fisher, Mark Lemley, and Peggy Radin. The infl uences of all of 
these giants in the fi eld can be seen throughout this book.
Maggie Chon, Anupam Chander, and I were together in Geneva in 
2007 when the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) adopted 
a revolutionary “development agenda” to reorient its practice to promote 
human development. I have learned much from both of them about the 
meaning of development, as I have also learned from James Love and 
Thiru Balasubramaniam of Knowledge Ecology International, who kindly 
allowed us access to WIPO during this critical period. Intellectual prop-
erty scholars in India have also become my colleagues over this period, 
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in particular Anil Gupta, V. K. Unni, Sudhir Krishnaswamy, and V. C. 
Vivekanandan.
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and for this I thank especially Jade Eaton, Doug Lichtman, and Jennifer 
Rothman.
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and friends have been a constant source of encouragement—and my 
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